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Beyond the water's edge: U.S. expatriates and the Vietnam antiwar movement

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BEYOND THE WATER'S EDGE: U.S. EXPATRIATES AND THE VIETNAM ANTIWAR MOVEMENT

by

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CERTIFICATE OF APPROVAL

PH.D. THESIS

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To Heather, Michelle, and Margaret

Proper criticism of a national policy certainly does not stop at the water's edge. Nor does patriotism begin at the water's edge.

Eugene McCarthy, "Speech on Dissent and Patriotism," January, 16 1968

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ABSTRACT

This dissertation examines the contributions and significance of U.S. expatriates in Great Britain, West Germany, France, and Canada to the Vietnam antiwar movement. Utilizing archives of several expatriate antiwar groups, the personal papers of prominent expatriate activists, and the U.S. government, I argue dissent from this constituency was motivated by a desire to broaden U.S. civil society so that it included the perspectives, insights, and experiences of the highly mobile postwar population and accounted for the reality of its transatlantic empire. Overseas citizens often presented their dissent as patriotic, leaning on a range of national icons and traditions to situate themselves as part of the U.S. community, and, based on their experiences abroad, they claimed a specific expertise, unavailable to most other citizens on matters of foreign policy, international relations, and national security. As such, expats contested how U.S. policymakers used claims of national security and credibility to mobilize the transatlantic public for the war, and instead disseminated alternative interpretations as the basis of their dissent.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AMEX	American Exiles in Canada
AOA	Americans Organized Abroad
APO	Außerparlamentarische Opposition (Extra-Parliamentary Opposition, West Germany New Left)
CAA	Concerned Americans Abroad (formerly Group ’68)
DRV	Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam)
FOR	Fellowship of Reconciliation
FUADR	French Union for American Deserters and Resisters
ICPD	International Committee on Peace and Disarmament
LSE	London School of Economics
MCAA	French Movement Against Atomic Armament
MOBE	National Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam
NLF	National Liberation Front
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organizations
PACS	Paris American Committee to Stop War
PRG	Provisional Revolutionary Government (NLF)
RITA	Resisters Inside The Army
SANE	Committee for Sane Nuclear Policy
SDS	Students for a Democratic Society
SNCC	Student Non-violent Coordinating Committee
TADP	Toronto Anti-Draft Programme
UAEB	Union of American Exiles in Britain

UAEF	Union of American Exiles in France
USIA	United States Information Agency
VMC	Vietnam Moratorium Committee
VSC	Vietnam Solidarity Committee (British Antiwar Organization)
VVAW	Vietnam Veterans Against the War
WRI	War Resisters International

INTRODUCTION
WRITING U.S. EXPATRIATES INTO THE HISTORY OF THE VIETNAM ANTIWAR MOVEMENT

On February 25, 1969, five Americans arrived at the upscale Claridge Hotel in London to deliver a letter to the new U.S. president, Richard M. Nixon, who was in the country on a state visit. The men had been instructed by the Secret Service to leave the letter at the hotel's front desk. Unable to walk to the hotel due to the police cordon set up across the street and the mass of people gathered there, the young Americans hired a taxi to drop them at the front door. Emerging from the car, they greeted the doorman and tried to enter the hotel, only to be intercepted by the U.S. Secret Service and London police officers, who noticed that their long hair, beards, and jeans seemed out of place. As security hustled the men behind the barriers, they confiscated a copy of the letter. Later, when President Nixon arrived at the hotel and walked the rope line, the men made one final time to give him the letter. Harry Pincus, a former Amherst College basketball player, made a fast break through a police cordon and a row of Nixon supporters only to be stopped and have the documents flung into the air, never reaching the president.[1]

The approach in delivering the letter to President Nixon reflected the "politics of the street," which Pincus and his cohort of U.S. expatriates opposed to the Vietnam War had cultivated over the previous four years. Though unorthodox, it embodied an earnest

[1] James Dickerson, *North to Canada: Men and Women Against the Vietnam War* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1999), 97; "Anti-Nixon Demonstrators Clash With Police," *Times* (London), February 25, 1969; "An Open Letter to Richard Nixon," *The American Exile in Britain*, no. 1 (5 March 1969), folder, "Correspondence, 1970, n.d. (ca. 1960s-1972)," Box 6, Papers of Alice and Staughton Lynd, Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Philadelphia, PA (hereafter SCPC); Clancy Sigal, "Diary" *London Review of Books*, 9 October 2008, [http://www.lrb.co.uk/v30/n19/siga01_.html] (accessed 30 June 2009).There is a slight discrepancy in the accounts of this event. Clancy Sigal, a colleague of Pincus's in antiwar circles wrote years later recounting the incident and contended the Nixon protest occurred some time after the free Rolling Stones concert that was held in Hyde Park on July 5, 1969. However, records indicate the President Nixon visited Great Britain twice—once in February 1969 and again on October 3, 1970. However, during the second visit Nixon was in London for only five hours, meeting with the Prime Minster and the Queen at Chequers. Nixon did not stay overnight during this visit. In all likelihood, the event Sigal refers to was the February 1969 event, which included a visit over several days, massive protests and a stay at Claridge's, a detail that Sigal confirms in his story.

attempt to participate in and contribute to national conversations on U.S. foreign policy. Had the president received and read the letter, he would have encountered a critical assessment of U.S. foreign policy rooted in their experience as U.S. citizens overseas:

> You say you have come to Europe to listen and learn. Perhaps you have already learned how much America's name has come to be feared and abused, how much it has come to symbolize napalm and mace rather than justice and hope. We ask you to re-direct American foreign policy so that it respects international law and serves justice. Only when this happens will there be no further reason for the exile and imprisonment of ourselves, our brothers, and our views.[2]

In calling attention to the U.S.'s suffering international reputation, the young Americans in Britain tried to claim a mantle of legitimacy to voice concerns regarding foreign policy in the belief that "all politics are local." U.S. expats in Britain, France, West Germany, and Canada viewed the transatlantic neighborhood in which they lived, worked, and studied, as "local" and one where they gained insights on U.S. foreign relations that were unavailable to the general U.S. public. As the U.S.'s credibility declined due to the war, expats hoped to convey the effects of this tarnished reputation to its elected leaders and raise concerns over their exclusion from the national polity, despite the expectation that expats should serve the homeland's interests and promote the "American Way" while abroad.[3]

As President Johnson had announced his intention to escalate the military conflict in Vietnam, U.S. expatriates registered opposition to the Vietnam War in foreign cities. Americans in Britain Against the War (known as "*Stop-It*"), the Paris American Committee to Stop War (PACS), the U.S. Campaign to End the War in Vietnam (based in West Berlin), and American Exiles in Canada (AMEX), among other groups, served on the front lines of global exchanges about the war. Like other interest groups that

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[2] "An Open Letter to Richard Nixon," *The American Exile in Britain*, no. 1 (5 March 1969), folder, "Correspondence, 1970, n.d. (ca. 1960s-1972)," Box 6, Papers of Alice and Staughton Lynd, SCPC.

[3] Wendy L. Wall, *Inventing the American Way: The Politics of Consensus from the New Deal to the Civil Rights Movement* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 242-247.

mobilized in opposition to the war, expats' concerns were not entirely without attention to their enlightened self-interest. As unofficial representatives of the United States, their lives depended on the pull and tug of their host countries' perceptions and relationship with the U.S. The ability to participate in international organizations and conversations about the war without fear of retribution remained an unfulfilled promise of a nation which promised its citizens security, but required individuals to mobilize for it whether they were present in the U.S. or in the domain of its empire.

My dissertation argues U.S. expatriates' expression of dissent over the Vietnam War signaled an effort to broaden civil society in the United States to include and account for the reality of its transatlantic empire. Expatriates offered a counterpoint to the administration's claims that U.S. credibility was at stake if they abandoned an ally, and showed how the war damaged the prestige and goodwill the country had enjoyed since the Second World War. Through their dissent, expatriates situated themselves between the U.S. government, which had called on its citizens to go abroad to promote the country's interests during the Cold War, and the civil society where ideas, assumptions, attitudes, and claims of U.S. policies were contested and refined. Expats believed their transatlantic vantage point provided a specific expertise unavailable to most other Americans on matters of U.S. foreign policy, international relations, and national security.

Stakes: Expatriates, Cold War Nationalism, and the National Security State

U.S. expatriates' attempts to participate in national conversations and demonstrate expertise on U.S. foreign policy matters during the Vietnam War represented another front where Cold War debates over nationalism and the national security state played out. Cold War nationalism embodied a set of shared assumptions, values, beliefs, myths, and facts about the United States, its citizens, and its global role during the Cold War. In their simplest and distilled form, the values embodied by the "American Way" included a

commitment to democracy, capitalism, equality, and freedom.[4] The values composing U.S. Cold War nationalism were understood to be exceptional and universal. They relied upon contrasts with the Soviet Union to sustain definition and mobilizing power.[5] More importantly, the web of interconnected assumptions and beliefs provided the U.S. public and policymakers with a common language and identity upon which claims, policies, mobilizations, and agendas could be framed and contested.[6] Civic nationalism during the Cold War was elevated to a religion, with accompanying pageants, sermons, and rituals to instill the values of the American Way into the public.[7]

Underwriting this Cold War nationalism was a particular interpretation of national security, deployed by policymakers in the U.S. This definition arose in the wake of previous efforts to mobilize the public for war, particularly during the Second World War. President Franklin Roosevelt justified intervention in World War II as necessary to protect the "Four Freedoms," which he asserted were the basis of U.S. democracy and fundamental human rights. At the dawn of the Cold War, U.S. policymakers maintained the Freedoms as basis for the country's national security, and saw "monsters everywhere" that threatened to destroy this American way of life. Policymakers mobilized the public accordingly and ignored or minimized alternative interpretations of national security.[8]

Within this context, even U.S. expatriates were regarded as another monster that potentially threatened the nation's security. The U.S. government needed its citizens to venture abroad and promote the "universal" and "exceptional" values they believed

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[4] Wall, *Inventing the American Way*, 5-9.

[5] Ibid., 185.

[6] John Fousek, *To Lead the Free World: American Nationalism and the Cultural Roots of the Cold War* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000), 13-15.

[7] Richard M. Fried, *The Russians are Coming! The Russians are Coming!: Pageantry and Patriotism in Cold War America* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), passim.

[8] Andrew Preston, "Monsters Everywhere: A Genealogy of National Security," *Diplomatic History* 38:3 (June 2014), 499-500.

inherent in the American Way as an antidote to totalitarian governments; however, if citizens accepted the credo of American exceptionalism, it begged the question of why anyone would desire to spend significant time overseas. Furthermore, living abroad threatened to make one "less American" or possibly entice them to "go native." Expats might misrepresent American values and become an "ugly American", preventing conversion to the American Way. Worse, everyone overseas was a potential communist dupe who might bring corrupting ideas into the U.S. and serve as a fifth column, toppling the United States from within.

While this dominant Cold War nationalism and its underwriting reliance on a strict definition of national security may have been ascendant and powerful, it was not monolithic. Many narratives have shown how various constituencies within U.S. civil society (e.g., labor, women, African Americans) both abided by the structures, frameworks, and assumptions of Cold War nationalism, and also exploited its contradictions in order to advocate for advancement in American society. In doing so, they achieved varying degrees of success in obtaining access to participate in national conversations and ultimately greater rights throughout the 1950s and 1960s.[9] With the codes of Cold War nationalism omnipresent in many aspects of U.S. life, it is easy to assume such an ideological matrix of nationalism arose organically, was a product of unchecked paranoia and hysteria at the time, or reflected the realities of Cold War America, since communist totalitarianism did pose a threat to this specific understanding of the American way of life.[10] Yet, if the dominant codes, assumptions, and frameworks that underwrote Cold War nationalism and national security possessed a distinct history,

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[9] Mary L. Dudziak, *Cold War Civil Rights: Race and the Image of American Democracy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), 6-17; Laura McEnaney, *Civil Defense Begins at Home: Militarization Meets Everyday Life in the Fifties* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), 7-9; Fousek, *To Lead the Free World*, 11-15.

[10] Stephen Whitfield, *The Culture of the Cold War* (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991, reprint 1996), 10-14.

what happened to alternative conceptions of national security as well as the language and rhetoric that underwrote them?

By the time of the Vietnam War, U.S. expatriates constituted a particularly well situated population where alternative ideas of nationalism and national security could be brought to bear on conversations about U.S. credibility. A popular contention within expatriate antiwar circles asserted the "Four Freedoms" was the basic creed of U.S. nationalism and the basis for its national security. However, rather than seeing those values as under threat from communist monsters, they believed the values articulated in the Freedoms to be universal in essence and in application, and regarded the United States as responsible for defending those values by the example it set domestically and internationally.[11]

Criticism within expatriate circles jettisoned radical and anti-imperial critiques often associated with Vietnam War dissent in order to stake a claim about the misguided nature of the war and abandonment of U.S. character in favor of knee-jerk international involvement. Expatriate organizations registered their dissent as U.S. citizens and simultaneously exhibited a belief in American exceptionalism. They frequently relied on national icons, which comprised an important part of their antiwar identity, and by doing so declared that no particular political ideology owned national symbols, but rather they belonged to everyone.[12] In addition to flags, holidays, and monuments, the expatriate war

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[11] Barbara J. Keys, *Reclaiming American Virtue: The Human Rights Revolution of the 1970s* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2014), 17-18; Elizabeth Borgwardt, *A New Deal for the World: America's Vision for Human Rights* (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, 2005), 280-281.

[12] I am mindful of the critiques of identity historian Rogers Brubaker and Frederick Cooper have outlined. However, in reading the documents, I believe a U.S.-identity, which is contested on multiple fronts, remains the best lens through which to understand the articulation of protest by expatriate Americans. While other identities existed, and were contested, often than not dissent is lodged as specifically as American, one that gave the expatriate community some legitimacy as being abroad forced them to consider meanings of belonging, made appeals to their government, and provided them a base of common assumptions upon which to rest their claims. It was one that also derived from their locations, and encountering other U.S. citizens in the same space. Rogers Brubaker and Frederick Cooper, "Beyond

opposition centered their claims to participate in national discussion on the American military bases, personnel, and especially the conscription process as it manifested within the transatlantic empire.

Despite such claims, the U.S. government targeted expat antiwar activists to delegitimize and discredit their objections in order to maintain international support for the war. The Johnson administration had the CIA monitor and report on the activities of expatriates and their international interactions.[13] The State Department created a study group to investigate and control international protests.[14] The FBI included overseas activists in its surveillance of the antiwar movement, compiling files on individuals, their travels, and their activities. The response that the expatriate antiwar opposition generated from the U.S. government suggests a desire to maintain a particular interpretation of nationalism and national security, in the face of surfacing alternatives.

Historiography

Heeding Amy Kaplan's call for historians to afford greater attention to how culture shapes attitudes and debates within imperial spaces, this project brings historical discussion of the international, cosmopolitan actor into the established historiography of the Vietnam antiwar movement.[15] To accomplish this, the dissertation utilizes the rich segment of Vietnam antiwar historiography, which emphasizes the impact of local

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"Identity," *Theory and Society* 29: 1 (2000), 1-47; Joan W. Scott, "The Evidence of Experience," *Critical Inquiry* 17:4 (Summer 1991), 773-797.

[13] Central Intelligence Agency, "International Connections of U.S. Peace Groups," 15 November 1967. *CIA FOIA documents*, http://www.foia.cia.gov/, accessed March 1, 2009; Central Intelligence Agency, "International Connections of U.S. Peace Groups--III," 28 February 1968. *CIA FOIA documents*, http://www.foia.cia.gov/, accessed March 1, 2009.

[14] Martin Klimke, *The Other Alliance: Student Protest in West Germany and the United States in the Global 1960s* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), 143.

[15] Amy Kaplan, "Left Alone with America" in Amy Kaplan and Donald Pease, eds., *Cultures of United States Imperialism* (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1993), 11-15.

conditions and attitudes on framing dissent. It brings this discussion into conversation with more recent developments in the history of U.S. foreign policy, which include the perspectives of highly mobile actors in transmitting, refining, and challenging assumptions of policymakers.

Over the past decade, scholarship of the Cold War has expanded to include transnational actors. These studies owe much to changing trends in the study of U.S. foreign policy, which now emphasizes non-state actors and the influence of highly mobile people on the course of U.S. foreign policy.[16] Travelers, hitchhikers, missionaries, immigrants, and students studying abroad have become subjects in the history of U.S. and foreign affairs, reflecting three broad developments.[17] First, there has been a realization that foreign policy is shaped not only by the actions of elite actors (e.g., heads of state, diplomats), but also by ordinary citizens whose lives, careers, and associations can have international implications. Second with the cultural turn, foreign policy scholars have emphasized the role of ideas in shaping foreign policy, particularly how they provide a

[16] This scholarship casts doubt on claims that many American ideas, values, and traditions are "exceptional" and asserts instead that U.S. cultural values do not exist in its own separate category, dichotomous with the world's values. Dan Rodgers, "Exceptionalism" in Anthony Molho and Gordon S. Wood, eds. *Imagined Histories: American Historians Interpret their Past* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), 21-40; Ian Tyrell, "American Exceptionalism in an Age of International History" *American Historical Review* 96:4 (October 1991): 1031-1055; George Frederickson, *The Comparative Imagination: On the History of Racism, Nationalism, and Social Movements* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), passim; Louis Perez , Jr., "We are the World: Internationalizing the National, Nationalizing the International," *Journal of American History* 89:2 (September 2002), 558-566.

[17] This genre includes, Judy Tzu-Chun Wu, *Radicals on the Road: Internationalism, Orientalism, and Feminism During the Vietnam Era* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2013); Andrew J. Falk, *Upstaging the Cold War: American Dissent and Cultural Diplomacy, 1940-1960* (Amherst and Boston: University of Massachusetts, 2010); Rebecca M. Schreiber, *Cold War Exiles in Mexico: U.S. Dissidents and the Culture of Critical Resistance* (Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 2008); Chris Endy, *Cold War Holidays: American Tourism in France* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004); Richard Ivan Jobs, "Youth Movements: Travel, Protest, and Europe in 1968," *American Historical Review*, 114:2 (April 2009), 376-404; Van Gosse, *Where the Boys Are: Cuba, Cold War America, and the Making of the New Left* (London and New York: Verso, 1993); Timothy B. Tyson, *Radio Free Dixie: Robert F. Williams and the Roots of Black Power* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1999); Donald William Maxwell, "Unguarded Border: The Movement of People and Ideas Between the United States and Canada During the Vietnam Era," Ph.D. diss, Indiana University, 2010.

framework for policymakers to engage particular issues and "in which the attentive public understands those issues."[18] Finally, texts by immigration and migration historians have pushed foreign policy scholars to think about the ways their works might complement one another, as their scholarship has long considered movement and settlement as political acts.[19]

Studies focusing on the traveler as an international actor showed the ability of individuals to influence national policies when persistent cultural and political roadblocks prevented conventional inclusion to the polity. Globetrotting activists opened networks for action and initiated international conversations on race, ethnicity, class, and gender among attentive members of the U.S. and global public. Civil rights activists used international public opinion to expose contradictions in the discriminatory policies defended by racists as traditional American values and beliefs.[20] Authors, filmmakers,

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[18] Michael Hunt, *Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1987), 16.

[19] On the intersection of U.S. foreign policy and immigration see, Donna R. Grabaccia, *Foreign Relations: American Immigration in Global Perspective* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012); Tucker, Robert W., Charles B. Keely, and Linda Wrigley, eds., *Immigration and U.S. Foreign Policy* (Boulder: University of Colorado Press, 1992); Nancy L. Green, "Expatriation, Expatriates, and Expats: The American Transformation of a Concept," *The American Historical Review* 114:2 (April 2009), 307-328; Matthew Frye Jacobson, *Barbarian Virtues: The United States Encounters Foreign Peoples at Home and Abroad* (New York: Hill and Wang, 2000); Sarah J. Mahler, "Constructing International Relations: The Role of Transnational Migrants and Other Non-State Actors," *Identities* 7:2 (2000), 197-232; James Frank Hollifield, "Migration and International Relations: The Liberal Paradox," in Hans Entzinger, Marco Martiniello, and Catherine Wihtol de Wenden, eds., *Migration Between Markets and States* (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2004); Nancy L. Green and Francois Weil, *Citizenship and Those Who Leave: The Political of Emigration and Expatriation* (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press), 2007; Wu, *Radicals on the Road;* Schreiber, *Cold War Exiles in Mexico.*

[20] For examples of this literature see, Dudziak, *Cold War Civil Rights;* Jonathan Rosenberg, *How Far the Promised Land: World Affairs and the American Civil Rights Movement from the First World War to Vietnam* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005); Joshua Bloom and Waldo E. Martin, Jr., *Black Against Empire: The History and Politics of the Black Panther Party* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 2013); Nico Slate, *Colored Cosmopolitanism: The Shared Struggle for Freedom in the United States and India* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012); Thomas Borstelmann, *The Cold War and the Color Line* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001); Carol Anderson*, Eyes Off the Prize: African Americans, The United Nations, and the Struggle for Human Rights,* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

and artists harassed by the culture of 1950s McCarthyism moved abroad and fashioned "cultural resistance" to prevailing Cold War assumptions.[21]

Recent scholarship on the Vietnam War has taken note of the role mobile citizens had in opening new avenues for debate and discussion among other cosmopolitans and intellectuals across borders, and whether this interaction affected policy outcomes. Historians have shown how distinct national movements mutually reinforced one another intellectually and structurally to convey a growing international opposition to the war.[22] Other scholars have demonstrated how traveling abroad during the Vietnam War proved intellectually transformative for many Americans, despite having the encounters reinforce ideologies such as orientalism and racial hierarchies, which became infused with so-called radical critics of U.S. hegemony.[23] There seems to be general agreement in this emerging scholarship that travel and international exchanges ordered international relations and reinforced a sense of personal diplomacy that challenged prevalent Cold War assumptions underwriting the Vietnam War. Nonetheless, disagreements persist over the extent, nature, and outcome of the exchanges on the course of U.S. foreign policy debates, as authors of the transnational antiwar movement often neglect soliciting activists' views of national security.

Literature on the Vietnam antiwar movement, therefore, provides a place to engage how travelers contemplated and considered debates over national security and

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[21] Falk, *Upstaging the Cold War*, 179-183; Schreiber, *Cold War Exiles in Mexico*, xii-xiii.

[22] Klimke, *The Other Alliance*, passim; Bethany S. Keenan, "'At the Crossroads of World Attitudes and Reaction': The Paris American Committee to Stopwar and American Anti-war Activism in France, 1966–1968," *Journal of Transatlantic Studies*, 11:1 (2013), 62-82; Caroline Hoefferle, "A Web of Interconnections: Student Peace Movements in Britain and the United States, 1960-1975," in Benjamin Ziemann, ed., *Peace Movements in Western Europe, Japan and the U.S. During the Cold War* (Essen: Klartext, 2008), 130; Martin Klimke and Joachim Scharloth, "1968 in Europe: An Introduction," in *1968 in Europe: A History of Protest and Activism, 1956-1977* (New York: Palgrave McMillan, 2008), 4.

[23] Wu, *Radicals on the Road*, 5.

war mobilization.[24] As this body of scholarship expanded to incorporate the larger imprint of the antiwar movement on U.S. political culture during the 1960s and 1970s,[25] studies took a regional or constituent focus. Authors identified and worked with particular locations or populations as case studies to challenge or sustain long held assumptions about the movement, its participants, and its effects. The contributions of women, intellectuals, African-Americans, southerners, and veterans are among the constituencies whose perspectives diversified understandings of the intellectual origins, motivations, framing, and efficacy of the antiwar movement; this took scholarship beyond the dissatisfaction of contemporary postwar life often attributed to it in earlier writings.[26] These investigations showed that antiwar activism varied greatly and relied on

[24] Charles DeBenedetti, "The American Peace Movement and the National Security State, 1941-1971," *World Affairs* 141:2 (Fall 1978), 118-129; An overview on the historiography of the Vietnam antiwar movement can be found in Charles Chatfield, "At the Hands of Historians: The Antiwar Movement of the Vietnam Era," *Peace and Change* 29, nos. 3 and 4 (July 2004): 483-526; Paul Joseph, *Cracks in the Empire: State Politics in the Vietnam War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987),13-41. A critique of the revisionist historiography can be found in Stephen Vlastos, "America's Enemy: The Absent Presence in Revisionist Vietnam War History" in John Carlos Rowe and Rick Berg, eds., *The Vietnam War in American Culture* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), 52-74.

[25] The political and culture wars of the 1970s and 1980s, source availability, and the absence of a workable methodology limited early Vietnam War scholars' scope to considering only the efficacy of the domestic antiwar movement. Over the last four decades, historians skirmished over how the movement should be defined, what motivated its leaders and foot soldiers, how activists perceived themselves, the extent to which the movement represented broader public opinion on the war, the factors accounting for the movement's demise, and what, if any, role the movement had in bringing the war to an end. Scholars and politicians conducting a post-mortem on the antiwar movement have conferred onto it the validation of citizen power in shaping government and the role of scapegoat for the decline of American values as well as for the military defeat. Examples of this early scholarship include, Fred Halstead, *Out Now!: A Participants Account of the Movement in the U.S. Against the Vietnam War* (New York: Pathfinder, 1978, rev. 1991); Nancy Zaroulis and Gerald Sullivan, *Who Spoke Up?: American Protests Against the War in Vietnam* (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Wilson, 1984); Todd Gitlin, *The Sixties: Years of Hope, Days of Rage* (New York: Bantam Books, 1987); Kirkpatrick Sale, *SDS* (New York: Random Books, 1973); Thomas Powers, *The War at Home: Vietnam and the American People, 1964-1968* (New York: Grossman Publishers, 1973).

[26] Examples of literature focused on specific constituencies include Andrew E. Hunt, *The Turning: A History of Vietnam Veterans Against the War* (New York and London: New York University Press, 1999); Kenneth Heineman, *Campus Wars: The Peace Movement at American State Universities* (New York: New York University Press, 1993); Lorena Oropenza, *Raza Si, Guerra No: Chicano Protest and Patriotism During the Vietnam Era* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005); Daniel S. Lucks, *Selma to Saigon: The Civil Rights Movement and the Vietnam War* (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 2014); Amy Swerdlow, *Women Strike for Peace: Traditional Motherhood and Radical Politics in*

a range of dissent and patriotic traditions to frame opposition, calling into question whether it constituted a "national movement" in any sense.[27]

Among the constituencies most concerned with debates and understandings of national security and international credibility were U.S. expatriates. As an annex of the broader U.S. population, expats' lives were structured around both being a representative of the United States, and dependency on the United States government to maintain good international relations for commerce as well as cultural and educational exchanges. U.S. government officials and policymakers treated expats as a distinct population for the purposes of taxation and voting, both of which became critical issues beginning in the 1960s. As this political awareness within the U.S. expatriate population developed, they used their experiences and identity as a basis to frame dissent and counter the prevailing ideas of national security promoted by the U.S. foreign policy establishment. From expats' vantage point, the war threatened to unravel U.S. global credibility the longer the government maintained the justification that the war was necessary for national security, a view not shared by its transatlantic allies.

In this vein, the U.S. expatriate population became a site where the contours and limits of the United States' national security claims were discussed and challenged. By focusing on the intersection of international exchanges, U.S. expatriates, and national security, my project both re-centers discussions of national security in the context of the

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the 1960s (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993); Mitchell K. Hall, *Because of Their Faith: CALCAV and Religious Opposition to the Vietnam War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990); Richard Tomes, *Apocalypse Then: American Intellectuals and the Vietnam War* (New York: New York University Press, 1998); Regional studies of antiwar activism include, Rhodri Jefferys-Jones, *Peace Now!: American Society and the Ending of the Vietnam War* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999); William J. Rorabaugh, *Berkley at War: The 1960s* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989); Paul Buhle, ed., *History and the New Left: Madison, Wisconsin, 1950-1970* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1990; Doug Rossinow, *The Politics of Authenticity: Liberalism, Christianity, and the New Left in America* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998); Michael S. Foley, *Confronting the War Machine: Draft Resistance During the Vietnam War* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003).

[27] Chatfield, "At the Hands of Historians," 513-514.

Vietnam War, while also acknowledging that these discussions did not transpire only in war rooms, congressional hearings, or policy meetings at the White House, or even in classrooms on U.S. college campuses. Debates and discussions over the meaning of U.S. national security occurred within transnational space, where its application was less abstract and theoretical, and possessed very real consequences.

Research Methodology

This dissertation utilizes both archival sources and oral histories to produce an ethnographic account of expatriate dissent during the Vietnam War. Given the impermanence of this group, I analyzed the content within the records generated by antiwar expatriate organizations including meeting minutes, correspondence, newsletters, memos, and flyers. In analyzing the archival record and oral histories, I considered how expatriates fashioned "popular political theories"[28] to understand and frame their dissent for citizens in host countries, allied governments, the U.S.-based antiwar movement, the American public, and U.S. policymakers. Each audience possessed different concerns of the war; expatriates understood this, and made conscious efforts to appeal to each audience based on relevant frames including patriotism, national security, human rights, and restoring U.S. credibility.[29]

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[28] Using this term, historian Robert Westbrook writes "Just because citizens are not political philosophers does not mean they do not on occasion advance significant theoretical arguments or that we should not subject these arguments to the same scrutiny that we give to those of intellectual elites." Robert Westbrook, *Why We Fought: Forging American Obligations in World War II* (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Books, 2004), 4-5.

[29] Scholars have offered numerous theoretical models on how social movements construct and deploy their "collective action." For the purposes of this dissertation I employ the definition offered by Robert D. Benford and David A. Snow that "collective action frames are action-oriented sets of beliefs and meanings that inspire and legitimate the activities and campaigns of a social movement organization." See Robert D. Benford, and David A. Snow. "Framing Processes and Social Movements: A Overview and Assessment," *Annual Review of Sociology* 26 (2000), 614. For more on collective action frames see, "Repertoires, Frames, and Cycles," in Nick Crossley, *Making Sense of Social Movements* (Buckingham and Philadelphia: Open University Press, 2002), 127-148; Hank Johnston, and John A. Noakes, eds. *Frames of Protest: Social Movements and the Framing Perspective* (New York: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2005).

I was particularly attentive to the vocabulary and symbols expats deployed to express their opposition to the war.[30] The use of symbols required thoughtful engagement with a national community's identity as well as the rights, roles, responsibilities, and narratives that accompany civic membership. Involvement in the antiwar movement offers a point from which to consider how activists applied and re-appropriated traditional symbols of national belonging to claim legitimacy and to craft a dissenting narrative. For Americans abroad, traditional symbols acquired new and diverse meanings. Memorials, flags, and holidays allowed expats to maintain a sense of national belonging that could overcome distance and political diversity, offered a cloak of legitimacy to expats who were often disparaged as disloyal, and became a terrain to stake an alternative claim about the nation's national security interests.

While the available record allowed me to reconstruct the groups' formations and articulate their dissent, uncovering how they navigated the U.S. government's demands to mobilize and fashioned their own interpretation of their homeland's global mission was

[30] Jürgen Habermas's *The Theory of Communicative Action* (1981, translated 1984) offers a useful framework in which to think about how individual and collective agency matters in shaping policy and discourse. Habermas believes that the basis for human rationality forms through collective action and "speech acts." This communicative action "produces its own space, meaning, and structure that form the basis for human rationality and political action." Through this communicative action, Habermas contends, individuals are able to give meaning to their actions and understand the larger world apart from having other structures, like bureaucracy or capitalism, define it for them. In doing this Habermas attempts to salvage the ideas of the Enlightenment and the notion of a public sphere that had come under attack by previous generations of philosophers. Ideas about collective action emerged in the nineteenth century as scholars writing in the age of industrialization complicated Enlightenment thinkers who understood collective action as a process of a bourgeois public sphere where political and social ideas and norms could be debated rationally. Hegel, Marx, and Weber believed emerging dominant modern structures, specifically bureaucracies and capitalism compromised human rationality and shaped any response directed at it. By the twentieth century, scholars in the "Critical Theory" school that influenced the New Left took these theories to their logical conclusion that technocratic and bureaucratic modes of thinking organized society, individuals possessed no autonomy to act other than to preserve the larger systems and structures, and cannot oppose it in any meaningful way. Max Weber, *Max Weber: Essays in Sociology,* translated by H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, 22; Jürgen Habermas, (translated by Thomas McCarthy), *The Theory of Communicative Action, Volumes I and II* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1981, 1984), xix, xxv-xxvi, xxxii, and 353; Max Horkheimer, *Eclipse of Reason* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1947), 95-96; Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno (translated by John Cumming), *Dialectic of Enlightenment* (New York: Continuum, 1944, reprint 1972), xiii-xvii.

limited by the available documentation and what it revealed. Organizations like PACS and AMEX have comprehensive archival records. Other groups have less complete archival documentation, due to a desire to remain clandestine, contentious group dynamics, or simple organizational inattention.[31] To overcome the limitations in the archival record, I reconstructed histories from information found in the files of other antiwar groups with whom they collaborated and corresponded. I also ascertained the reception and impact of antiwar activities from files of official U.S. government sources including the U.S. State Department, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the files of White House staffers who monitored and responded to the claims of the U.S. expatriate antiwar community. Finally, I compensated for archival deficiencies by conducting several interviews with individuals central to expat antiwar groups.

Terminology: Expatriates, Exiles, Migrants, or Emigrants?

As more U.S. citizens relocated to Canada to resist conscription, large-scale media and public interest followed.[32] Journalists from Canadian newspapers asked them why they came; U.S. journalists asked them why they left. Academics, too, saw research potential in the new communities, and used the opportunity to inquire how exile altered or reinforced ties to one's homeland.[33] However, journalists and academics encountered a problem: how does one describe people who live apart from the homeland, but retain the definition of citizenship and claim belonging in the national community? The issue was complicated by the fact that no consensus existed among the Americans abroad as to how they classified themselves in relation to their homeland. Were they expats or exiles? In a

[31] Maria Jolas, one of the organizers of PACS expressed this fear when she donated the PACS papers to the Wisconsin Historical Society, noting in correspondence of her fear of another McCarthy-like episode in American history, where people would revisit the PACS membership lists, and wanting guarantees for privacy.

[32] David S. Churchill, "An Ambiguous Welcome: Vietnam Draft Resistance, the Canadian State, and Cold War Containment," *Social History*, 37:73 (2004), 12-13; Maxwell, "Unguarded Border," 9-10.

[33] Renee G. Kasinsky, *Refugees from Militarism: Draft Age Americans in Canada* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1976), 139-141.

1969 interview, Renee Kasinsky, a sociologist from the University of Calgary asked a U.S. deserter in Toronto identified as "Doyle" his views on the issue then consuming the ranks of Americans abroad:

> I: on the issue of 'exile' versus 'ex-patriot' what is your stand? Which one do you see yourself as?
>
> Doyle: Well, actually when this issue came up before our general membership, the proposed name of the Union of American Exiles, changing it to the Union of American Ex-Patriots, was badly beaten. And I opposed the name change, for the basic reason that while 'exiles' doesn't necessarily describe us, 'ex-patriots' doesn't describe anything. 'Ex-patriots' can be used to refer to the draft dodger and the deserter community; it can be used to describe the 30,000 oilmen living in Calgary. It just doesn't mean a damn thing[34]

Contemporary scholars, like the individuals whose lives were defined by such designations, remain divided as to the appropriate label. Scholars have justified using expatriates, exiles, refugees, and migrants to describe the U.S. population abroad depending on the circumstances.[35] Some academics have suggested the term "expatriate" may not accurately describe the general overseas population, and that using the term reaffirms a feature of American exceptionalism: the U.S. has expats, while the rest of the world has migrants or immigrants.[36]

Recognizing that all vocabulary used to describe a set of individuals is laden with political, cultural, and historical connotations, expatriate is used here to broadly signify individuals who lived overseas for any period of time who considered themselves to be U.S. citizens, but were not part of an official overseas delegation employed by the

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[34] Oral History Interview Transcript, Renee Kasinsky with "Doyle," a deserter, Toronto, n.d., folder 4-7, Box 4, Renee Goldsmith Kasinsky Fonds, University of British Columbia Rare Books and Special Collections, Vancouver, BC, Canada.

[35] Amanda Klekowski von Koppenfels, *Migrants or Expatriates?: Americans in Europe* (London and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 20-21; Green, "Expatriation, Expatriates, and Expats," 307-328; Kasinsky, *Refugees from Militarism,* passim; Roger Williams, *The New Exiles: American War Resisters in Canada* (New York: Liveright Publishers, 1971), passim; Judith N. Shklar, "Obligation, Loyalty, Exile," *Political Theory* 21:181 (1993), 181-197.

[36] Klekowski von Koppenfels, *Migrants or Expatriates?*, 20-21.

United States government. Government officials and members of the military are excluded by this definition. The definition is intentionally broad to include both U.S. citizens who departed with the intention of never returning, and those whose time overseas lasted not much longer than a typical tourist. In utilizing this definition, I draw on scholarship that fashions "expatriate" in more cultural than legal or political terms.[37]

As historian Nancy Green notes, expatriation has been a historically constructed term whose meaning has constantly evolved. Beginning with the American Revolution and throughout most of the nineteenth century, it signified a concrete legal definition: a person who lost their claim to citizenship. Over time, the term became imbued with other socially constructed meanings, especially pertaining to the reasons why one went overseas.[38] By the twentieth century, living abroad, "for a time," one could be an "expatriate" without being an "ex-patriot" making the distinction between the cultural and legal definitions of the law.[39]

In contrast, when using the term exile, I denote an estrangement with the homeland: a person who has been banished and has a contested claim of national

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[37] This formulation is offered in Green, "Expatriation, Expatriates, and Expats," 307-328.

[38] Ibid., 310-311.

[39] Many of these changes occurred during the Cold War, when legal challenges, collectively known as the "expatriation cases" removed many of the specific legal avenues to strip one of their citizenship. Prior to the Cold War, a series of laws and court cases established precedents to control and define the relationship of the expatriate with his or her homeland. That definition emerged in the aftermath of the U.S. Civil War that recognized that legal expatriation required a "voluntary act" on the part of the individual. However, after nearly a century a clear definition of a "voluntary" remained opaque, and would not be resolved until the start of the Second World War and refined during the Cold War. The emerging national security state that accompanied the Cold War hysteria brought individuals' loyalty and allegiance to the homeland under intense scrutiny, especially those who chose to live away from it. This resolution in a Cold War context with its prevailing notions of loyalty and national belonging further augmented the public's attitude about expatriates, tending to view those abroad for any purpose with skepticism and suspicion. *Kent v. Dulles* 357 U.S. 116 (1958); *Perez v. Brownell* 356 U.S. 44 (1958); *Trop v. Dulles* 356 U.S. 86 (1958); "High Court Backs U.S. Expatriation," *New York Times*, 1 April 1958, p. 22; Anthony Lewis, "3 U.S.-Born Fight for Nationality," *New York Times*, November 11, 1957, p. 24; Green, "Expatriation, Expatriates, and Expats," 317.

belonging. Members of the exile community used the term to oppose a specific policy or practice, and to express a belief of an inability to return until conditions changed. Over the course of the war, as Doyle's interview indicates, many draft resisters and military deserters preferred using "exile" to describe their status. Use of this term was motivated by the politics of the moment as leaders prepared to make the case for amnesty as the war concluded. Other terms were debated and discussed within this community, but exile seems to have carried the day, and I largely follow this convention when discussing the interactions of exiles with expatriates.

Chapter Overview

To examine the tension between expatriate politics and the rising antiwar movement, this dissertation is organized into five chapters that unfold chronologically, with some content excepted. As the Johnson, and later Nixon, administrations mobilized and justified U.S. intervention in South Vietnam, overseas Americans leaned on their experiences and intellectual influences, and framed their dissent in different ways at different times during the war. This construction of dissent changed over the course of the war due to government interest in suppressing it both at home and overseas, and especially as a result of thousands of draft resisters and military deserters from the U.S. armed forces leaving the country. While typically viewed in other Vietnam War literature as evidence for widening support for dissent, in the case of expatriate communities, the new exiles strained relations within an already tense group dynamic. By the end of the war, the most visible antiwar efforts by overseas American groups were geared toward ministering to the new arrivals.

The first chapter, "Ugly Americans and Fellow Travelers: U.S. Expatriates during the Cold War," provides an overview of the expatriate landscape by the early 1960s and explores the awakening of an organized effort by expats on issues of foreign affairs beginning in the late 1950s and early 1960s. It shows how pejorative perceptions of U.S. expatriates in U.S. culture supplanted legal efforts to minimize and control their activism

during the Cold War. The widespread negative cultural attitudes reinforced expats' status as outsiders in relation to the homeland, and motivated their early interventions into discussions of U.S. foreign and domestic policy. During this period two important constituencies mobilized into a viable element of civil society confronting transatlantic governments: American businessmen and progressive-minded activists. Both groups lodged specific claims of national belonging and worked in support of Lyndon Johnson's presidential campaign in 1964 to validate the claim to participate in the affairs of the United States.

Chapter Two, "'Help Restore America's Image Abroad: U.S. Credibility and the Origins of U.S. Expatriate Dissent, 1965-1967," features the competing efforts of the United States Information Agency (USIA) to manufacture transatlantic support for the Vietnam War and a growing segment of the increasingly skeptical U.S. expatriate community who understood the war's damage to U.S.'s global image. Both sides believed U.S. credibility was at stake with the war, but in very different ways. This chapter details the evolution of antiwar expatriate organizations following the resumption of Operation Rolling Thunder in early 1966 after a Christmas pause. The chapter is particularly attentive to the intellectual strands motivating opposition to the war among the expat community, especially how interpretations of the United States' global mission and national security informed their counterargument.

The next chapter, "Outside Agitators: American Patriotism and the Framing of U.S. Expatriate Dissent, 1966-1968," explores overseas Americans' full-scale participation in the broader antiwar movement. Like other antiwar constituencies, expats' opposition largely reflected their own political situations, primarily the inability to fully participate in conversations due to distance, stigma, and diversity of their community. As a result, expats embraced symbolism and traditions associated with the United States, both to present an argument that war did not reflect the nature and characteristics of the United States in world affairs, and to claim qualification as U.S. citizens with a

distinctive perspective on world affairs to engage in debates meaningful to the national polity. Antiwar opposition offered expats a method to stake a claim of national belonging. However, these claims did not go unchallenged as the U.S. government's reaction to overseas dissent indicates.

In addition to the U.S. government and its allies' responses to overseas protests, by 1968 the emergence of a draft resistance and military desertion network complicated expats' ability to forge a cohesive antiwar argument staked on U.S. identity. The willingness of Western Europeans and Canadians to coordinate the effort forced many U.S. expats to consider the consequences they were willing to endure in order to oppose the war, given the legal constraints such actions entailed. More significantly, the chapter "U.S. Expatriates and the International Desertion and Resistance Network, 1967-1968," shows how some expats seized the opportunity to participate in the network as a method to confront questions of racial and socio-economic inequality in the U.S., to situate the war as both a product of misguided Cold War and of international assumptions, and to draw attention to the failures of U.S. society that needed to be addressed if the U.S. wished to remain an example for the rest of the world to emulate.

The fifth and final chapter, "From the Politics of the Street to the Politics of the Cocktail Party: Expatriate Protests After 1968" considers the efforts of overseas Americans as the war and the U.S. government's actions became increasingly difficult to defend after 1968. In this period antiwar expatriates had become far more fragmented due to the main antiwar groups being shattered by government pushback, political developments in their host countries, and an inability to maintain consensus in their actions and messages. After 1968, U.S. expats routinely encountered the prevalent view the world no longer looked at the U.S. as the defender of the oppressed and marginalized. Focusing attention on the U.S.'s human rights record in the war, people like Heinz Norden, Maria Jolas, Harry Pincus, and others believed their greatest contribution to the antiwar effort was to speak on behalf of the war's victims: deserters, draft resisters, and

the Vietnamese people. In fulfilling this niche, primarily at small-scale social gatherings, expats tried to maximize their role in antiwar conversations in the final years of the war.

Collectively the chapters show that by the time the war ended in 1973, little had changed regarding the cultural currency of "the expatriate." However, by the end of the war the U.S. public conceived of "expat" as a draft resister or exile, replacing earlier images of the "tax cheat" or "bohemian writer." Nonetheless, expat presence within the antiwar community reaffirmed the lack of consensus within the broader U.S. polity on foreign affairs to transatlantic allies. By doing so, expats provided a powerful alternative message to the official declarations of Washington during this tumultuous period. Their effort showcased how democracy is sometimes messy and requires debate, dissent, and due process, despite the undertakings of a supposedly liberal-democratic state to silence those rights in times of war. Finally, as standard bearers of a cosmopolitan vision to define the national character and security of the United States, expats and exiles' efforts to speak in national conversations prevented the complete ascendancy of provincial attitudes as the basis to justify popular foreign policy understanding in Cold War America.

CHAPTER ONE
UGLY AMERICANS AND FELLOW TRAVELERS: U.S. EXPATRIATES DURING THE COLD WAR

In August 1963, Maria Jolas, a seventy-year-old American grandmother who had lived in Paris off and on since 1920 and continually since 1946, wrote to President Kennedy and Secretary of State Dean Rusk concerning her views of U.S. foreign policy and the international reputation of the United States:

> After watching for over fifty years the effect of our various foreign policies on the events of this exciting, revolutionary century, during which time our country has fluctuated from complacent inaction to magnificent, courageous leadership and sacrifice, I can't tell you with what relief and admiration I salute your recent diplomatic accomplishments…You are wiping out the stain of hypocrisy in which we were content to see the dark skin remain the badge of inferiority and underprivileged, hypocrisy that has hindered our foreign policy throughout the world.[1]

In writing to President Kennedy and Secretary Rusk, Jolas fulfilled her civic duty to convey to political leaders in the U.S. the attitudes and opinions of the global public so that the U.S. retained the respect and credibility of the world in order to continue leading it. As a civic missionary of the United States, Jolas believed the example the U.S. set through its actions was critically important and inseparable from its power and global leadership. In doing this, she positioned herself as a remote citizen who cultivated a particular knowledge of foreign affairs based on experiences and interactions overseas. However, this view of an expat as a civic missionary was not universally shared by the U.S. government, public, or even those in their host countries.

This chapter contextualizes the perceptions of U.S. expats by the mid-1960s. It chronicles how expats viewed themselves in relations to the U.S.'s Cold War mission. It also addresses how others perceived expats, including how the U.S. government and public viewed this increasingly mobile and separated population, and the reception of

[1] Letter, Maria Jolas to President Kennedy and Secretary of State Dean Rusk, August 20, 1963, folder, "Kennedy, John F. 1963," Box 33, Eugene and Maria Jolas Papers. General Collection, Beinecke Rare Book and Manuscript Library, Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut.

expatriates in their host countries. Each audience projected some degree of Cold War anxiety and insecurity onto the expatriate population.

Whether residing abroad for business, pleasure, study, or escape, expats internalized the lessons and justifications for the Cold War and accepted the critical importance of maintaining the U.S.'s global image as a world power against totalitarianism and oppression. However, this Cold War nationalism that emphasized security did not appear from nothing. Rather than being something the Truman administration developed, Cold War nationalism derived from unresolved debates of the New Deal and mobilization of the American people for the Second World War. Roosevelt's efforts to mobilize the nation for war tapped into an understood American commitment to make the world safe through democracy, and blended it with new formulations calling on Americans to uphold and protect the "Four Freedoms" he believed encapsulated the American Way.[2] The emphasis on defending the Four Freedoms from internal and external threats led many policymakers during the Cold War to see "monsters to be destroyed everywhere," who then deployed analogous language to mobilize the public.[3]

Yet while this vision of U.S. global mission became the defining feature of Cold War nationalism, many U.S. citizens read different lessons from Roosevelt's World War II mobilization and the Four Freedoms. This alternative interpretation viewed the war, and justifications for it, not as a call to preserve the "American Way," but rather to uphold universal values encapsulated by those freedoms, as any liberal democratic state should. However, this vision too retained an element of U.S. exceptionalism in that adherents believed the U.S. was in the best position to uphold certain principles —

[2] Andrew Preston, "Monsters Everywhere: A Genealogy of National Security," *Diplomatic History* 38:3 (June 2014), 496-498.

[3] Ibid., 499.

diversity, equality, internationalism, and common humanity — that served as the antidote to totalitarianism. Accomplishing this required extending the Four Freedoms at home and ensuring the country served as a model onto the rest of the world, rather than seeking "monsters to destroy."[4]

The unresolved tensions emanating from Roosevelt's mobilization and justification for World War II cast a long shadow and forced the U.S. public, expats included, to respond and align with a particular vision. To ensure the U.S.'s ever-growing overseas population complied with the officially sanctioned Cold War vision, the U.S. government extended its postwar national security state to the expatriate population. Even after successful legal challenges on arbitrary Cold War travel restrictions, the U.S. government and the public continued to view the expatriate population as a suspect class susceptible to outside influences that might accompany them back to the U.S. and undermine the U.S.'s internal security.

The chapter concludes by looking at expatriates' participation in the 1964 presidential election between President Lyndon Johnson and Senator Barry Goldwater (R-AZ). The contest featured a stark contrast between competing visions of the U.S.'s role in world affairs. It pitted Goldwater's staunch anti-communism and desire to contract the welfare state against Johnson's moderated Cold War views and desire to expand the U.S. welfare state both to address social ills and to improve the U.S.'s global image. For the first time, many expats took an active and prominent role in the election, overwhelmingly supporting the Johnson campaign. For overseas expats, participation offered an outlet to access U.S. political channels often denied them by both distance and

[4] Elizabeth Borgwardt, *A New Deal for the World: America's Vision for Human Rights* (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, 2005), 157-159.

stigma. It also provided a visible method to assert their claims of belonging in the national community and to communicate the expertise they cultivated abroad.

U.S. Expatriates in Political and Popular Culture

A 1963 feature article in the *New York Times* opened with a litany of stereotypes Americans commonly associated with the modern expat—"a tax cheat, zealous rebel, nymphomaniac, bilingual beatnik, left bank writer, or Chelsea scholar." The article invited comparisons between the postwar expat and the earlier lost generation of writers and artists of the 1920s and 1930s. It also declared the new generation was not "lost" and their sojourn abroad did not derive from rebelliousness. Instead, it painted a picture of overseas Americans as being from one of two backgrounds: the "grubbing" writers and artists who no longer had to struggle as much as they once did in the 1930s, and the businessmen with whom they now had to "share the scene."[5]

The *Times* article was part of a growing public interest in the American expatriate in the 1950s and the early 1960s. The American abroad became a prominent character in the country's postwar culture, touching on the themes of spreading liberal democratic values and furthering the country's economic, political, and military interests. Popular novels like *The Quiet American* (1956), *Giovanni's Room* (1956), *The Ugly American* (1958), and *Going Away* (1962), and films on the silver screen such as *The Third Man* (1949), *An American in Paris* (1951), and *One-Two-Three* (1961) were all set abroad and featured U.S. citizens wrestling with dilemmas of identity and morality.

Americans abroad also attracted academic interest. In 1958, scholars at the Maxwell School of Public Policy at Syracuse University commissioned a study on the American overseas community and published their findings in a set of recommendations for government agencies and the private sector as they increasingly sent citizens

[5] Edwin Gilbert, "New Faces in the Expatriate Colony," *New York Times*, 8 December 1963, p. 296.

overseas.[6] Their recommendations reflected a desire to balance the importance of promoting American internationalism and immersion in foreign cultures for successful ambassadors with retaining beliefs in American exceptionalism, at one point declaring, "Every American planning to work abroad should know America first."[7]

By the early 1960s, American expatriates represented a well-established subculture of the middle to upper class United States, which now transplanted many of its values, norms, and political debates to distant shores. Expanded economic growth, the low cost of traveling and living abroad, incentives by the U.S. government to encourage postwar trade, and the expansion of student and cultural exchanges contributed to the proliferation of U.S.'s overseas presence. Americans went overseas for adventure, for reprieve from the confines of the growing affluent society, or to escape the political repression of McCarthyism.[8] Approximately 1.5 million U.S. citizens, excluding military servicemen, lived overseas by 1960 accounting for 1% of the total U.S. population.[9]

The uninhibited and exponential growth of U.S. multinational corporations accounted for the largest contingent of Americans abroad.[10] This community, which included business executives, staff members, and families, brought a new presence to Western Europe. Not only did they represent the establishment of a beachhead for American businesses and consumer goods, they also functioned as the model of the

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[6] Cleveland, Harlan, Gerard J. Mangone, and John Clark Adams. *The Overseas Americans*. New York, London, and Toronto: McGraw Hill Book Company, 1960), 291-305.

[7] Ibid.

[8] Andrew J. Falk, *Upstaging the Cold War: American Dissent and Cultural Diplomacy, 1940-1960* (Amherst and Boston: University of Massachusetts, 2010), 178-211; Rebecca M. Schreiber, *Cold War Exiles in Mexico: U.S. Dissidents and the Culture of Critical Resistance* (Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 2008), passim.

[9] Cleveland, et. al., *The Overseas Americans*, 3.

[10] In 1964, one trade publication for American businessmen reported that more Americans lived throughout Western Europe than in Cleveland, Ohio. Cleveland, et. al., *The Overseas Americans*, 3; Philip W. Whitcomb, "The New, New, New, New New York Times," *Commerce in France* (15 March 1964), 17.

aspiring American middle class that the U.S. government hoped to showcase to the rest of the world.[11]

In addition, political leaders in the U.S. and its global allies viewed academic and cultural exchanges as necessary for promoting postwar cosmopolitan values and mutual understanding as an antidote to communism. "Modernization theories," prevalent among social scientists in the 1950s and 1960s, held that greater interaction between U.S. citizens and the rest of the world fostered democratic values, ideas, and development.[12] Programs which sent young adults abroad such as the U.S. Peace Corps, begun in 1961, reflected this assumption.[13] So, too, did government-sponsored exchanges like the Informational and Educational Exchange Act passed by Congress in 1947 and its expansion in 1961 with the Fulbright-Hays Act. Both provided opportunities for college students and professors to spend time overseas.[14] Additionally, colleges and universities added opportunities for undergraduates to study overseas and earn college credit. While only a handful of colleges offered a study abroad program before World War II, an estimated 365 colleges and universities had a study abroad program by 1957, with approximately 1,000 students studying overseas during the 1956-1957 academic year.[15]

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[11] A partial list of works that discuss the how the United States has tried "to sell" the idea of a middle class throughout the twentieth century to the world include: Laura A. Belmonte, *Selling the American Way: U.S. Propaganda and the Cold War* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008), 136-158; Victoria De Grazia, *Irresistible Empire: America's Advance Through Twentieth Century Europe* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005),439-442; Emily Rosenberg, *Spreading the American Dream: American Economic and Cultural Expansion, 1890-1945* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1982), 20-22; Richard Pells, *Not Like Us: How Europeans have Loved, Hated, and Transformed American Culture since World War II* (New York: Basic Books, 1997), 195-198.

[12] Michael Latham, *Modernization as Ideology: American Social Science and Nation Building in the Kennedy Era* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000), 4.

[13] Ibid., 109-149.

[14] Paul A. Kramer, "Bernath Lecture: Is the World Our Campus? International Students and U.S. Global Power in the Long Twentieth Century," *Diplomatic History* 33:5 (November 2009), 800-801.

[15] Irwin Abrams, "Study Abroad," *New Dimensions in Higher Education, Number 6*, published by the U.S. Department of Health Education and Welfare, Washington, D.C: Government Printing Office, 1960, 5-11.

Americans with the means and opportunity continued the prewar tradition of going to Europe to pursue post-graduate degrees as well.[16] With the increase in students venturing overseas, university officials expressed concern that study abroad programs were expanding too rapidly by the early 1960s.[17] Despite this assessment, the U.S. government ensured the trend continued with the passage of the International Education Act of 1966.[18]

Finally, artists, writers, political progressives, and Cold War critics ventured abroad for a reprieve from the harassment they endured during the hysteria of the Second Red Scare.[19] Increasingly marginalized in professional and social circles, progressives looked overseas to rebuild their lives. Others not directly suspected of being a Communist or sympathizer nonetheless felt that psychological repression hindered their work.[20] Acquiring the moniker "McCarthy Refugees," progressive intellectuals of the 1950s flooded Western Europe and elsewhere to continue working.[21]

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[16] Daniel T. Rodgers, *Atlantic Crossings: Social Politics in a Progressive Age* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998), 76-90; Frank Costigliola, *Awkward Dominion: American Political, Economic, and Cultural Relations with Europe*. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1984), 174.

[17] Abrams, "Study Abroad," 3.

[18] Kramer, "Is the World Our Campus?," 800-801.

[19] On the Cold War, McCarthyism and the Second Red Scare see, David Caute, *The Great Fear: The Anti-Communist Purge Under Truman and Eisenhower* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1978); Griffin Fariello, *Red Scare: Memories of the American Inquisition, An Oral History* (New York and London: W. W. Norton, 1995); Stephen Whitfield, *The Culture of the Cold War* (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991, reprint 1996); Ellen Schrecker, *Many Are The Crimes: McCarthyism in America* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999); Landon R.Y. Storrs, *The Second Red Scare and the Unmaking of the New Deal Left* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013); David K. Johnson, *The Lavender Scare: The Cold War Persecution of Gays and Lesbians in the Federal Government* (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2004).

[20] Falk, *Upstaging the Cold War*, 179-183, 200-204; Schreiber, *Cold War Exiles in Mexico*, passim.

[21] Falk, *Upstaging the Cold War*, 179-183; Rebecca M. Schreiber, *Cold War Exiles in Mexico*, xii-xiii. Clancy Sigal, author of *Going Away* recalled that although he departed the United States after the height of the Red Scare, in late 1956, many in England where he eventually settled regarded him as a "McCarthy Refugee" Oral History Interview with Clancy Sigal, interview by author, MP3 digital recording, Los Angles, CA, March 8, 2013.

U.S. Expatriates and the National Security State

In February 1960 Air Force Major General William T. Hefley, head of the Air Force's air materiel command in France, sparked a minor controversy when asked about a proposed change to the Air Force's rotation schedule for its civilian employees overseas. Hefley told the press that living abroad for long periods of time affected one's loyalty and patriotism, and such Americans "are not good citizens of the United States and should turn in their passports."[22] The General continued criticizing civilian employees of the military, saying "after they have lived abroad for a number of years, they have lost their usefulness as patriotic American citizens."[23] Hefley's comments made the front page of the *New York Times* the following day, forcing him to modify the statements. Claiming they were taken "out of context," Hefley stated his remarks were directed at only the small fraction of Americans "who never wished to return home" and offered his sincerest apologies.[24]

Hefley's comments represented the bind the United States government found itself in by the early 1960s. On one hand, the U.S. government needed more citizens to go abroad to represent the American way; but at the same time, it wanted to maintain the integrity of basic Cold War assumptions guiding its foreign policy, and feared these could be eroded by prolonged time abroad. As such, the U.S. government incorporated expats

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[22] "General Says U.S. Expatriates Should Relinquish Citizenship," *New York Times*, 27 February 1960, p. 1; Arthur J. Olsen, "Army Will Limit Its Civilians To Overseas Service of 5 Years," *New York Times*, 11 March 1960, p. 3

[23] "General Says U.S. Expatriates Should Relinquish Citizenship," *New York Times*, 27 February 1960, p. 1.

[24] Nonetheless, less than two weeks later the U.S. Army in Europe issued a directive that limited civilian employees there to a maximum of five years abroad. Deflecting Hefley's recent criticisms about the loyalty and patriotism of Americans abroad, General Clyde D. Eddleman in Heidelberg stated the policy evolved more from a concern over a civilian employee's technical knowledge becoming obsolete while in the field, and bringing a new worker in every five years would permit the military to maintain a staff with current training. W. Granger Blair, "General Modifies Expatriate View: Hefley Limits Questioning of Patriotism," *New York Times*, 28 February 1960, p. 40' Arthur J. Olsen, "Army Will Limit Its Civilians To Overseas Service of 5 Years," *New York Times*, 11 March 1960, p. 3

into the ever-evolving Cold War national security state.[25] Moving abroad for any length of time, and eventually returning home, required sanction of the United States government. One's motives and past activities, as well as those while overseas, were scrutinized and taken into account when applying for a passport.

In 1950, the Internal Security Act, championed by Nevada Senator Pat McCarran, targeted domestic communist groups, who the law's authors assumed worked for Moscow.[26] In seeking to neutralize the worldwide communist threat that posed "a clear and present danger" in the United States, the law required communist organizations to register with the Subversive Activities Control Board and the U.S. Attorney General.[27] In Section 6 of the law, Congress granted the State Department broad authority to deny issuing or renewing passports to people suspected of belonging to communist organizations. Under this provision, lawmakers effectively attached explicit political implications to the travel documents.[28]

The law codified a practice the State Department Passport Office had, in reality, engaged in since the 1940s. Since the end of the Second World War, the Office had scrutinized the claims and purposes of travelers, occasionally denied passports, or held

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[25] On the national security state as an ideological concept see, Andrew Preston, "Monsters Everywhere," 477-500; On the rise of the national security state see, McEnaney, Laura. *Civil Defense Begins at Home: Militarization Meets Everyday Life in the Fifties* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000); Melvyn P. Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1992); Jonathan Bell, *The Liberal State on Trial: The Cold War and American Politics in the Truman Years* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004); Michael J. Hogan, *A Cross of Iron: Harry Truman and the Origins of the National Security State, 1945-1954* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Michael Sherry, *In the Shadow of War: America Since the 1930s* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1995); Ira. Chernus, *Apocalypse Management: Eisenhower and the Discourse of National Insecurity* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2008).

[26] Internal Security Act of 1950, Public Law 831, 81st Congress, 2d sess. (22 September 1950).

[27] Ibid.

[28] Falk, *Upstaging the Cold War*, 195-196; On the history of passports, Craig Robertson, *The Passport in America: The History of a Document* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), passim and John Torpey, *The Invention of the Passport: Surveillance, Citizenship and the State* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), passim.

requests up in bureaucratic channels due to past associations or the nature of travel.[29] By the early 1950s, the State Department's Passport Office was overseen by several individuals sympathetic to Senator Joseph McCarthy's (R-WI) efforts to root out subversives. With the Internal Security Act, bureaucrats regularly rejected applications for passports to Americans who might criticize American foreign policy while abroad. Historian David Caute writes that over 1951-1952, the office prevented 300 Americans from traveling abroad.[30] The Americans whose passports were denied or hung up in channels included prominent writers, entertainers, and scholars, including Richard Wright, Paul Robeson, Bernard Vorhaus, Josephine Baker, Arthur Miller, and Edward G. Robinson.[31]

With the hold-ups, denials, and revocations, the State Department's arbitrary passport regulations did not go unchallenged. A series of Supreme Court decisions in 1958 collectively known as the "expatriation cases" ruled U.S. citizenship could only be forfeited through a voluntary action.[32] In the case *Kent v. Dulles* (1958), the Court

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[29] Caute, *The Great Fear*, 245.

[30] Ibid., 246.

[31] Caute, *The Great Fear*, 247; Falk, *Upstaging the Cold War*, 195-196; Mary L. Dudziak, *Cold War Civil Rights: Race and the Image of American Democracy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), 71-76; Wright biographer, Hazel Rowley indicates that this was in 1945, but the source material she cites refers to 1946. She also notes that Wright had intended to emigrate to France since 1939, but the war delayed his plans. Hazel Rowley, *Richard Wright: His Life and Times* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2001), 327. Bernard Vorhaus, an American filmmaker, who would become involved in Vietnam antiwar protests in England in the 1960s recounted similar difficulties with the U.S. State Department over passports in the 1950s. While filming, *The Lady from Boston* (1951) in Paris, he learned Edward Dmytryk, one of the Hollywood Ten, named him to the House Committee investigating Communist subversion in the film industry. Rather than return to the U.S., Vorhaus opted to stay in Europe. However, to avoid hassle in having his travel documents renewed, he sought out U.S. consulate offices in smaller cities—Nice and Genoa—rather than Paris and Rome. Vorhaus and his wife Hetty, later returned to Britain, where she was a citizen. He described life overseas without a valid U.S. passport as "precarious and worrying." Bernard Vorhaus, *Saved from Oblivion: An Autobiography* (Lanham, MD; Scarecrow Press, 2000), 118-119, 123.

[32] *Kent v. Dulles* 357 U.S. 116 (1958); *Perez v. Brownell* 356 U.S. 44 (1958); *Trop v. Dulles* 356 U.S. 86 (1958); "High Court Backs U.S. Expatriation," *New York Times*, 1 April 1958, p. 22; Anthony Lewis, "3 U.S.-Born Fight for Nationality," *New York Times*, 11 November 1957, p. 24; Green, "Expatriation, Expatriates, and Expats," 317.

equated one's liberty to travel and settle overseas with interstate travel. The case originated in 1953 when the State Department denied abstract expressionist painter Rockwell Kent a passport to attend the World Council of Peace (WCP) International Congress in Helsinki, Finland. The State Department informed Kent he could request a formal hearing to resolve the matter, however, before such a hearing could proceed, he had to submit an affidavit attesting whether he was "then or ever had been a Communist."[33] Kent balked at the requirement and sued, contending the department imposed an undue burden on him as an American citizen to fulfill the legal requirements to leave the country.

Ruling in Kent's favor, the U.S. Supreme Court ended the practice of imposing a political test on the issuance of passports. Justice William O. Douglas cited the evolution of passport law in western civilization. He contended the primary nature of passports was to ensure safe passage for American citizens, rather than afford security protections for the country. The passport proved more functional than political in nature. Douglas also noted the right of a citizen to travel overseas derived from the same liberty that permitted individuals to cross state borders.[34]

As courts resolved outstanding issues of citizenship and guaranteed mobility rights to U.S. citizens regardless of political views, entrenched popular views supplanted the overt political restrictions as the medium to control overseas behavior. One such view derived from the memory of U.S. citizens who traveled to the Soviet Union in the 1920s and 1930s, and returned espousing the virtues of their modern post-revolutionary classless society.[35] Both the excessive praise of many in the U.S. intelligentsia and the conditions of the First Red Scare made such citizens the target of political and cultural

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[33] *Kent v. Dulles* 357 U.S. 116 (1958)

[34] Ibid.

[35] Storrs, *The Second Red Scare*, 35-36.

critics, especially as word slowly emerged as to the reality of life in the Soviet Union. Although the public was willing to overlook such associations during the Second World War, as the U.S. pivoted from National Socialism to Communism as its primary enemy, past perceptions were easily revived.[36] In the early Cold War, anyone espousing not just hard line communist stances, but anything to the left of center or remotely resembling accommodation with the Soviet Union, was tarred with the label of "fellow traveler" and was believed to have been "duped." Compounding this, too, was the belief that international communism was as sly as it was predatory. One could be indoctrinated and not even realize they had become an agent of the Soviet Union until it was too late.[37] If modernization theory held, and the U.S. could influence global development initiatives with increased contact, then the same must be true for the U.S.'s enemies, and citizens venturing abroad needed to remain vigilant.

General Hefley's remarks in early 1960 embodied the persistence of cultural attitudes classifying overseas Americans as suspicious and potentially subversive. Even after arbitrary legal restrictions had been removed, the wandering American still confronted stigma and endured warnings when venturing overseas. The application of Cold War mentalities toward U.S. expatriates provides another example of how the U.S. public distilled complex ideas into narratives and tropes to communicate a mutual understanding of a particular idea. This shorthand, of the "suspect expat," was easily accessible during times of national crisis, whether real or manufactured, to be utilized by the state and others to build public support for their cause.

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[36] On the pivot from the U.S. government depicting National Socialism to Communism as the primary enemy of the United States see, Michaela Hoenicke Moore, *Know Your Enemy: The American Debate on Nazism, 1933-1945* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 344.

[37] Abbott Gleason, *Totalitarianism: The Inner History of the Cold War* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 92-107.

Transplanting U.S. Networks Abroad

As more Americans moved abroad, and political and legal restrictions became less onerous, expats transplanted their political associations and reinvigorated dormant networks. The U.S. business community mobilized to position themselves as an extension of stateside commerce interests. Progressives abroad showed solidarity with anti-nuclear and civil rights activists at home and overseas. As Americans replicated their political networks abroad, it also brought them into increasing contact with European citizens who shared their worldviews, allowing expats to claim legitimacy of speaking on behalf of the world when petitioning U.S. leaders about certain issues.

U.S. business elites overseas created the Council of American Chambers of Commerce in Europe. American Chambers of Commerce had existed in various European cities since the beginning of the twentieth century. Prior to the Second World War, the local Chambers on the continent functioned mostly as social clubs for prominent businessmen due to distance and communication issues.[38] The new Council originated in early 1962 when representatives of American Chambers of Commerce from Paris, Brussels, Frankfurt, Milan, Barcelona, London, and The Hague met in Barcelona amid the increased economic uncertainty.[39]

The Council's creation allowed local overseas Chambers to consolidate resources and provided a site where American business leaders could convene, discuss pressing issues, and formulate a single response, lending an appearance of consensus on trade and

[38] Robert Collins, *Business Response to Keynes* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981), 23-24; Richard Hume Werking, "Bureaucrats, Businessmen, and Foreign Trade: The Origins of the United States Chamber of Commerce," *Business History Review* 52:3 (Autumn 1978), 321-341. Werking argues that the government took an active role in the creations of the Chambers; Meg Jacobs, *Pocketbook Politics: Economic Citizenship in Twentieth Century America* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), 33-34, 73-75; Liz Cohen, A *Consumers' Republic: The Politics of Mass Consumption in Postwar America* (New York: Vintage Books, 2003), 20-25; Brooke Blower, *Becoming Americans in Paris: Transatlantic Politics and Culture Between the World Wars* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 27-29; Charles Glass, *Americans in Paris: Life and Death Under Nazi Occupation* (New York: Penguin Books, 2009), 13.

[39] R. H. Jerosch, "Council of American Chamber of Commerce in Europe," *Anglo American Trade News*, May 1963, 5, 50; "The Year's Work," *Commerce in France* (15 February 1964), 11.

business matters. Centered in Belgium, the Council met quarterly to discuss policies and approaches to the U.S. business situation in Europe. Its stated primary objectives aimed at encouraging the expansion of U.S. trade in Europe, fostering solidarity among American businessmen in Europe, and collecting and disseminating information of interest to its members throughout Europe. It maintained a relationship with Chambers in the U.S., and it established contact with governmental agencies, trade organizations, and "other associations concerned with European matters, except when it is in the function within the individual countries."[40] Furthermore, its presence in Belgium provided direct access to European Economic Community officials located there, allowing the Council to abide by its formula that had worked in the past of organizing to intervene at specific levels of government, whether local, state, national, or now transatlantic.

In addition to lobbying transatlantic policymakers, U.S. business interests remained visible to policymakers back home. The 1963-64 debates over tax reform in the United States included proposals to significantly increase the tax liabilities of overseas Americans.[41] The Council sent an immediate protest telegram to Congressman Wilbur

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[40] William E. Channing, "The Objectives of the Council of American Chamber of Commerce in Europe," *Anglo American Trade News*, August 1964, 15-16.

[41] In 1962 Kennedy's economic advisors proposed a tax cut directed at the top marginal rates believing its ability to promote economic growth by encouraging employment outweighed any potential threat of inflation or out of control budget deficits. However, as Congress debated the Revenue Act, Americans who lived overseas grew concerned about a proposal embedded within the legislation, the so-called Gore Amendment sponsored by Tennessee Senator Albert Gore, Sr. Gore was an ardent progressive tax reformer and sought to end most tax loopholes he believed benefited the wealthy and corporations. Gore's proposal aimed at bringing some of these earnings back into the United States treasury. At the time of the proposed legislation, taxable income earned by Americans who lived and worked abroad for three years was not subject to taxation until income crossed over $35,000. For Americans who lived and worked abroad for shorter periods, 510 days in an 18-month period, the tax code allowed exemptions on income up to $20,000. Gore's amendment proposed dramatically altering the levels, reducing the former's threshold to $6,000, and the latter's to $4,000. In the face of resistance from Americans abroad, Congress relented and only reduced the liability from $35,000 to $25,000 for Americans overseas for three years providing Americans overseas a partial victory. See Cleveland, et. al., *The Overseas Americans*, 16-17; Eileen Shanahan, "Senate Rejects a Change In Capital Gains Tax Rate," *New York Times*, 4 February 1964, p. 1; Albert Gore, Sr., "An Appeal from the Senate Floor," January 9, 1961; Stanley S. Surrey, "Taxation of Unremitted Foreign Income," *The Commercial and Financial Chronicle*, June 1, 1961, Reprinted in *International Executive*; Roland, Wolfe, "US Revenue Act of 1962," *Anglo American Trade News*, May 1963, 34-39; G. Calvin Mackenzie and Robert Weisbrot, *The Liberal Hour*: *Washington and the Politics of*

Mills, Chair of the House Ways and Means Committee, as well as Senator Russell Long, Chair of the Senate Finance Committee, who held hearings on the tax proposals asking that the proposed amendment be eliminated from the bill.[42] U.S. Secretary of Commerce Luther H. Hodges received numerous letters from Americans abroad, likely coordinated by the Council and local Chambers, expressing opposition to the Gore Amendment.[43] The growing discontent and political pressure from the expatriate business community forced Congress to relent, and the enacted changes in expat tax liability came in significantly under initial proposals when President Johnson signed the Revenue Act in February 1964.

The greater visibility of Chambers on the European continent also fostered greater cooperation with European business leaders. The organizations joined together to host events meant to showcase friendship and a shared commitment to economic cooperation. One joint event in February 1964 featured U.S. NATO Ambassador Thomas Finletter speaking to the American Chamber in London. His address, attended by both American and British business leaders, addressed the virtues of NATO as not only "a citadel not for the purpose of just military defense, but that it also is concerned with other kinds of defense, such as political cohesion and economic solidarity."[44] Later that year, the U.S. Ambassador to West Germany, George McGhee, delivered a speech to the Commerce

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Change in the 1960s (New York: Penguin Press, 2008) 89; Jim F. Heath, *John Kennedy and the Business Community* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969), 86-93; Allen J. Matusow, *The Unraveling of America: A History of Liberalism in the 1960s* (New York: Harper and Row, 1984), 35; B. Hughel Wilkins, "A Note on the Gore Amendment," *National Tax Journal* 18:3 (September 1965), 321-326.

[42] Norbert Baillen to Congressman Mills and Senator Long, February 7, 1964, reprinted in William Channing, "What Effect Would the Gore Amendment Have on American Citizens Abroad?" *Commerce in France* (15 March 1964), 9-10.

[43] B. Hughel Wilkins, "A Note on the Gore Amendment," *National Tax Journal* 18:3 (September 1965), 321-326.

[44] Ambassador Thomas K. Finletter, "The Purpose of NATO," *Anglo American Trade News*, February 1964, 6.

and Industry Chamber of Frankfurt and the American Chamber of Commerce on the topic of U.S. investments in the country. Addressing growing West German concerns of increased U.S. market share, he noted U.S. investment comprised only a fraction of the overall total in the West German economy.[45]

The reinvention of Chambers and their close association with business elites positioned the U.S. business community as individuals with legitimate and valid reasons to be abroad amid persistent suspicions over expats loyalty. These efforts showcased a commitment to officially sanctioned messages of the United States during the Cold War, even when they contested domestic policies like altering tax structures. Participating in this debate, even from afar, additionally signaled to policymakers and stateside citizens that despite being separated, the overseas business community remained engaged in specific issues, and planned to return. Through these actions, they made themselves into the "ideal expatriates" whose interests in being abroad served the official interests of the U.S., in contrast to Americans whose reasons for being abroad might be more "ambiguous."

Other Americans abroad, mostly from the progressive ranks, gravitated toward political issues they believed impeded efforts at effective and credible Cold War victories in the realm of international public opinion. Two issues captured the attention of this cadre: the advancement of civil rights for African Americans in the United States, and the promotion of world peace through nuclear non-proliferation. Both issues, this "other

[45] George C. McGhee, "Why Americans Invest in Germany," reprinted in *Anglo American Trade News*, June 1965, 5-8, 39; Philip Shabecoff, "American Investment Defended Against West German Attacks," *New York Times*, October 21, 1964. According to McGhee, U.S. investment in 1963 was $1.8 billion, less than 4% of the West German industrial investment. Furthermore, he noted that the U.S. subsidiaries employed only 1% of the German workforce. He noted that of the 35 largest corporations in West Germany, only three—Esso, GM's Opel, and Ford—were American. The message was that neither German nor American investors should fear continued U.S. investment in the Federal Republic, and that more exports would strengthen both economies in the long run.

America" abroad believed, were fundamental to maintaining U.S. credibility not only in Western Europe, but also in the developing world.[46]

Prominent and cosmopolitan African-Americans, including Richard Wright and James Baldwin, joined the outward migration of Americans beginning in the late 1940s. Victimized by de jure and de facto racial segregation in the United States and its personal and psychological impact, many African American intellectuals moved abroad to practice their craft and find greater opportunities for acceptance in intellectual circles that had been closed to them.[47] Additionally, African American expatriates combated the codified racist practices in the United States while overseas, not only in joining the civil rights struggle from afar, but also through participation in the ascending anti-colonial movements.[48]

As the civil rights struggle burgeoned in the United States during the late 1950s and into 1960s, the U.S. government, especially during the Kennedy administration, understood how the practices of racial intolerance undermined the U.S.'s global credibility as it battled for moral supremacy with the Soviet Union. Throughout the early Cold War, State Department officials struggled to explain to world leaders and the global public why, if the United States stood ready to defend democracy, freedom, and equality

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[46] Dudziak, *Cold War Civil Rights*, 34-46; Thomas Borstelmann, *The Cold War and the Color Line* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001), 142-157; Kevin Gaines, *African Americans in Ghana: Black Expatriates and the Civil Rights Era* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006) passim.

[47] Nico Slate, *Colored Cosmopolitanism: The Shared Struggle for Freedom in the United States and India* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012), passim; Carol Anderson, *Eyes Off the Prize: African Americans, The United Nations, and the Struggle for Human Rights,* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003).,160-163;Baldwin, James and Robert Tomlinson. "Payin' Ones Dues': Expatriation as Personal Experience and Paradigm in the Works of James Baldwin," *African American Review* 33 no. 1 (Spring 1999), " 135-148.

[48] Richard Wright, for example, was among those in attendance at the Bandung Conference shortly before his death in 1960. Odd ArneWestad, *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 99; Dudziak, *Cold War Civil Rights*, 189-191.

in Western Europe, it did not see the need to make those same guarantees to African-Americans in Alabama and Mississippi.[49]

In August 1963, as civil rights organizers in the U.S. coordinated the March on Washington, American expatriates, both black and white, held sympathy marches in Paris, Cairo, and elsewhere throughout the world.[50] In the wake of the march, expatriates created new organizations like "*Les Amis du SNCC"* [The friends of SNCC].[51] American students, faculty, and supporters at the American Center for Students and Artists organized Paris American Racial Integration Support (PARIS), which publicized the civil rights struggle in France and sent letters to policymakers urging passage of critical civil rights legislation before Congress.[52]

Pressing the United States government from afar on the issue of civil rights was complicated. While it offered a competing vision of the United States to the world, many political leaders saw it as undermining a message of power and strength and gave ammunition to the Soviet Union to use against the United States in their propaganda campaigns.[53] President Johnson's call for greater government attention to racial and socio-economic inequality, with his "Great Society" speeches in the spring of 1964 and the passage of the Civil Rights Act in July 1964, signaled to many Europeans and U.S.

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[49] Dudziak, *Cold War Civil Rights*, 56-57*;* Borstelman, *The Cold War and the Color Line*, 57-58.

[50] Mary L. Dudziak," Op-Ed: The Global March on Washington," *New York Times*, 28 August 2013.

[51] This organization remained under surveillance by the U.S. government throughout the 1960s. See, Report, "The SNCC Support Organization in France," April 4, 1968 and Report, "James Rufus Forman," May 21, 1968, folder, "Project Alpha/Black Power/Europe," Box 85, John Dean Files, Richard Nixon Presidential Library, Yorba Linda, CA.

[52] Meeting Announcement, Paris American Racial Integration Support (PARIS), May 12, 1965, folder 3, box 77 (77.3), James Jones Papers, Harry Ransom Center, University of Texas, Austin (Hereafter, HRC); Telegram, Paris American Racial Integration Committee, March 10, 1965, folder, "Paris, A-E," Box 43, White House Central Files Name File, Lyndon Johnson Library, Austin, TX (Hereafter, NLLBJ).

[53] Dudziak, *Cold War Civil Rights*, 169-170; Westad, *The Global Cold War,* 134.

allies that Johnson at least recognized that while the United States was imperfect, it continued to socially improve and made the task of threading the needle of American exceptionalism for expats a little easier.[54]

The 1964 Presidential Election Abroad

The extension of party politics overseas reflected the broader trend of expatriates mobilizing as a political constituency, beginning in the 1950s. The Democratic Party had begun an overseas operation in 1952, primarily by identifying prominent U.S. businessmen in Latin American countries.[55] The organization struggled in early years and had little impact apart from initial fundraising, in large part due to the United States' byzantine voting laws that gave ultimate jurisdiction for deciding voting requirement to each state, except in the cases of overseas military personnel and federal employees.[56] By 1960, the effort spread to the business community in Paris, where expats waded into the

[54] Dudziak, *Cold War Civil Rights*, 212-214.

[55] Memo, Jackie Peterson Democrats Abroad Mexico City Chapter to Frank McDermott, July 14, 1964, folder, "Americans Abroad for Johnson," Box 4, Frank McDermott Files, NLLBJ.

[56] The 1955 Federal Overseas Voting Assistance Act governed how expats could vote via absentee ballot. Under this act, the U.S. government allowed only civilian federal employees to join military servicemen stationed overseas to request ballots. Owing to a system of federalism, whereby individual states determined qualifications for voting, including residency, and the federal government set procedures; the law only encouraged states to make ballots available and did not force states to comply. By 1965, fewer than half of the U.S. states made any allowances to let overseas non-military, non-federal employees voters obtain a ballot. . In states that permitted expats to vote, they reported the paperwork required to apply for an absentee ballot varied from state to state. Some states allowed "postcard registration," while others required cumbersome, notarized documents. Every state had different definition of "resident," and sometimes interpretation depended on local election board officials. The system as it existed, many expats argued, disqualified an entire class of voters, and they endeavored to push lawmakers to streamline the process. Over the next decade, expatriates obtained piecemeal advancements in their ability to access absentee ballots, culminating with the 1975 Overseas Voting Rights Act signed by President Ford. This law assured expats the right to absentee ballots for voting in federal elections, and uniformly standardized the residency requirements for overseas Americans with respect to national elections for president. Amanda Klekowski von Koppenfels, *Migrants or Expatriates?: Americans in Europe* (London and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 242-245; Kevin J. Coleman, "The Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act: Background and Issues," Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, October 4, 2012. [*https://opencrs.com/document/RS20764/]*,[accessed April 23, 2013.]

political campaign of the homeland on a small scale in support of the Kennedy campaign.[57]

Democratic Party organizers cited the close results of the 1960 election as the basis for organizing and energetically appealing to the expat community. In reality, it derived from the increased visibility of the expatriate, especially the overseas business community. Leading the international effort was Alfred E. Davidson, an attorney who represented a consortium of French, British, and American banking interests to obtain $400 million to build the tunnel underneath the English Channel, and Anthony Hyde, a longtime Democratic Party supporter who served under Truman and was a rising star in the field of international advertising.[58]

Given Johnson's vocal support for civil rights and anti-poverty stance, progressives also flocked to the campaign. Authors James Jones (*From Here to Eternity*, *The Thin Red Line*) and James Baldwin (*Go Tell It on the Mountain*) served on the Johnson Campaign's Executive Committee in Paris and helped organize artists and writers there.[59] Beyond well-known and well-connected individuals, press accounts frequently reported on the composition of expat volunteers as a cross section of middle class American society: authors, lawyers, doctors, housewives, businessmen, bankers, journalists, artists, filmmakers, all of whom wanted to sustain some connection to the

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[57] Letter, Francis Leary to Maria Jolas, February 27, 1966, Paris American Committee to Stop War Papers, Microfilm, Reel #1, Wisconsin Historical Society, Madison, WI (Hereafter WHS).

[58] Thomas Nuzum, "Plan Drive in Europe for Votes for Barry," *Chicago Tribune*, 26 September 1964, p. 11; Peter Bart, "Advertising: Memorandum by Rosser Reeves Becomes Big Seller," *New York Times*, 12 October 1961, p. 47; Peter Bart, "Advertising: Ogilvy Drops Rolls-Royce Job," *New York Times*, 28 May 1962, p. 44; Peter Bart, "Advertising: Memorandum by Rosser Reeves Becomes Big Seller," *New York Times*, 12 October 1961, p. 47; "Johnson Backers Abroad Organize," *Washington Post*, 8 August 1964, p. A1.

[59] Press Release, "Americans Abroad for Johnson Open Headquarters in Paris," n.d.; Letter, Artists and Writers for Johnson Chairman Tria French to James Jones, October 10, 1964; James Jones Remarks at Democrats Abroad Fundraiser, October 15, 1964, folder 10, box 73 (73.10), James Jones Papers, HRC.

United States.[60] Most of the daily events at campaign offices were similar to those in the U.S., structured around making phone calls, preparing mailings, and identifying potential voters and donors.[61] The organization placed advertisements in newspapers known to have a wide expatriate readership, encouraging them to vote if their last state of residency permitted expats to vote in the election.[62] More importantly, with vast connections to the business community, Davidson planned 20 fundraisers for Johnson throughout Europe during the campaign, where donors gave tens of thousands of dollars.[63]

Although based in Paris, Americans Abroad for Johnson spread quickly, and Johnson support groups appeared in Geneva, Rome, Frankfurt, and Brussels.[64] Johnson supporters favored distinctive ways to announce their presence in each city. In Frankfurt, John A. Ryan, an American businessman from San Francisco, launched the campaign with electioneering in the town square where President Kennedy had spoken the previous

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[60] "A London Campaign for Johnson," *Times Union* (Albany, NY), October 19, 1964, folder, "Volunteer Groups: Americans Abroad for Johnson," Box 182, Democratic National Committee Files, NLLBJ.

[61] Meeting Minutes, Americans Abroad for Johnson Daily Staff Meeting, October 1, 1964, folder 10, box 73 (73.10), James Jones Papers, HRC; Meeting Minutes, Americans Abroad for Johnson Executive Committee, October 14, 1964, folder 10, box 73 (73.10), James Jones Papers, HRC; Thomas Nuzum, "List Envoys' Wives as Johnson Backers," *Chicago Tribune*, 25 September 1964, p. 6.

[62] Letter, Toby Hyde to Presidential Aide Jack Valenti, October 2, 1964, Folder, "PL/CO (General)," Box 30, White House Central Files National Defense, NLLBJ. Kevin J. Coleman, "The Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act: Background and Issues," Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, October 4, 2012. [*https://opencrs.com/document/RS20764/], downloaded on April 23, 2013.* Memo, Jackie Peterson Democrats Abroad Mexico City Chapter to Frank McDermott, July 14, 1964, folder, "Americans Abroad for Johnson," Box 4, Frank McDermott Files, NLLBJ.

[63] "Who's Ahead in the Sixth Arrondissement?," Time Magazine, October 9, 1964, folder, "Volunteer Groups: Americans Abroad for Johnson," Box 182, Democratic National Committee Files, NLLBJ; In addition after the campaign both the Johnson support organizations in Paris and London donated their remaining cash on hand, some $2000 to independent Johnson organizations, some of which was returned to party officials in the U.S.

[64] Robert H. Estabrook, "Expatriates Form Group For Johnson," *Washington Post*, 22 August 1964, p. A4 James Feron, "Johnson Backers Are Busy Abroad: Americans in London Open Absentee Ballot Drive, *New York Times*, 23 August 1964, p. 78; "Brussels Gets Johnson Group," *New York Times*, 16 September 1964, p. 16.

year.[65] At Oktoberfest in Munich, Johnson supporters wore campaign hats and Johnson buttons and had a Bavarian brass band play "California Here I Come." In London, supporters organized a baseball game in Hyde Park.[66] In the London suburbs, Johnson supporters set up tables at local supermarkets and approached people they believed to be Americans.[67] In France, Davidson and his counterpart in the Goldwater campaign, Evan Galbraith, who worked for a French subsidy of Morgan Guaranty Trust, held a debate at the American Center that was moderated by both American and European journalists.[68] The performance of many expats in "Americans Abroad for Johnson" groups provided an opportunity to practice personal diplomacy and showcase some of the positive attributes of Johnson's vision to the world.[69] Leaflets distributed by Johnson supporters abroad proclaimed the president's views to potential voters, saying, "As a nation we cannot afford any retreat from our present position of respect in world affairs."[70]

European interest in the campaign remained high as well, as many people on the continent worried over the prospect of a Barry Goldwater presidency. Goldwater's

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[65] "Americans Begin Johnson Election Drive in Frankfurt," *Chicago Tribune*, September 26, 1964, folder, "Volunteer Groups: Americans Abroad for Johnson," Box 182, Democratic National Committee Files, NLLBJ.

[66] "Johnson's Vote Drive in London is in Full Swing," *Chicago Tribune*, September 13, 1964, folder, "Volunteer Groups: Americans Abroad for Johnson," Box 182, Democratic National Committee Files, NLLBJ.

[67] "LBJ Bandwagon Visits 24 Towns," *Washington Post*, October 11, 1964, folder, "Volunteer Groups: Americans Abroad for Johnson," Box 182, Democratic National Committee Files, NLLBJ.

[68] Letter, David M. Davis to James Jones, October 14, 1964, folder 10, box 73 (73.10), James Jones Papers, Harry Ransom Center, University of Texas, Austin; "Who's Ahead in the Sixth Arrondissement?," *Time Magazine*, October 9, 1964, folder, "Volunteer Groups: Americans Abroad for Johnson," Box 182, Democratic National Committee Files, NLLBJ.

[69] Press Release, "Americans Abroad for Johnson Open Headquarters in Paris," n.d.; Letter, Alfred E. Davidson to James Jones, July 27, 1964, folder 10, box 73 (73.10), James Jones Papers, HRC.

[70] "Youths Stump London for Johnson," *New York Times*, 5 September 1964, p. 6; "The Campaign Abroad for Johnson," *Chicago Tribune*, 16 September 1964, p. 20, "Volunteer Groups: Americans Abroad for Johnson," Box 182, Democratic National Committee Files, NLLBJ.

nomination by the Republican Party in July revived the specter of the early Cold War. His staunch anti-communist position and refusal to denounce extremist elements within the United States, such as the Ku Klux Klan and the John Birch Society, damaged his reputation before transatlantic audiences. Furthermore, Goldwater's proposal for the use of nuclear weapons to become more conventional and used at the discretion of military commanders in the field prompted sharp criticism in the U.S. and abroad.[71] Many Europeans saw Goldwater as representing the advent of a new period of isolationism and xenophobia that had characterized the Pre-World War II era in the United States.[72]

The transatlantic public's reaction to Goldwater's nomination speech was observed and noted by U.S. expatriates as already doing "damage" and provoking "anxiety among our European friends."[73] James Jones captured and relayed this sentiment to a group of artists at a Paris fundraiser for the campaign:

> I don't think there is an American in Europe who hasn't been confronted a dozen times a week this past month or so with frantic questions asking what's going to happen in the American elections. It's eye-opening to discover how much the world worries about what we do in our election. Worry is really the word. There isn't question that Lyndon Johnson could be re-elected if Europe voted. Or Asia or Latin American or Africa for that matter.[74]

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[71] Tom Wicker, "Turnout is Heavy**:** President Expected to Get 60% of Vote, With 44 States**,"** *New York Times,* 4 November 1964, p. 1.

[72] Thomas Alan Schwartz, *Lyndon Johnson and Europe: In the Shadow of Vietnam* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003), 36; Fredrik Logevall notes this popular perception of Goldwater was in no small part due to Johnson's continued rhetoric on the campaign trail and statements that used phrases like "trigger happy" and "war monger" to describe Goldwater. Fredrik Logevall, *Choosing War: The Lost Chance for Peace and the Escalation of War in Vietnam* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1999), 237.

[73] Letter, James V. Compton to Democratic National Committee, July 23, 1964, folder, "Americans Abroad for Johnson," Box 4, Frank McDermott Files, NLLBJ.

[74] James Jones, "Remarks at Democrats Abroad Fundraiser," October 15, 1964; Letter, Artists and Writers for Johnson Chairman Tria French to James Jones, October 10, 1964, folder 10, box 73 (73.10), James Jones Papers, HRC.

Despite this assessment, Republican Barry Goldwater's supporters made attempts to organize in Europe as well. Heading up the Party's effort in Europe were former Congresswoman and U.S. Ambassador to Italy and Brazil, Clare Booth Luce, and Charles A. Barr, a lawyer with Standard Oil of Indiana, a subsidiary of the American Oil Company.[75] Luce and Barr's participation in the Goldwater campaign overseas seemingly represented the two pillars of the Senator's campaign—rabid anti-communism and vehement opposition to the legacy of the New Deal.[76] Compared to the highly enthusiastic Johnson campaign overseas, Goldwater's campaign was more haphazard and lackluster. The Republicans were beset by logistical problems throughout the campaign. Expats for Goldwater did not hold an organizational meeting until late September, nearly two months after the Johnson advocates met. In Italy, Pier Talenti, a Goldwater supporter, decried the difficulties of organizing in the country, saying any gathering of more than five people must be approved by a host of officials from the Interior Minister all the way "to the local Fire Department," echoing Goldwater's criticism on the problems of excessive governance. Most of the campaign's success was reported around U.S. military bases near the cities of Vicenza, Verona, Livorno, and Naples.[77] The anti-communist rhetoric and crusade of Goldwater and his followers, the popular associations of expats as leftists, the fact many of the Arizona Senator's supporters abroad did not want to be identified as expats, and the reality of there being few votes for Goldwater

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[75] Thomas Nuzum, "Plan Drive in Europe for Votes for Barry," *Chicago Tribune*, 26 September 1964, p. 11, folder, "Volunteer Groups: Americans Abroad for Johnson," Box 182, Democratic National Committee Files, NLLBJ.

[76] Lisa McGirr, *Suburban Warriors: The Origins of the New American Right* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 111-146; Rebecca E. Klatch, *A Generation Divided: The New Left, the New Right, and the 1960s* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1999), 81-88; Robert David Johnson, *All the Way With LBJ: The 1964 Presidential Election* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), passim.

[77] "Who's Ahead in the Sixth Arrondissement?," Time Magazine, October 9, 1964, folder, "Volunteer Groups: Americans Abroad for Johnson," Box 182, Democratic National Committee Files, NLLBJ.

among the U.S. expatriate community, all limited the efficacy of the Goldwater's campaign.

As the campaign neared the finish line, the enthusiasm of expats seemed infectious. News outlets reported requests for absentee ballots ran 3 to 1 ahead of 1960, even with fewer servicemen overseas.[78] Money poured into the overseas campaign organizations, so much so that Hyde and Davidson made arrangements to send the surplus back to Johnson organizations in the states to continue supporting other Democratic candidates.[79] In addition, both Hyde and Davidson inquired to Party officials about the prospects of maintaining the organizations for future elections. [80] Even a French editor interviewed by an American magazine, when asked about his perception of the campaign efforts underway in France, stated, "One gets the impression it [participating in

[78] "That Overseas Vote," *The Honolulu Adventurer,* October 30, 1964, folder, "Volunteer Groups: Americans Abroad for Johnson," Box 182, Democratic National Committee Files, NLLBJ.

[79] After the election Toby Hyde contacted the administration about the balance forward. In the letter he enclosed a check for $2570.70, the balance of remaining funds from Americans overseas for Johnson. The check is made out to Independent Citizens for Johnson. At the bottom of the carbon paper in the case file is Toby's wishes to the president including "tell him [Johnson] that the American community over in the UK continues its strong admiration for the way he is handling very difficult decisions. We are solidly behind him, over here." Letter, Toby Hyde to Henry Dudley, May 13, 1965, Folder, "PL 3 1/1/65-6/24/65 (General)," Box 113, White House Central Files, NLLBJ. Similarly Alfred Davidson in Paris turned over his money to the DNC, (not independents for Johnson as the British group did). In a letter Bailey of the DNC acknowledges receipt of two check totaling $1691. 27. Bailey states that he very much wants the organization to continue, and thus returns a check for $500 to assist in building the organization. Bailey expressed his appreciation of the DNC for their work, and looks forward to their help in the 1966 congressional races. He also suggests changing the name to "Democratic Committee for France" Letter, Chairman of the Democratic National Committee John M. Bailey to Alfred Davidson, January 22, 1965, folder 3, box 77 (77.3), James Jones Papers, HRC. For additional exchanges between the campaign and supporters abroad see: Toby Hyde to Henry Dudley and Jack Valenti, May 13, 1965, folder, "Americans," Box 139, White House Central Files Name File, Johnson Library, Austin' Americans Abroad for Johnson Executive Committee Meeting Minutes, November 12, 1964, and Letter, AAFJ Treasurer Bob Simpson to James Jones, n.d., folder 10, box 73 (73.10), James Jones Papers, HRC.

[80]As to the question as to whether a permanent overseas party organization should be created, Jack Valenti referred the inquiry to Johnson aid Cliff Carter, who worked closely with the DNC on February 27, 1965. Carter responded to Valenti a week later: "we have Tony Hyde's suggestion under advisement, but confidentially, I rather doubt the wisdom of such a long term arrangement. Because of changing personnel, I believe it best that these campaigns out of the United States be organized every four years on an individual basis. "Letter, Toby Hyde to President Johnson, February 25, 1965, folder, "GI 2-8/HUN-HZ," Box 68, White House Central Files, NLLBJ.

the campaign] stimulates sluggish livers. I think we should be allowed to campaign and vote for the American President too. You are selfish not to share the pleasure."[81] The French editor's observation on overseas election participants may have been at the same time a tongue-in-cheek commentary on the spectacle of expats, admiration of the vibrancy of the democratic process, and a surreptitious suggestion that the decision of the U.S. electorate possessed implications far beyond the country's borders.

Conclusion

Expatriate participation in the presidential election held benefits and disadvantages for their status and inclusion into the U.S. political community. It signaled expatriates had traveled a long distance in overcoming some of the earlier Cold War perceptions of being abroad. Participation provided an outlet to transmit some of the transatlantic anxiety over the revival of hard line Cold War positions. Expatriates' political activism, too, remained a part of future campaigns and provided an important source of campaign financing for political candidates. It made the expat community visible to political leaders. Finally, campaign participation politicized the transatlantic space, engulfing it in the symbols and ritual of American political campaigns.

In the immediate aftermath of the 1964 election, President Johnson remained popular among the expatriate community. An American nun who taught at a religious school outside of Paris reported that she voted for Johnson, and also noted how the French people were happy with the election's outcome, an impression she gathered from the newspapers, her students, their parents, and others in her religious community. She wrote, "I went to my first period class with a heart full of love for our American people and our friends here abroad who really love us and who look to us as friends with a

[81] "Who's Ahead in the Sixth Arrondissement?," *Time Magazine*, October 9, 1964, folder, "Volunteer Groups: Americans Abroad for Johnson," Box 182, Democratic National Committee Files, NLLBJ.

common goal: world peace!"[82] The experience, observations, and interactions of the expatriate community provided the basis for its political claims as 1965 arrived.

On New Year's Day 1965, President Johnson sent greetings, thanks, and best wishes for the holidays to the thousands of overseas Americans specifically mentioning, "servicemen, diplomats, Peace Corpsmen, and all other Americans who devoutly and faithfully representing our country in far away lands." The president commended the civilian and military employees of the United States, noting that their unselfish acts were helping "to create order and progress in a troubled world." The president then mentioned Americans in both Vietnam and the Congo who "serve their country's interests and they serve the cause of peace. They bring help and hope to the people of less fortunate countries."[83] Johnson's message to official representatives of the United States occurred at a time when public opinion continued to show relatively positive views of the country.

In June 1965, even as the U.S.'s war in Vietnam was well underway and included a massive bombing campaign, the United States Information Agency (USIA) asked people throughout Western Europe about the compatibility of U.S. and their countries' interests. The numbers reached their post-1960 apex everywhere (except France). A net total of 77% in West Germany, 73% in Britain, and 57% in Italy saw their countries' and the U.S.'s interests in sync. France, the only outlier, netted 10% of the population showing agreement with the two countries' goals.[84]

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[82] Letter, Reverend Mother Francis Joseph, R.A, to President Johnson, November 4, 1964, folder, "PP 2-2/CO—PP 2-2/CO 94 (General)," Box 45, White House Central Files, NLLBJ.

[83] "President Praises Americans Abroad For Serving Peace," *New York Times*, 2 January 1965, p. 5.

[84] "Perceived Community of Basic Interest With the United States," United States Information Agency, "Trends in West European Public Opinion on US Policy Objectives," March 12, 1968, folder "Trends in West European Public Opinion on US Policy Objectives," Box 13, E. Ernest Goldstein Files, NLLBJ.

This high water mark of international views of the U.S. only a few months after the 1964 election slowly eroded over the next decade, as the United States applied a military solution to the evolving situation in Vietnam. The war became the next front in which the expatriate community staked their claims as experts in the affairs of foreign policy and in questions of U.S. global credibility and national security.[85] However, in doing so, they continued to encounter widespread suspicions of their loyalty and motives, which shaped their efforts to join the growing community of dissenters in the U.S. and internationally.

[85] Robert J. McMahon, "Credibility and World Power: Exploring the Psychological Dimension in Postwar American Diplomacy," *Diplomatic History* 15:4 (Fall 1991), 466-471.

CHAPTER TWO
'HELP RESTORE AMERICA'S IMAGE ABROAD': U.S. CREDIBILITY AND THE ORIGINS OF U.S. EXPATRIATE DISSENT, 1965-1967

In December 1965, as the Johnson administration paused the intense bombing campaign over Vietnam, known as "Rolling Thunder," for the Christmas holiday, many in the antiwar movement believed it signaled a reconsideration of the military approach to the situation in Southeast Asia.[1] The hopefulness was reflected in the telegram from American author James Jones who lived in Paris. Jones had worked with the 1964 Johnson Campaign, raising funds among the artistic and literary community overseas. In the telegram, after identifying himself as a Johnson supporter, Jones declared he was "in strong accord with those elements of your administration who are against renewing bombing of North Vietnam. Let us save ourselves and our strength for the Great Society."[2] Jones raised the possibility that the war distracted and deprived the administration of its domestic goals to address rampant social and racial inequality in the United States. By connecting his antiwar sentiment with the laudable goals of the Great Society, Jones situated his opposition to war within a longer tradition of American foreign policy dissent that linked U.S. global credibility with the example the U.S. provided to the rest of the world.

Between 1964 and 1966, President Johnson worked to build international support for the U.S. war in Vietnam. His appeals reflected Cold War assumptions that communism was monolithic and expansive and U.S. national security was at stake.[3] Additionally, Johnson framed the need to fight in Vietnam as necessary to maintain U.S.

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[1] John Prados, *Vietnam: The History of An Unwinnable War* (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 2009), 146-147.

[2] Telegram, James Jones to President Johnson, January 28, 1966, folder, "Americans," Box 139, White House Central Files/Name File, Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library, Austin, Texas (hereafter NLLBJ).

[3] Andrew Preston, "Monsters Everywhere: A Genealogy of National Security," *Diplomatic History* 38:3 (June 2014), 478-479.

credibility when confronting Soviet aggression. The Johnson administration used the United States Information Agency (USIA), the propaganda arm of the U.S. State Department, to sell the global public on a specific version of the United States' Cold War mission. The USIA regularly sponsored lectures, public programs, and information centers directed at middle and upper class Europeans, including intellectuals, journalists, clergy, business leaders, and local elected officials, whom the United States government deemed to be important constituencies in maintaining support for their foreign policy and global image.[4]

This official vision did not go uncontested, however. At the same time the U.S. government worked to convince the transatlantic allied leaders and public of the stakes in Vietnam, U.S. citizens overseas presented a powerful counterargument challenging the idea U.S. credibility was at stake if they abandoned an ally. American expatriates tried to convey to U.S. audiences and leaders that the war squandered the U.S.'s international goodwill, as many individuals throughout the world questioned the war's necessity and the tactics used by the U.S. military in Vietnam. This assessment rested on the assumption that the United States' positive global image emanated from a belief that the U.S. traditionally upheld basic universal principles of justice, equality, and democracy throughout the world, rather than from its ability to reshape the world in its image through military power.[5]

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[4] Laura A. Belmonte, *Selling the American Way: U.S. Propaganda and the Cold War* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008), 127-135; Shawn J. Parry-Giles, "The Eisenhower Administration's Conceptualization of the USIA: The Development of Overt and Covert Propaganda Strategies," *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 24, (Spring, 1994), 263-276; Mark Haefele, "John F. Kennedy, USIA, and World Public Opinion," *Diplomatic History* 25:1 (Winter 2000), 63-84.

[5] John Fousek, *To Lead the Free World: American Nationalism and the Cultural Roots of the Cold War* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000), 10-11; Anders Stephanson, "Liberty or Death: The Cold War as U.S. Ideology," in Odd Arne Westad, ed., *Reviewing the Cold War: Approaches, Interpretations, Theory* (Portland, OR and London: Frank Cass, 2000), 81-102; Michael Hunt, *Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1987), 19-45.

This chapter considers the origins of this counterargument relating to expatriates and the Vietnam War. For expats who vocalized antiwar dissent during the early war (1965-1967), the absence of a natural constituency in which to appeal and frame their objections to U.S. foreign policy in Vietnam posed a problem. Stateside antiwar dissent had already begun to sort themselves according to interests (e.g., students, veterans, African-Americans, mothers) and used that identification to frame opposition to the war. Expatriates similarly used the war as a method to gain recognition for the limits on their own civic participation in U.S. politics and society.

Motivated by desire both to restore U.S.'s global image and to establish their credentials to comment upon issues of national importance, expatriates formed ad hoc committees to oppose the U.S. war in Vietnam beginning in early 1966. Being overseas and cut off from the emerging antiwar movement in the United States pushed expats into increased contact with one another, despite arriving at antiwar opposition from a variety of intellectual traditions. In this international space, the associations blended intellectual traditions of old-left progressivism with new-left critiques of the war. Expats merged these strands to position themselves within this growing transatlantic civil society as a distinctly American voice against the war.

Seeing the U.S. government was unwilling to pursue meaningful alternatives in Vietnam as bombing resumed after the 1965 Christmas pause, U.S. citizens overseas registered their opposition to war. The Paris American Committee to Stop War (PACS), formed by Maria Jolas and other progressives who had acquired their political consciousness and worldviews during the Second World War, became the foremost expat opposition group on the continent. While the older generation framed their dissent using rhetoric and language of earlier progressives, many of the students in the U.S. Campaign in West Berlin and the *Stop It Committee* in London retained much of the new-left ideas and attitudes circulating on U.S. college campuses.

President Johnson and Framing Official Justifications for War

In late 1963 the most pressing foreign policy concern confronting the United States' international reputation was the question over North and South Vietnam. The political and military situation in U.S.-backed South Vietnam spiraled out of control the previous summer. Vietnamese students took to the streets demonstrating against the repressive Ngo Dinh Diem regime, as the National Liberation Front (NLF) gained public support. South Vietnamese soldiers raided Buddhist pagodas throughout the country in order to stifle the growing protests like that of Thich Quang Duc, a South Vietnamese Buddhist monk whose self-immolation and image newspapers flashed throughout the world, represented the deepening political turmoil in South Vietnam.[6] The raids were a continuation of the U.S.-backed Diem regime's widespread crackdown against any perceived enemies and were coordinated by Diem's brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu, the head of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN).[7]

In November 1963, just weeks before President Kennedy's assassination, a military coup, backed by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, deposed of Ngo Dinh Diem and his brother. Both men had been ardent anti-communists and had been installed with the U.S. government's blessing in 1956.[8] Over time, however, their brutal policies—the persecution of Buddhists, the torture and imprisonment of political enemies, and the adoption of laws like Law 10-59, which banned any form of dissent and gave the South

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[6] On the situation in South Vietnam in the early 1960s, see, Jessica M. Chapman, *Cauldron of Resistance: Ngo Dinh Diem, the United States and 1950s Southern Vietnam* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2013),192-193.

[7] Prados, *Vietnam,* 77-81; Mark Bradley, *Vietnam at War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 77-79; Mark Lawrence, *The Vietnam War: A Concise International History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 76-80.

[8] Chapman, *Cauldron of Resistance*, 70-76; Miller, "The Ascent of Ngo Dinh Diem," in Mark Bradley and Marilyn Young, eds., *Making Sense of the Vietnam Wars: Local, National, and Transnational Perspectives* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 133- 169.

Vietnamese government the right to execute dissidents—slowly eroded U.S. credibility among the Vietnamese people. In December 1960, a coalition of anti-Diem forces including Buddhists, communists, liberal democrats, and others established the National Liberation Front (NLF) to oppose Diem and seek the reunification of North and South through a neutralized settlement. While not all members of the NLF endorsed communism or violence, many in the organization saw it as a path to ending the tyranny of the Diem brothers, expelling the influence of outsiders, establishing a more democratic and inclusive South Vietnam government, and ultimately reunifying the country.[9]

In July 1964, USIA Director Carl Rowan sent a memo to USIA station heads and public affairs officers emphasizing the president had "placed the highest priority" on programs supporting U.S. determination to stop communism in Southeast Asia. Rowan wrote, "I have accordingly assured the President that USIA will spare no resource or effort in support of that objective."[10] He elaborated on specific talking points its stations needed to emphasize, and directed the USIA media division to "launch an expanded and sustained flow of products in support of this priority project" that would be of interest to local media, civic groups, and cultural institutions. In this effort, the USIA prioritized five European countries: West Germany, France, Italy, Austria, and Britain, which consumed 56% of USIA funds allocated toward the agency's West European operation in fiscal years 1963 and 1964.[11]

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[9] On Pubic Law 10-59 and its effectiveness and the rise of the NLF see Bradley, *Vietnam at War*, 88-89; Lawrence, *The Vietnam War*, 76-80; Lawrence, *The Vietnam War*, 65-66; Robert Brigham, *Guerilla Diplomacy: The NLF's Foreign Relations and the Vietnam War* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999), 1-18.

[10] Memo, USIA Director Carl T. Rowan to USIA Heads of Elements and Public Affairs Officers, July 17, 1964, folder, "Volume II: Documentary Supplement," Box 2, United States Information Agency Administrative History, NLLBJ.

[11] "Western Europe Area (IAE) Program," in Chapter Five (pages 60-70) of *The Administrative History of the United States Information Agency*, 1968 folder, "Volume I: Administration History [2 of 2],"Box 1, Administrative History of the United States Information Agency, NLLBJ.

Rowan's directive in mid-1964 coincided with an intense effort by the Johnson administration to build international support for the South Vietnamese government known as the "More Flags" campaign. With this campaign, President Johnson instructed Secretary of State Dean Rusk to gauge the support of U.S. allies in Western Europe on the question of securing and stabilizing South Vietnam, and their willingness to supply troops, armaments, and resources to the cause. The U.S. State Department hoped such a commitment might demonstrate to North Vietnam and its allies that the free world stood united in defending the South Vietnamese people. In reality, it was hoped that an influx of military, economic, or other material support might stabilize the floundering, post-coup South Vietnamese government. Furthermore, by having Western European countries invest in the situation, it gave them a stake in the outcome, possibly requiring a deeper and more substantial commitment at a later date.[12] The Western European allies, however, balked and provided only token assistance.[13]

Unsure how to proceed, the Johnson administration unleashed an intense bombing campaign known as "Operation Rolling Thunder" in March 1965, after a series of incremental steps and piecemeal bombing failed to convince North Vietnam and the NLF to come to the negotiating table.[14] Citing the authority granted by Congress under the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, Rolling Thunder was a massive carpet-bombing campaign of

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[12] On "More Flags" see, Fredrik Logevall, *Choosing War: The Lost Chance for Peace and the Escalation of War in Vietnam* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1999), 180-182.

[13] Even the SEATO allies, in the region where the war was fought, and perhaps most affected by the domino theory, proved reluctant to join in the war effort, despite Australia's attempt to get Washington to have SEATO run the operations, as the UN had done in Korea. Only Australia and South Korea provided troops to the effort, as they adhered to the Domino theory argument and saw the U.S. as the primary guarantor of their security during the Cold War. About 50,000 Australians served over the course of the war, with 8,000 at its peak and suffered about 500 causalities. Edwards, "The Strategic Concerns of a Regional Power: Australia's Involvement in the Vietnam War," and Fredrik Logevall, "America Isolated," 183-188 in Andreas W. Daum, Lloyd C. Gardner, and Wilfried Mausbach, *America, the Vietnam War and the World: Comparative and International Perspectives* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

[14] Marilyn Young, *The Vietnam Wars*, *1945-1990* (New York: Harper Collins, 1991), 135-136; Prados, *Vietnam,* 114.

the North, hitting any conceivable target believed to be of military value.[15] It also established "free fire zones" in the south, which were areas believed to have heavy NLF guerilla infiltration.[16] It was hoped that the sheer intensity would cripple the North's infrastructure and morale, while at the same time, buy time for the U.S.-backed government in Saigon to stabilize. Commencing a large-scale aerial assault required U.S. ground troops to guard military installations and airbases. Seeking to head off NLF attacks, U.S. General William Westmoreland sent U.S. troops on patrols near the military installations, bringing a ground war to South Vietnam to accompany the bombing. Shortly after, General Westmoreland sent the administration a request for additional troops, seeking to up the levels of U.S. troops there to 200,000 from 75,000.[17] In July, the request came for more.

On July 28, 1965, President Lyndon Johnson authorized an additional 100,000 U.S. troops to Vietnam. At the press conference announcing the increased troop presence, Johnson read a letter he received from a woman in "the Midwest" who had a son serving in Vietnam and wanted answers about the war and why the United States needed to fight it. Johnson patiently explained the decision to fight in Vietnam originated in the lessons of the previous two wars— World War II and Korea.[18] He stated the United States fought for freedom in those wars, and that "We have learned at a terrible and a brutal cost that retreat does not bring safety and weakness does not bring peace."[19] Making an analogy to

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[15] Young, *The Vietnam Wars*, 158-159; Prados, *Vietnam*, 127-128.

[16] On free fire zones see, Prados, *Vietnam,* 137; Young, *The Vietnam Wars*, 129; Bernd Greiner, *War Without Fronts: The USA in Vietnam* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2009), 72-73. Greiner cites a U.S. Senate report that an estimated 300,000 Vietnamese people were killed in Free Fire Zones between 1965 and the end of 1968.

[17] Young, *The Vietnam Wars*, 158-159; Prados, *Vietnam,* 127-128.

[18] Preston, "Monsters Everywhere," 477-500.

[19] Lyndon B. Johnson: "The President's News Conference," July 28, 1965. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=27116 [accessed November 9, 2013]

the agreement negotiated between Britain, France, and Germany in Munich in 1938, Johnson told the assembled press and American public that, "We did not choose to be the guardians at the gate, but there is no one else." Failing to stand up to communist aggression would "dishonor our word," "abandon our commitment," and "leave those who believed us and who trusted us to the terror and repression and murder that would follow."[20]

As the Johnson administration mobilized the public for the war, the official justification repeatedly centered on maintaining U.S. credibility and security in the face of global communist aggression. Central to Johnson's claim was that failure to act in Vietnam had far reaching implications throughout the world. The previous April, when delivering a "why we fight" speech at Johns Hopkins University, he noted the world from "Thailand to Berlin" would notice what the U.S. does in Vietnam.[21] Johnson's argument rested on the belief that if the U.S and western powers failed to confront communism at the current front, South Vietnam, they risked wider war and bloodshed.[22] If the U.S. did not confront the communist menace in the developing world, where the stakes were low, could the U.S.'s global allies, especially in Western Europe, count on the U.S. if Soviet tanks rolled across the Fulda Gap? Johnson's assertion assumed that the rest of the world saw Vietnam, and the military response there, as critical to their security.[23]

In making this claim about U.S. credibility, the lesson of Munich became a popular trope deployed by the Johnson administration. The analogy, despite its dubious

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[20] Ibid.

[21] Lyndon B. Johnson: "Address at Johns Hopkins University: "Peace Without Conquest."," April 7, 1965, Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=26877 [accessed November 9, 2013]

[22] Ibid.

[23] Preston, "Monsters Everywhere," 477-500.

nature, worked as a rhetorical device as it allowed the administration to frame communism as the inheritors of fascism, and as the primary threat to world peace and stability.[24] The analogy was accessible to the transatlantic public as well. It allowed the president to demonstrate how remote areas of the world might pose a threat to U.S. security. It also permitted the President, a World War II veteran, to appeal specifically to a generation who had successfully fought back Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan two decades before, placing the emerging conflict in relatable terms. In theory, it also appealed to a generation of Europeans who might remember the hardship and suffering the war and its aftermath brought.

Dissenting Views in the U.S. and Abroad

As President Johnson intensified the bombing campaign and sent U.S. troops to fight a ground war, intellectuals in the United States expressed concern over the military intervention. In February 1965, shortly before the administration unleashed Rolling Thunder, George Kennan, the architect of the U.S.'s Cold War containment policy, told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee expanding the U.S.'s military role in Vietnam risked bringing the Soviet Union and Communist China into the war. Even worse, Kennan believed, the Soviets might resent being forced into defending Vietnam,

[24] Several authors have cited how this analogy is flawed, specifically in that the United States in relation to world power in 1965 was not comparable to Britain and France in 1938. In fact the German military, probably had more military capability than both Britain and France and to issue an ultimatum in this instance who have been foolhardy at best, and second, dangerous. Finally the analogy that Johnson makes presupposes that Vietnam was analogous to Nazi Germany (or Communist China or the Soviet Union, if one held the outdated Cold War assumptions that communist remained monolithic, an idea that had been widely discredited by the early 1960s by experts such as Kennan and Morgenthau.) The power and capabilities of the two nations were not even in the same league at the moment. Nor were the stakes similar. A cursory look blows this analogy apart. Despite its failings, US officials continue to invoke the Munich Lesson. In September 2013, Secretary of State John Kerry, in calling for US intervention Syria, referred to it as a "Munich moment." For a comprehensive discussion of this invocation of the Munich Lesson, especially as justification for the Vietnam War see, Yuen Foong Khong, *Analogies at War*: *Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), passim.

ultimately hampering ongoing efforts to ease U.S.-Soviet tensions.[25] He concluded by urging American policymakers "not to worry so much about those remote countries scattered across the southern crescent, to let them go their own way, not to regard their fate as our exclusive responsibility, to wait for them to come to us rather than our fussing continually over them."[26]

Ten days after Johnson's Johns Hopkins Speech, University of Chicago professor Hans Morgenthau penned an editorial in the *New York Times* entitled, "We are Deluding Ourselves in Vietnam." Morgenthau, the German expatriate and the grandfather of American political realism, opened by referencing the Johns Hopkins speech, and commended Johnson for offering a way out of the situation. However, Morgenthau delineated a key difference between U.S. military presence in Western Europe and the developing world. In his essay, Morgenthau argued U.S. military presence in Europe derived from the legitimate military threat posed by the Soviet army after the Second World War to sweep across the continent and take advantage of the weakened countries there. Contrasting this necessary containment with events in Southeast Asia, Morgenthau suggested political development, rather than military power, threatened to subvert U.S. foreign policy goals in the region. Morgenthau believed as governments in the developing world tried to stabilize, it opened the possibility to communist subversion. He then prescribed a course for the U.S. foreign policy establishment that recognized China's influence as a "fact of life," and assessed each country in the region in relation to the U.S.'s foreign policy interests and goals.[27]

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[25] Felix Belair, "Kennan Cautions on Vietnam Raids: Asserts Moscow Would Aid Peking in Hostilities," *New York Times*, 27 February 1965, p. 3.

[26] "Kennan Bids U.S. Reduce Asia Role: Urges Softening of Policies Toward Soviet and China," *New York Times*, 26 February 1965, p. 3.

[27] Hans J. Morgenthau, "We Are Deluding Ourselves in Vietnam"' *New York Times*, 18 April 1965, p. SM 25

As Kennan and Morgenthau presented a realist critique of the war, college and university campuses spawned additional criticism of the war throughout 1965. On March 24, a few weeks after the administration announced Rolling Thunder, students and faculty at the University of Michigan organized the war's first teach-in. After the initial plans for a daylong faculty moratorium faced resistance from university administration and the state legislature, Marshall Sahlins, an anthropology professor, proposed holding an overnight teaching session. Over three thousand students attended. Michigan was just the beginning. Throughout the spring term, teach-ins spread throughout the country's universities and became a popular venue for student engagement on the war.[28]

In the aftermath of the Johns Hopkins Speech in April, Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), an organization of college students, staged an antiwar rally in Washington.[29] They invited other pacifist, progressive, and radical groups to participate, hoping to unite and rebuild a coalition of the progressive left that had been badly damaged by external threats and internal disagreements plaguing it over the past decade and a half.[30] Despite this effort to build consensus, several leftist groups refused to participate. Nonetheless, an estimated 15,000 people made it to Washington, D.C. over the Easter weekend.[31]

The rally culminated in a speech given by SDS president Paul Potter, entitled "We Must Name the System." In the speech, Potter laid out a clear denunciation of the war,

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[28] Tom Wells, *The War Within: America's Battle Over Vietnam* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), 34-39.

[29] Ibid., 16-17.

[30] Ibid. The organization's youth perhaps made them unaware of the long-standing hostilities and resentment that persisted within leftist circles after the anticommunist crusades of the 1950s. Many groups, including Committee for Sane Nuclear Policy (SANE), spurned the invitation, due to their own exclusionary policies that prevented cooperation with communist or leftist groups.

[31] On the 1965 SDS Easter Rally see, Wells, *The War Within*, 25-26; James Miller, *Democracy is in the Streets: From Port Huron to the Siege of Chicago* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994), 231-234.

and the rationale President Johnson provided only ten days earlier at Johns Hopkins. Potter declared he did not believe Johnson, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, or National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy were evil men. He then challenged the audience to identify the large-scale system that pushed good men to such ends of dropping bombs on the people of Vietnam. Potter declared, "We must name that system. We must name it, describe it, analyze it, understand it, and change it."[32] Never in the speech did he actually label the system, and his refusal to do so may have been an effort to deny the administration and war supporters ammunition to dismiss the rally and its attendees as radical and communists. More likely, Potter's rhetorical device was intended to force the audience to draw their own conclusions about it and think critically about the forces and structures underwriting the war, and their own personal complicity with those structures, indicating the rising influence so-called "New Left" thinkers had in shaping the budding movement.

The announcement that more troops were being deployed to Vietnam in late July 1965, however, spurred the nascent stateside and international antiwar movement. Dissent became more vocal and coherent over the ensuing months. In October, antiwar students at the University of California at Berkley organized an "international day of protest" aimed at showcasing global opposition to the war, although the most visible outrage was confined to U.S. campuses, larger cities, and few locations overseas.[33] In November, antiwar organizations, including the liberal-moderate National Committee for Sane Nuclear Policy (SANE) and the more radical SDS, jointly sponsored a major

[32] Paul Potter, "Speech to the April 17, 1965 March on Washington," reprinted in Judith Calvir Albert and Stewart Edward Albert, eds., *The Sixties Papers: Documents of a Rebellious Decade* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1984), 218-225.

[33] Prados, *Vietnam*, 167; Martin Klimke, *The Other Alliance: Student Protest in West Germany and the United States in the Global 1960s* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), 44.

demonstration in Washington, DC.[34] The demonstration reluctantly brought together dissenting old left and new left voices, and exposed the limits of protest when SDS President Carl Oglesby directly took a shot at the moderate liberals who had voiced their opposition to the war in marginal and unproductive ways. Oglesby denounced it as the "liberals' war," a misguided endeavor by liberals of all political leanings.[35] Calling out liberals for their complicity in the Vietnam War, he hoped to push moderates toward direct action that might bring the war to a swift conclusion. The November 1965 rally illustrated both the growing antiwar movement directed at the Vietnam War and the continued tension within the movement's ranks over message, tactics, and significance.

Additionally, pacifist, religious, and leftist groups used the Vietnam War to spur its constituencies to action on questions of international affairs. Fearful that the Vietnam War might bring a wider war that might engulf Europe, civil society awakened. Organizations like SANE and War Resisters International (WRI) garnered renewed interest among the public. New organizations such as the International Committee on Peace and Disarmament (ICPD) provided a network for activists across Europe to express their opposition to the militarism embodied by the Vietnam War. In Britain, groups like Bertrand Russell's *Committee of 100* organized periodic walks and demonstration outside

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[34] SANE not only refused to participate in joint rallies with the World Peace Council, a Soviet backed anti-nuclear movement, its leaders distanced themselves from Communists and refused them membership in the organization, going so far as to ask the FBI for assistance in identifying suspected Communists in local SANE chapters. Often, SANE alienated other organizations they worked with throughout the 1950s and 1960s due to their desire to maintain a strict mainstream, liberal anti-communism. SANE membership represented the survivors of the anti-communist left that had largely been dismantled due to the purges and intimidation of the red scare of the previous decade. Lawrence S. Wittner, *The Struggle against the Bomb, vol. 2: Resisting the Bomb: A History of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement, 1954-1970* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997), 97; Wells, *The War Within,* 61-62; Nancy Zaroulis and Gerald Sullivan, *Who Spoke Up?: American Protests Against the War in Vietnam* (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Wilson, 1984), 63-66; Griffin Fariello, *Red Scare: Memories of the American Inquisition, An Oral History* (New York and London: W. W. Norton, 1995), 514-515.

[35] Carl Oglesby, "Denouncing the Liberals' War, 1965," reprinted in Robert J. McMahon, ed., *Major Problems in the History of the Vietnam War* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 2003), 429-431; Carl Oglesby, *Ravens in the Storm: A Personal History of the 1960s Antiwar Movement* (New York: Scribner, 2008), 93-97.

of U.S. air bases in the country and activists created the British Campaign for Peace in Vietnam.[36]

Religious pacifism, long a cornerstone of American and European civil society, directed their flocks' attention toward global instability brought by the escalating war in Vietnam. Spiritual leaders and anti-nuclear activists throughout Europe had joined to conduct "Easter Marches" coinciding with the Christian holiday beginning in 1960 and experiencing growth throughout the decade.[37] Both the 1964 and 1965 Easter Marches cast attention on the hostilities in Vietnam as their dominant themes. The focus of religious leaders in Europe and the United States pressed lawmakers on both sides of the Atlantic to consider the morality of their actions in the realm of foreign affairs, offering a counterweight to the drumbeats of war.[38]

The Vietnam War also reinvigorated the student left in Europe. Since the Algerian War ended, student activists in France had primarily focused their efforts at university administration rules that governed student life.[39] In West Germany, the *Sozialistische Deutsche Studentenbund*, established in 1946, had become the leading organization there to advocate for university reform.[40] These organizations began turning attention to

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[36] On the 1964-1965 March see, Flyer Vietnam March, 1964; Flyer, RUISLIP Action, Easter 1964; Press release on Ruislip air base march; Resistance Easter 1964, box 4, National Committee of 100 Files, International Institute of Social History, Amsterdam, Netherlands (hereafter, IISH).

[37] Mausbach, "Auschwitz and Vietnam," in Daum, et. al., *America, the Vietnam War and the World: Comparative and International Perspective*, 283; See Chapter Six, "Policymakers and Protest: Governments Confront the Movement, 1954-1958," in Wittner, *Resisting the Bomb*, 98- 124; Alice Holmes Cooper, *Paradoxes of Peace: German Peace Movements Since 1945* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996), 99-103.

[38] Andrew Preston, *Sword of the Spirit, Shield of Faith: Religion in American War and Diplomacy* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2012), 220-235.

[39] Bernard Brown, *Protest in Paris: Anatomy of a Revolt* (Morristown, NJ: General Learning Press, 1974), 4-8.

[40] Nick Thomas, *Protest Movements in 1960s West Germany: A Social History of Dissent and Democracy* (Oxford and New York: Berg Publishers, 2003), 59.

international affairs and connecting to the American movement as the war progressed, inspiring in several critical ways.[41]

Prominent public intellectuals throughout Europe joined U.S. counterparts, Morgenthau, Kennan, and others in denouncing the war.[42] The esteemed British philosopher and pacifist Bertrand Russell expressed concerns on the morality of the war.[43] In 1967, he lent his name to a tribunal of international activists that investigated allegations of war crimes that the U.S. government and war supporters denounced as partisan and anti-American.[44] German theologian and intellectual Martin Niemoeller traveled to North Vietnam to meet Ho Chi Minh and became a vocal critic of the war on moral and pacifist grounds.[45] In France, philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre denounced the war and gave interviews and speeches throughout 1965 and 1966 both attacking U.S. imperialism, and also expressing common cause with the Vietnamese people in their battle.[46] Intellectuals, like religious leaders and other members of civil society, contributed yet another site where policymakers had to continue refining their justifications for the war.

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[41] Klimke, *The Other Alliance,* 12-13.

[42] Richard Tomes, *Apocalypse Then: American Intellectuals and the Vietnam War* (New York: New York University Press, 1998), passim. Tomes argues the intellectual strands in the U.S. opposed to the war provided too divided to make an impact on policy, although the war itself did change the trajectory of intellectuals in the U.S.

[43] Bertrand Russell and Vietnam War see, Alan Ryan, *Bertrand Russell: A Political Life* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1988), 202-206; Bertrand Russell, *War Crimes in Vietnam* (London: George Allen and Unwin LTD, 1967), passim.

[44] Bertrand Russell, *War Crimes in Vietnam*; Greiner, *War Without Fronts*, 4.

[45] On Martin Niemoeller see, James Bentley, *Martin Niemoeller* (London and New York, 1984), 224-227; John S. Conway, "The Political Theology of Martin Niemoeller," *German Studies Review* 9:3 (October 1986), 521-546.

[46] Bethany S. Keenan, "'Vietnam is Fighting For Us:' French Identities and the U.S. Vietnam War, 1965-1973" Ph.D. diss, University of North Carolina, 2009, 1-2.

Despite the intensity of antiwar sentiment among some sectors of transatlantic civil society, it represented only the leading edge of public opinion on the issue. Surveys the USIA compiled and relayed to the President's staff show that from 1965 and into early 1966, the public in Western Europe and Canada as lukewarm and divided regarding the U.S.'s military intervention in Vietnam. They were more definitive in their responses when asked if their country should become involved in the war, reflecting the hesitancy the U.S. government repeatedly encountered as it tried to bring "more flags" to the war.

The British people proved the most divided on the war. A Gallup Poll asked Britons in spring 1965, "Do you approve or disapprove of the recent American armed action in Vietnam?" Results showed 40% disapproved, 30% approved, and 30% did not know.[47] In August 1965 when asked, "Would you approve or disapprove if the government were to send troops to fight alongside the South Vietnamese in Vietnam?" 69% of Britons disapproved, while only 17% approved, and 14% had no opinion. By early 1966, the disapproval number climbed to 79% with only 10% approval.[48]

In Canada and West Germany, the numbers from late 1965 appeared more favorable to President Johnson's position. When asked, "Do you approve or disapprove of the way the US is handling the Vietnam Situation?" 44% of Canadians approved, 33% disapproved, and 23% were undecided. By March 1966, however, those numbers fell off as more Canadians expressed doubts about the war with only 35% approval, 34% disapproval, 2% who qualified their response, and 29% undecided.[49] West German polls

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[47] Memo, Leonard Marks, USIA to Hayes Redmon (White House), "British Gallup Poll on Vietnam, April 14-19, 1966," April 28, 1966, folder, "Foreign Polls, 1st of 2 parts," Box 218, Frederick Panzer Files, NLLBJ.

[48] Memoranda for the President from Leonard Marks, March 2, 1966, "Eight in Ten Britons Opposed to Sending Troops to Vietnam," March 1, 1966, folder, "Foreign Polls, 1st of 2 parts," Box 218, Frederick Panzer Files, NLLBJ.

[49] USIA Brief #61, "Canadian Opinion Divided on US Handling of Vietnam Situation," June 14, 1966," folder, "Foreign Polls, 1st of 2 parts," Box 218, Frederick Panzer Files, NLLBJ.

in October 1965 showed more support for the U.S. than the British or Canadian positions, but less public support for sending German combat troops to Vietnam. When asked if the "U.S. was right to intervene in Vietnam?" 50% of Germans said yes, and 24% said no, with another quarter undecided. West Germans also placed most of the blame for the war on North Vietnam and Communist China. Polls showed 57% of West Germans feared an escalation of the war that might bring Germany into the conflict. When asked "Should West Germany help US by sending troops to Vietnam?" a resounding 88% said no, with only 3% saying yes.[50]

Surveys conducted by French Institute of Public Opinion (IFOP) and released to the USIA indicated the war had little support among the French public. When asked in early 1966 their opinion of the war, only 28% of the French public remained sympathetic to the United States and 26% were sympathetic to the North Vietnamese. 46% responded "neither." When asked if they believed the United States really sought a peaceful settlement to the conflict, 35% said yes, while 42% stated no. In comparison, when asked the same question about the North Vietnamese, 22% said yes, while 42% said no.[51]

Many overseas Americans remained silent on the issue of the war through most of 1965. A few letters trickled into the White House addressing the conduct of the war, too few to shed light on a possible undercurrent of expatriate opposition at the particular moment.[52] One American in France writing the day after President Johnson's Johns Hopkins speech, expressed he was "ashamed of his country."[53] A month before

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[50] Memo, Hayes Redmon to Bill Moyers, "One German in Two Supports US in Vietnam with only a Quarter Opposed," November 3, 1965, folder, "Foreign Polls, 2nd of 2 parts," Box 218, Frederick Panzer Files, NLLBJ.

[51] Memo, Hayes Redmon to Bill Moyers, "French Attitudes toward US Involvement in Vietnam," February 26, 1966, folder, "Foreign Polls, 1st of 2 parts," Box 218, Frederick Panzer Files, NLLBJ.

[52] It's possible additional letters exists; however, the Lyndon Johnson Presidential Library has left much of the file "Public Opinion Mail" unprocessed leaving the contents of over 200 boxes unknown.

[53] Letter, Frederick E. James to President Johnson, April 16, 1965, folder, "CO 81: France 8/19/64—5/28/65," Box 31, White House Central Files/Country Files/France, NLLBJ.

Johnson's decision to increase U.S. troop levels, a group of twenty-five Americans from the Midwest and East coast signed a petition declaring, "We the undersigned American citizens traveling abroad disapprove of military build-up in Vietnam. We urge reconsideration."[54] Toby Hyde, the mastermind of Johnson's 1964 election campaign in London, sent a letter to Johnson's advisor Jack Valenti providing an update on the Democrats Abroad organization and adding, "most thoughtful Americans living abroad believe the president is taking the right course—in fact the only course he can take at this point."[55] Hyde's work as a Johnson supporter and history as a Democratic Party operative likely captured and accurately reflected the opinions of many of the president's supporters and members of the U.S. business community in mid-1965.

The events of early 1966 collectively proved to be a turning point on global and expatriate opinion on the war. The administration's resumption of the bombing campaign in late January 1966 deeply concerned the global community. Not only did war opponents see the resumption as a missed opportunity for peace, but signaled the administration remained committed to military solution rather than a diplomatic one to the situation in Vietnam. Further disheartening news arrived a few months later. In April 1966, Johnson expanded the list of approved targets in North Vietnam and authorized the use of B-52s in bombing runs.[56] The combined actions indicated that the war was not likely to end soon, and the administration did not seem ready to pursue peaceful alternatives.

With the resumption, the first high-profile elected officials in the U.S. began to voice concerns on the war, further emboldening many liberal and leftist critics. In

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[54] Telegram, Michael Korman, et al. (25 Americans in total) to President Johnson, June 19, 1965, folder, "CO 312 Vietnam 5/65-7/25/65," Box 83, White House Central Files, NLLBJ.

[55] Letter, Anthony Hyde to Jack Valenti, June 21, 1965, folder, "Hyde, A," Box 498, White House Central Files/Name File, NLLBJ.

[56] Prados, *Vietnam,* 134.

February 1966, Chairman of the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee William J. Fulbright (D-AR) opened hearings on the Johnson administration's policy in Vietnam and invited supporters and opponents like George Kennan to testify. CBS and NBC preempted daytime television schedules to broadcast the hearing. Daily coverage in domestic and international newspapers recapped the previous day's highlights, offering Americans insight into the debate. The Johnson administration hastily convened a conference among U.S. policymakers, war planners, and South Vietnamese officials in Honolulu to divert attention from the Fulbright Hearings. Providing the war's critics a platform to articulate dissent, the hearings afforded a degree of legitimacy to citizens questioning administration policies, and made dissent more acceptable to among mainstream audiences.[57]

Paris American Committee to Stop War (PACS)

Capturing this rising antiwar sentiment, on February 16, 1966, a dozen Americans gathered at the Café Procope on Paris's Left Bank for lunch. After initially exchanging pleasantries, they discussed the recent Fulbright Hearings and the fear that the situation in Vietnam might escalate. Many of the Americans had become acquainted with one another through other expatriate organizations and past activism. The previous November, a few of the Americans, including Maria Jolas, Ira Morris, and Jean Davidson, the son-in-law of artist Alexander Calder, met at the Paris apartment of James and Gloria Jones. At that time, they decided to circulate a protest petition among other expatriates and deliver it to the U.S. Embassy in Paris.[58] The language of the petition

[57] Joseph A. Fry, *Debating Vietnam: Fulbright, Stennis, and Their Senate Hearings* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006), passim; Wells, *The War Within*, 68-70; Melvin Small, *Johnson, Nixon, and the Doves* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1988), 78-81.

[58] Chronology and Memo to the File, Maria Jolas, July 1974, MSS M88-202 (Unprocessed Accretion), Box 8, Paris American Committee to Stop War Files, Wisconsin Historical Society (WHS); Bethany S. Keenan, 'At the Crossroads of World Attitudes and Reaction': The Paris American Committee to Stopwar and American Anti-war Activism in France, 1966–1968, *Journal of Transatlantic Studies*, 11:1 (2013), 64

revealed deep-seated anxiety over taking such an open stance against the war. Defending their action as patriotic, it defined patriotism as "not synonymous with advancing increased death measure, but is based on the fundamental principle of preventing the loss of life."[59]

During their lunch meeting, the assembled U.S. expats established the Paris American Committee of SANE, as an affiliate of the anti-nuclear organization to which several attending Americans belonged.[60] Attendees at the lunch meeting were not new to activist circles. Many of the founding members of PACS had worked in the anti-nuclear movement while abroad and had developed deeply held views on the U.S.'s role in the world based on their experiences during the Second World War and its immediate aftermath. Rather than spread American influence via economic and commercial expansion, as Henry Luce had advocated in his 1941 "American Century," Americans like Jolas and the Morrises saw incremental political reforms at home and abroad as the best method for the United States to maintain credibility.

Born in 1893 in Louisville, Kentucky, Maria Jolas moved to France in 1920. In the interwar period she and her husband, Eugene Jolas, established themselves within the literary community there.[61] She worked as James Joyce's secretary while in Paris, and after his death became an ardent defender of his legacy.[62] Despite her progressive views,

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[59] Petition, American Citizens in Paris, 1965, folder 3, box 77 (77.3), James Jones Papers, Harry Ransom Center, University of Texas, Austin, Texas (Hereafter HRC).

[60] Keenan, "'At the Crossroads of World Attitudes,'" 66-69.

[61] Together the founded the literary journal *Transition*, which published and promoted the interwar literary and artistic trends. See, Eugène Jolas, *Man From Babel*, Andreas Kramer and Rainer Rumold, eds. (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1998); Eugène Jolas, *Eugène Jolas: Critical Writings, 1924-1951*. Klaus H. Kiefer and Rainer Rumold, eds. (Chicago: Northwestern University Press, 2009); and Dougald McMillan, *Transition: The History of a Literary Era 1927-38* (New York: George Brazillier, 1976).

[62] Letter, Maria Jolas to City of Zurich, Switzerland, May 23, 1966, folder, "'C' General Correspondence, 1939-1981,"Box 29; Letter, Maria Jolas to New Republic, "Joyce as Revolutionary," November 9, 1942, Folder 927, Box 41, Eugene and Maria Jolas Papers. General Collection, Beinecke Rare Book and Manuscript Library.

she was by no means a pacifist. Upon returning to the United States after Germany invaded France in 1940, she and her husband, Eugene, became outspoken interventionists. In radio interviews, essays, and articles, Maria Jolas outlined the justification for American intervention in Europe. She framed her appeals for U.S. entry into the war as a battle between two ways of life.[63] In a May 3, 1941 speech, she explained that expatriates who fled France had undertaken a duty to bring the message of the French people to the United States. She declared, "America Awake! This is not England's war alone. It is the war of every man and woman to whom a free life is essential. As a noted French writer has expressed it: this is a war between slave owners and abolitionists."[64] During the war, Jolas worked with several U.S.-France friendship groups to raise awareness of the plight of the French people. Beginning in April 1944 she worked for the Office of War Information (OWI) at the French language desk where she translated newspapers and cables from French news sources.[65]

After the war, she and Eugene returned to France. They resumed life among artists and writers until his death in 1952.[66] Jolas had participated in a pacifist mothers' group throughout the 1950s. In May 1958, she helped organize an international

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[63] This was the Office of War Information's official propaganda line, see Michaela Hoenicke Moore, *Know Your Enemy: The American Debate on Nazism, 1933-1945* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 143-144.

[64] Maria Jolas, "Radio Address on WCNH (Brooklyn)," May 3, 1941 reprinted in Mary Ann Caws, ed. *Maria Jolas, Woman of Action: A Memoir and Other Writings* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2004), 113-114.

[65] Maria Jolas to Madam Davey, January 14, 1946, folder "Correspondence 'D' General 1939-1975," Box 29, Eugene and Maria Jolas Papers. General Collection, Beinecke Rare Book and Manuscript Library, Yale University, New Haven Connecticut (hereafter Beinecke Library).

[66] For more on Maria Jolas's life see Caws, ed. *Maria Jolas, Woman of Action: A Memoir and Other Writings*; Edwin McDowell, "Maria Jolas, 94, Translator and Paris Magazine Founder," *New York Times*, 7 March 1987; For more on her husband and his work in helping rebuilding civil society in Germany after the war see, Jessica C. E. Gienow-Hecht, *Transmission Impossible: American Journalism as Cultural Diplomacy in Postwar Germany, 1945-1955* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1999), 122-123.

conference in Paris entitled "The Responsibility of Women in the Nuclear Age." The conference brought together women throughout Europe and the United States to discuss the issue of nuclear weapons.[67] In writing to friend Freda Kirchwey, editor of *The Nation*, she described the conference and her involvement in it: "the nearest I have come to political activity (except of course, to have been a very early and faithful reader of *The Nation*) is my present modest position of Paris secretary of the *Societe Europeenne de Culture*, which has some 900 members on both sides of the 'curtain.' In other words, I am in favor of the dialogue and seize every opportunity to engage in it."[68] Jolas's comments suggest both an opposition to nuclear weapons, and entrenched Manichean views within both the U.S. and Soviet Union that prevented any dialogue between the superpowers.

Ira and Edita Morris were also well-known antinuclear advocates. Edita had recently to come to both the American and European publics' attention with her book, *The Flowers of Hiroshima*, which she wrote after visiting the city in 1955.[69] The novel, based on the stories of people she and her husband met in the city, elucidates the personal, physical, and emotional toll nuclear weapons had on the citizens of Hiroshima.[70] *The Flowers of Hiroshima* became an international best seller. In 1961

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[67] Letter, Claude Bourdet to Pearl Buck, May 2, 1958, folder, "Acceptances," Box 1, series M88-240, Paris American Committee to Stop War Records, Wisconsin Historical Society, Madison, Wisconsin (hereafter WHS).

[68] Letter, Maria Jolas to Freda Kirchwey, [n.d.]—1958, folder, "Reunion du 31 Mai," Box 1, series M88-240, Paris American Committee to Stop War Records, WHS. It is interesting that claimed anti-nuclear work represented her introduction to political work Jolas had already amassed an impressive career in politics dating to the Second World War. In noting that she has never done any political work before, Jolas discounts or does not classify her work during the Second World War, including the radio broadcasts, translation work with the OWI, and work with some U.S.-French solidarity groups as political, despite their obvious political character. Her work in the anti-nuclear movement of the 1950s, despite her claims, is a culmination, rather than an introduction, to political activism.

[69] Edita Morris, "Hiroshima City of Ghosts," folder, "Hiroshima City of Ghost Article," Box 20, Ira and Edita Morris Papers, Rare Book & Manuscript Library, Columbia University in the City of New York (hereafter, RBML-Columbia).

[70] Edita Morris, *The Flowers of Hiroshima* (New York: Viking Press, 1959, reprint 1961), passim.

Morris received the Albert Schweitzer Prize, given to a book that addresses human suffering.[71] In the aftermath, the Morrises established Hiroshima House, and became international advocates for the people who still suffered in Hiroshima from the American bombing there.[72] By 1963 the book was in its fourth printing, and had sold over a half million copies in 24 countries and translated into eleven languages.[73]

Affiliating PACS with SANE embodied the commitment to the anti-nuclear cause reflected beliefs in the "one world" and "common man" ideas that gained prominence during the Second World War. Despite their opposite political affiliations, Henry Wallace and Wendell Willkie shaped the ideas of a growing cosmopolitan strand that linked American exceptionalism with new international norms of human rights, global cooperation, and world peace.[74] *One World* was title of a popular book by Republican Wendell Willkie, in which he reflected on the lessons of his world travel. In it, he concluded the United States must assume a more international posture, which had been lacking in the interwar period, and sustaining world peace must begin by recognizing a shared bond of humanity across nations, and that people of every nationality are part of "one world."[75] Similarly, in justifying U.S. participation in World War II, Vice President Henry Wallace promoted the war's effort in securing internationalism and equality in his

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[71] "Albert Schweitzer Prize," [n.d.], folder "Edita Morris, The Flowers of Hiroshima, Albert Schweitzer Prize, 1961," Box 38, Edita and Ira Morris Papers, RBML-Columbia.

[72] Edita Morris, "Hiroshima Man," *The Mennonite* May 9, 1965 and "Hiroshima Speech," folder, Hiroshima Speech, Box 20, Edita and Ira Morris Papers, RBML-Columbia.

[73] "Publication History of the Flowers of Hiroshima," folder, "The Flowers of Hiroshima Publication History, Box 37, Ira and Edita Morris Papers, RBML-Columbia.

[74] Elizabeth Borgwardt, *A New Deal for the World: America's Vision for Human Rights* (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, 2005), 157-161

[75] In the book, Willkie writes, "Freedom is an indivisible word. If we want to enjoy it, and fight for it, we must be prepared to extend it to everyone, whether they are rich or poor, whether they agree with us or not, no matter their race or the color of their skin." Wendell Willkie, *One World* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1943), ix, 188.

1942 "Century of the Common Man." In the speech, Wallace implored the U.S. public to support the war, as "a fight between the slave world and a free world,"[76] and called on common men "everywhere" to rebuild the world as part of their duty as international citizens.[77]

In addition to reflecting PACS organizers' deeply held beliefs, working as a section of SANE provided Paris expatriates several benefits in terms of political cover as they fashioned a message of dissent. Primarily, it allowed them to operate within the acceptable limits of Cold War nationalism. As a SANE chapter they could collect dues, distribute its literature, and proselytize its anti-nuclear mission. It had tangible benefits for recruiting, since the organization was widely known, especially among intellectuals. In their initial by-laws, PACS proposed attending international conferences as official representatives of SANE.[78] Finally, it secured the benefit of having an international presence that allowed coordination with non-communist anti-nuclear groups in Europe.

However, not all members of PACS supported the relationship with SANE, raising questions of its prohibition on admitting people with ties to totalitarian parties.[79] Some like Maria Jolas and Ira Morris, owing to their one-world philosophy, saw PACS as the best method to foster cooperation, especially given the political diversity of the expatriate community. Outlining the beliefs in the original bylaws, they stated PACS might be a place "to bring into active relationship a broad and representative group of citizens supporting a boldly conceived and executed policy which will lead mankind

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[76] Borgwardt, *A New Deal for the World*, 157.

[77] Henry A. Wallace, "Century of the Common Man" speech given on May 8, 1942, reprinted in *Prefaces to Peace,* 369-374.

[78] PACS, "By Laws," ca. March 1966, Microfilm, Reel #1, Paris American Committee to Stop War Records, WHS.

[79] Keenan, "'At the Crossroads of World Attitudes,'" 66-69.

away from nuclear war and toward world peace and justice for all."[80] Others, like Francis Leary, who had worked with the national SANE organization and within Democratic Party political circles, viewed SANE as the best legitimate method to organize and express dissent on the war. Looking to find common ground, Leary wrote to Jolas and offered advice on how PACS might appeal to modify SANE's rule prohibiting leftists and totalitarian leaning individuals from their ranks in order to maintain the affiliation. Leary wrote, "rather than automatic exclusion of those belonging to or sympathetic with totalitarian parties, it should be pointed out to the National SANE that in the U.S. communism is a criminal conspiracy, but that in France it is a perfectly legal party commanding the support of many teachers, intellectuals, writers, etc."[81] SANE, however, refused to relent on the issue.

Modifying their name slightly to the Paris Committee to Stop War (PACS) to reflect their orphan status, the leadership opted to affiliate with the International Confederation for Disarmament and Peace (ICDP), an ad hoc organization established two years prior (1963) that united pacifists across borders and hosted conferences on the issue of world peace.[82] Like SANE, the ICDP had been established as an organization to bring other anti-nuclear voices together, while avoiding the World Council of Peace, a Soviet-backed peace effort. In aligning with the ICDP, PACS maintained its orientation toward internationalist goals of peace and stability, while adhering to Cold War norms of

[80] PACS, "By Laws," ca. March 1966, Microfilm, Reel #1, Paris American Committee to Stop War Records, WHS.

[81] Letter, Francis Leary to Maria Jolas, March 27, 1966, Microfilm, Reel #1, Paris American Committee to Stop War Records, WHS.

[82] "Europe Peace News in Brief" *PACS News*, Summer 1966, Box 1, Paris American Committee to Stop War Records (M88-202), WHS.

avoiding entanglements with communists. Rejecting SANE did result in some attrition within PACS's ranks, including Francis Leary.[83]

As PACS promoted its agenda and recruited members, it honed its objections to the Vietnam War in a fashion similar to the realist critiques of Kennan and Morgenthau, and the older progressive moralist critiques of Willkie and Wallace, rather than the more radical critiques emerging on college campuses. PACS placed advertisements in newspapers directed at other Americans urging other expats to "Help Restore America's Image Abroad," appealing directly to the perception the war further damaged the reputation of their homeland, which made pursuing and obtaining its global interests more difficult.[84] A March 1966 flyer announcing their formation (still identified as a SANE affiliate) quoted both Kennan's admonishment of U.S. involvement in Vietnam being detrimental to its international credibility as well as Wayne Morse (D-OR), one of two U.S. Senators who voted against the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, addressing the morality of the U.S.'s tactics and its effect on the credibility among the South Vietnamese people.[85] In this way, PACS called attention to the way U.S. military intervention backfired and proved counterproductive to building support among the very people the U.S. claimed to be helping. As more bombs fell on Vietnam, and the U.S. government showed unwavering support for the repressive regime, PACS feared South Vietnamese people would increasingly gravitate to the NLF and join their ranks, leaving the U.S. without any viable options to influence government and civil society there. A critical problem, if in fact U.S. national security required a presence in South Vietnam.

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[83] For an in-depth discussion of this split within PACS's ranks see, Keenan, "'At the Crossroads of World Attitudes,'" 68.

[84] "Help Restore America's Image Abroad" advertisement, International Herald Tribune [n.d.], clipping in Microfilm, Reel #1, PACS Records, WHS.

[85] Letter, PACS to friends, March 29, 1966 and Flyer, Paris American Committee for A Sane Nuclear Policy, March 1966, folder 12, box 80 (80.12), James Jones Papers, HRC.

As the organization evolved, these realist and progressive philosophies guided PACS's activities. Their meetings at the Quaker Centre in Paris functioned akin to a foreign policy study group. Speakers and topics considered the origins of U.S. involvement in the war, the motivations and intent of the NLF, the goals of U.S. policy in Southeast Asia, the tactics and weapons deployed by the U.S. military, and the nature of the growing antiwar movement in the United States. There, members were encouraged to send letters and telegrams of support to Senators Fulbright and Mansfield to "sustain them," and they debated contacting a Swiss organization that provided medical care for Vietnamese children affected by the war.[86]

This study group approach and the language of involvement resembled the rhetoric and style of an earlier activism more closely associated with the progressive era than postwar manifestations favoring politics of the street. Progressive era activists and their intellectual descendants in the 1920s and 1930s heralded American-style democracy, but also believed it was imperfect. To strengthen it, reformers of the time used the language of "interests" and "publics" to convey the central message that organizing and building coalitions provided the best method to overcome the pitfalls of American democracy, primarily its tendency to become fragmented and represent the desires of the few.[87] For those in the Progressive Era, this antidote required organizing along the lines of common purposes and identities, engaging individuals and organizations in public debates, and requiring them to be civic minded to understand how

[86] "PACS, "Meeting Minutes February 16, 1966," Microfilm, Reel #1, PACS Records, WHS.

[87] John Dewey, *The Public and Its Problems* (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 1927); Walter Lippmann, *The Phantom Public* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1927, reprint 2004); Walter Lippmann, *Public Opinion* (Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, 1921, reprint 2004); Herbert Croly, *The Promise of American Life* (New York: Macmillan, 1911), all passim.

democratic processes worked, so their interests might have a public hearing within the halls of power.[88]

Given Paris's reputation as the epicenter of American expatriates, especially progressive expats, the possibilities of building an antiwar expat community seemed limitless. Paris was the home of an American Church, an American Library, and an American College that offered a natural place for the organization to direct its antiwar recruitment efforts. By the early 1960s, Americans in Paris had repeatedly gravitated to U.S. political causes. Furthermore, many there had organized the Paris American Racial Integration Committee (PARIS), a group of Americans who promoted the cause of U.S. civil rights from abroad.[89]

However, both the church and the library refused to assist PACS and denied them access to hold meetings or recruit from their members.[90] Given the more mainstream and conservative orientation of these organizations, their lack of enthusiasm for antiwar activities is not surprising. Eventually, PACS found a home at the Quaker Centre in Paris, headed by expat Tony Clay, who eventually used the Centre as a site to coordinate efforts to help military deserters who arrived in Paris as the war continued. Working out of the Quaker Centre, PACS linked their progressive opposition to the war with the religious pacifism Quakers had represented in the consciousness of many Americans. As historian

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[88] Progressive era language of reform and interests in the realm of U.S. foreign policy received its fullest articulation from a range of activists such as William James, Eugene Debs, Randolph Bourne, and W.E.B Du Bois. These men, who also spent extended time in Europe, increasingly thought about this problem "American democracy" as it applied to the rest of world and were among the first to give serious thought as to how the unrealized promises of American democracy (like racial and class inequality) posed problems to the country's credibility and its claims of exceptionalism. Christopher McKnight Nichols, *Promise and Peril: America at the Dawn of a Global Age* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011), 125-127.

[89] Telegram, Paris American Racial Integration Committee to President Johnson, March 10, 1965, and Telegram, Paris American Racial Integration Committee to President Johnson, April 6, 1968, folder, "Paris, A-E," Box 43, White House Central Files/Name File, NLLBJ.

[90] "Meeting Minutes," February 16, 1966, Microfilm, Reel #1, PACS Records, WHS.

Bethany Keenan has noted, this marriage of convenience, too, posed problems for PACS in that many in the French government believed the Americans used the religious organization as a cover for their more radical views.[91]

With a home base established, PACS worked to build their ranks and publicize their efforts in the city. In March 1966, PACS members suggested they distributed leaflets before Martin Luther King, Jr.'s upcoming speech at the *Palais des Sports*, which was designed as a fundraiser for the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC). The event was coordinated in Paris by a group of politically diverse Americans who formed the ad hoc Martin Luther King Paris Committee, some like Jack Egle, had connections to both PACS and Democrats Abroad.[92] Given the high profile of the event, the likelihood that Americans, many sympathetic to their cause, would be in attendance, and the cross-pollination of organizers, it seemed ideal for recruitment.

However, tensions had already emerged within the civil rights movement on the issue of the Vietnam War, highlighted by comments singer and civil rights activist Harry Belafonte made upon his arrival in Paris where he was to introduce and sing at King's speech. Belafonte declared to the French media that he would "raise his voice to end the war in Vietnam and apartheid in South Africa." He further commented that the "militant wing" of the civil rights movement now wanted to engage in issues of U.S. foreign policy as well as domestic policy.[93]

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[91] Keenan, "'At the Crossroads of World Attitudes,'" 64.

[92] Meeting Announcement, Paris American Racial Integration Support (PARIS), May 12, 1965, folder 3, box 77 (77.3), James Jones Papers, HRC; Keenan, "'At the Crossroads of World Attitudes,'" 65.

[93] "Belafonte in Paris Assails Policy of U.S. in Vietnam," *New York Times* 25 March 1966 p. L25. In the aftermath of Belafonte's statement on the Vietnam War, the ad hoc group issued a statement that stated they regretted Dr. King's statement had become the subject of political and diplomatic controversy. The press and others interpreted this as the group distancing themselves from Dr. King and the SCLC, forcing the issuance of another press release to clarify that the ad hoc committee did not take a stand on the issue of the war due to their diverse membership. Letter, Martin Sargent, Martin Luther King Paris Committee for Civil Rights to James Jones, April 26, 1966, folder 12, box 80 (80.12), James Jones Papers, HRC.

In the wake of Belafonte's comments, PACS membership was far from unanimous on the issue of distributing leaflets at the event. Members feared their efforts might be misconstrued as opposing civil rights, or might offend Dr. King and those organizing the event by linking the issues of civil rights and the Vietnam War, on which King had yet to make a definitive statement in opposition.[94] To address their concerns, and perhaps assuage guilt for politicizing the event, PACS sent a letter to Dr. King and reassured him of their support for civil rights, and explained the rationale behind using the event to attract opposition to the war.[95] As the event proceeded, PACS leadership issued strict guidelines for its members as it distributed leaflets outside the venue.[96]

As PACS raised its public profile at demonstrations and through meeting announcements placed in the *International Herald Tribune*, a paper of note among the expatriate community, they attracted both sympathetic and critical reception for their activities. The mail PACS received in response to their activism reflected both enshrined cultural perceptions of U.S. expatriates and the Manichean nature of Cold War assumptions. Some expats who encountered PACS's ads or handbills wrote to the organization and labeled the group traitors. One American, Avery Jenkins, who lived in Tripoli, wrote to the organization and referred to its members as "poor, insipid, stupid, misguided, communist vietnik bastards."[97] Jenkins further echoed long-standing attitudes toward expatriates asking, "Why don't you organize a club to advertise the good things

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[94] Although some scholars have read antiwar sentiment in many of his speeches of this time, the consensus identifies his speech at Riverside Church in New York City on April 4, 1967 as the definitive moment when King registered his opposition to the war publically.

[95] Letter, Vivian Werner, PACS Corresponding Secretary to Martin Luther King, Jr. March 26, 1966; Handbill, "Fellow Americans, "Let's Stop the War in Vietnam,"; Letter, Francis Leary to Maria Jolas, March 23, 1966; and Letter, Francis Leary to Schofield Coryell, March 26, 1966, Microfilm, Reel #1, PACS Records, WHS.

[96] Letter, Francis Leary to Schofield Coryell, March 26, 1966, MSS M88-202 (Unprocessed Accretion), box 7, PACS Records, WHS.

[97] Letter, Avery C. Jenkins to PACS May 7, 1966, Microfilm, Reel #1, PACS Records, WHS.

your country does. And if you don't agree with our policy, go on home, pay your delinquent income tax, serve your time in the draft and vote the people out of office who disagree with you."[98] Others sent back PACS handbills with comments including, "why not give up your citizenship," and "in my opinion you are a traitor on our country."[99] Another American returned the advertisement PACS had placed in the *International Herald Tribune* about the U.S Air Force's use of napalm in Vietnam. At the bottom, the person wrote, "we get enough of this information in the English language broadcasts of Radio Moscow."[100] The assumption that PACS members were communist dupes reflects the extent to which little had changed in popular attitudes about expatriates since the days of early Cold War mobilization.

PACS's appeal to other Americans in Paris, rather than working to build international opposition for the war, derived from the political climate in France with regard to the war. Public opinion continually showed the majority of French citizens opposed to the war.[101] The most ardent supporters in France of the war were likely to be other Americans who arrived in the country either permanently or temporarily as tourists, offering another venue to convey on personal terms, citizen to citizen, the damage the war continued to have on U.S. credibility.[102]

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[98] Ibid.

[99] R. H. Adams to PACS [n.d.] and D.C. Lindle to PACS, Microfilm, Reel #1, PACS Records, WHS.

[100] Anonymous Letter to PACS, ca. June 1966, Microfilm, Reel #1, PACS Records, WHS.

[101] Keenan, "Vietnam is Fighting for Us," passim.

[102] By the 1960s sixty-six percent of tourists who visited France were American. Despite efforts of the Johnson administration to dissuade Americans from going overseas in the face of an increasingly serious balance of payments deficit, the French government undertook aggressive campaign to lure more Americans and their dollars to the country, following a several incidents of bad publicity generated by tourists in the late 1950s and early 1960s.The arrival of thousands of Americans to the city of lights. Chris Endy, *Cold War Holidays: American Tourism in France* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004), 11 and especially chapters six and seven.

Throughout the summer of 1967, PACS members distributed flyers at places frequented by their fellow citizens including hotels, American Express offices, and monuments.[103] Handbills reflecting the organization's predisposition to religious progressivism, political realism, and American nationalism, proclaimed "Welcome to American Tourists" and told Americans, "the French are happy to see you, for they like Americans. But this time they have some questions to ask you. Are the American people really going to permit the U.S. Government to kill every Vietnamese in Vietnam in the name of freedom?" It further noted, "The people of the world are looking to the American people to use the freedom they proclaim to expose the lies and oppose the brutality of their government."[104] Other pamphlets declared "Christians Speak Out" and contained quotes from several religious organizations and individuals about the immorality of the war, and "Two Poems for Americans," the first written by Barbara Beidler of Vero Beach, Florida and published in Venture, a Presbyterian magazine and a response entitled "Truth Blazes Even in Little Children's Hearts," by Huy Can, a Vietnamese poet.[105]

Public responses to the leaflets were predictable. Some tourists took the handbills, wrote comments about the organization and the Vietnam War upon them, and returned them. Comments on returned PACS flyers included, "would you like to have the

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[103] PACS members learned of this tactic during a meeting in 1966 when David McReynolds, the head of the War Resister's League, reported on 1966 WRI Triennial Conference in Rome. At the time he was traveling under the sponsorship of the ICDP to "activate the European movements and establish a liaison between the many organizations which are working to end the war in Vietnam. Similar efforts at reaching U.S. tourists throughout Western Europe including Ireland, the Netherlands, and West Germany See, "War Resisters' League Meeting Minutes" March 1, 1966, folder**, "**Executive Committee Minutes, 1965-1969", Series B, Box 1, War Resister's League Papers, Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania (hereafter SCPC); Maria Jolas, "Notebook" [March 1966], Box 8, Series M88-202, PACS Records, WHS; Devi Prasad, *War is a Crime Against Humanity: The Story of the War Resisters' International* (Espenau: Braeuning and Rudert, 2005), 375.

[104] PACS, "Welcome to American Tourists," folder, "Leaflets and Reactions, Spring 1967," box 1, PACS Records, WHS.

[105] PACS, "Two Poems" and "Christians Speak Out," folder, "Leaflets and Reactions, Spring 1967," box 1, PACS Records, WHS.

Communists run over Vietnam, to say nothing of the rest of Southeast Asia," illustrating the resonance of the administration's domino theory as justification for the war. Others mistook PACS members for French nationals and after the highly publicized row the previous year over perceived French rudeness to American tourists wrote, "keep on doing what you are doing, and more and more Americans will avoid France in their travels, they will refrain from buying French made perfume, clothes, etc." The note was signed, "an American who regrets he fought in France in World War I."[106]

Americans in Britain for U.S. Withdrawal from Vietnam (Stop It Committee)

Harry Pincus was an example of the young, cosmopolitan American who ventured abroad after completing his undergraduate studies. Pincus was born in 1943 in Asheville, North Carolina, and raised on the Upper East Side of Manhattan. After graduating high school in 1960, Pincus attended Amherst College, played on the varsity basketball team, joined the Phi Gam fraternity, and majored in English. Nothing from his college record suggests that Pincus was oriented toward political activism during his college years.[107] After graduation from Amherst in 1964, he pursued study in social work and psychology in Britain. Pincus, like other younger students at home and abroad, encountered postwar philosophers and writers who shaped their thinking about the U.S. mission in the world and how the practices of U.S. intervention subverted its democratic claims.

Being overseas had a profound effect on Pincus as he transformed into a political activist while pursuing sociology at Oxford and working at the Tavistock Institute in London.[108] Tavistock had been established in the aftermath of World War II with funds

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[106] Anonymous letters to PACS written on tourist leaflets, folder, "Leaflets and Reactions, Spring 1967," box 1, PACS Records, WHS.

[107] Matriculation Record for Harry G. Pincus, Alumni Biographical File, folder, "Harry G. Pincus," Amherst College Archives and Special Collections, Amherst, Massachusetts (hereafter, Amherst).

[108] Letter, Harry Pincus to Marshall Bloom, October 14, 1964, folder 5, "Correspondence, 1964-1965," Box 2, Marshall Bloom Papers, Amherst.

from the Rockefeller Foundation to explore how social science research and theories could be translated into the promotion of social engagement and civic change.[109] Much of the Institute's intellectual orientation derived from psychoanalytic thinking and the Frankfurt School's debates over culture in society. At Tavistock, Pincus obtained exposure to ongoing work in Object Relations theory of psychoanalytic thought through the clinic's director John Sutherland, founder Eric Trist, and psychologist Harry Guntrip, whose book, *Healing the Sick Mind*, Pincus described to a friend as providing the best lay introduction to the type of thinking at Tavistock.[110]

The political awakening of Pincus, especially the understanding of how structures constrain man, is evident in letters between him and Marshall Bloom, a budding social activist, former fraternity brother at Amherst College, and later founder of Liberation News Service. Shortly after Pincus arrived in England, mundane correspondence between Pincus and Bloom included discussions about having Bloom sell Pincus's car while overseas and providing encouragement to Bloom who was pursuing the editorship of the Amherst College newspaper.[111] However, in a 1964 letter to Bloom, Pincus wrote:

> Almost daily I become re-convinced that this move here is the smartest of my life and snobbily find it difficult to imagine that people can consider themselves educated without significant experiences in travel and other cultures. What this means is I'm learning a great deal just by seeing how these people live and think, and though as usual I have to become more diligent about books, I have become much more aware of politics and the intractability of habits (however disparate), and the absurdity of many of the structures man has devised, and the super overwhelming importance of real education. After finally reading Baldwin I became convinced of the worth of your idea of starting or running a negro college, and maybe someday… [112]

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[109] A history of the Tavistock Institute can be found in Eric Trist and Hugh Murray, eds., *The Social Engagement of Social Science: A Tavistock Anthology* (Philadelphia: University of Penn Press, 1990), passim.

[110] Letter, Harry Pincus to Marshall Bloom, October 14, 1964, folder 5, "Correspondence, 1964-1965," Box 2, Marshall Bloom Papers, Amherst.

[111] Ibid.

[112] Ibid.

By early 1966, Pincus described himself as having an ongoing internal "dialogue between the romantic and the social reformer. I skedaddle the line down the middle and won't make up my mind."[113] In the same letter, however, he bluntly asks Bloom: "Marshall-when will they stop that war? After the South Vietnamese started rioting against us one would have thought the people in Washington would get the hint. Foreign policy seems to be made by Lyndon determined to have his way, rather than with any appreciation of what other peoples are about."[114]

Pincus's transformation continued while a student at the London School of Economics (LSE). At LSE, Pincus was joined by some of his former Amherst cohort, including Marshall Bloom. Unlike Pincus, Bloom experienced a political awakening while a student at Amherst.[115] Originally, a conservative from Denver, Colorado, Bloom arrived at Amherst in fall 1962 and served as editor of the school newspaper, and developed an interest in the civil rights movement after helping organize protest in St. Augustine, Florida.[116] Bloom's work in the movement led him to Vietnam War protests. He maintained a close friendship with Elliot Isenberg, who headed Amherst's SDS chapter and also went to LSE after graduation. At Bloom's Amherst commencement ceremony in 1966, the college's decision to confer an honorary degree to Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara led Bloom and others to organize a walkout in protest, a move that garnered national attention, including a story in *Life Magazine*.[117]

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[113] Letter, Harry Pincus to Marshall Bloom, April 2, 1966, folder 14, "Incoming 1966-1967," Box 2, Marshall Bloom Papers, Amherst.

[114] Ibid.

[115] Blake Slonecker, "We are Marshall Bloom: Sexuality, Suicide, and the Collective Memory of the 1960s," *The Sixties: A Journal of History, Politics, and Culture*, 3:2 (2010) 187-205.

[116] Ibid., 189.

[117] "A Case of Bad Manners at Amherst College," *Life Magazine*, June 17, 1966; Caroline Surrey, "Some Notes on "On-Off-On" Record Foreign Policy Session: Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara and Amherst College Students, June 13, 1966, folder 23, "Commencement—Robert S. McNamara and Walkout," Box 5, Marshall Bloom Papers, Amherst.

At LSE, the Amherst gang transplanted their civic activism to a new campus. Bloom immediately assumed a position of leadership, heading the Graduate Student Association. Bloom used this position to continue fighting against injustices committed by supposed liberal institutions and governments, including the school's appointment of Dr. Walter Adams to be its new Director. For Bloom and others, the point of contention was Adams's record at his previous post as Principal of the College of Rhodesia. There, opponents contended, Adams had failed to do enough to oppose the Rhodesian Front, a political party who supported apartheid as the country transitioned to independence.[118] Following the announcement of the appointment, the Graduate Student Association, under Bloom's direction, along with several student organizations including the Socialist Society, distributed leaflets and handbills, organized meetings, and petitioned the college for reconsideration of the appointment.

Events climaxed on January 31, 1967, the week before the school's break for Lent. Then, Bloom and another student, David Adelstein of South Africa, attempted to hold a forum in the university's Old Theater to discuss Adams' appointment. The school, having enough of the protest, forbade the use of the auditorium. At 4 p.m., Bloom and several of his associates from his Amherst days gathered outside the theater, only to find the entrance blocked. After considering several solutions and listening to the instructions from the current LSE Director, Sidney Caine, the crowd voted to occupy the theater in order to hold their meeting in defiance of the ban. In the melee that ensued, one of the university porters who had been instructed to bar the doors suffered a heart attack. Following the announcement of the porter's death, the students left the auditorium.

In the aftermath of the protest, backlash emerged on campus, with students and faculty taking sides on the issue. Unable to avoid a public hearing on the matter, Bloom

[118] "Clipping from *Washington Post*," March 15, 1967, Folder 10, "Correspondence—London," Box 2, Marshall Bloom Papers, Amherst.

was brought before the administration on charges that the protest and the refusal to disperse violated the LSE Student Code. Making a point to note that the students were not responsible for the unfortunate death of the porter, they nonetheless found Bloom guilty of the violations and expelled him from the university.[119] Pincus's participation in the Adams demonstration caught Bloom by surprise, writing to friends, "a number of Amherst men participated including Harry Pincus '64 and Leonard Lamm, men who usually don't do that kind of thing."[120]

The controversy over the appointment of Dr. Adams, the death of the LSE porter, and the expulsion of Bloom from LSE coincided with the efforts of another group of American students who had begun to flirt with protesting the war overseas. In December 1966, a month before the LSE protest, Danny Schechter, another LSE student, aspiring journalist, and friend of Marshall Bloom, organized antiwar protests against U.S. military involvement in Vietnam.[121] For International Human Rights Day (December 10) commemorating the ratification of the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, Schechter and another American student, Dori Meibach, staged a protest

[119] "Decision of the Board of Discipline of the London School of Economics and Political Science re : Marshall Bloom," March 13, 1967, folder 41, "Official University Communications," Box 6 and Letter Bloom to David [?] [n.d.], folder 11, "Correspondence London 1966-1967," Box 2, Marshall Bloom Papers, Amherst. Bloom returned to the United States and founded Liberation News Service (LNS) with fellow journalists Raymond Mungo. LNS provided underground and alternative newspapers with an AP style bulletins about the events of the larger antiwar movement throughout the world. However, Bloom continuously fought depression and other personal demons, eventually seeking refuge in a commune in Massachusetts. After a falling out with some of the other founders of LNS, Bloom committed suicide in October 1969. For more on the life of Marshall Bloom, see Slonecker, "We are Marshall Bloom,"; Abe Peck, *Uncovering the Sixties: The Life and Times of the Underground Press* (New York: Citadel Press, 1991), passim; Raymond Mungo, *Famous Long Ago: My Life and Hard Times with the Liberation News Service.* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1970), passim.

[120] Marshall Bloom to "Dave and Skip," [n.d.] folder 11, "Correspondence—London," Box 2, Marshall Bloom Papers, Amherst.

[121] Letter, Daniel Schechter to Editor "World Herald Tribune," March 27, 1966, folder 12, Box 2, Marshall Bloom Papers, Amherst. Although the letter is dated 1966—it is from 1967)

at the U.S. Embassy in London.[122] In the press release announcing the protest, Schechter and Meibach described the protest as "organized as a public service by Americans," and as not affiliated with any specific organization. At the protest, Americans distributed leaflets that asked the U.S. ambassador to convey to "his boss" two simple requests: first, bring U.S. troops home, and second, free the few who have resisted the draft and war, specifically mentioning the Fort Hood Three, a trio of soldiers in Texas who refused deployment to Vietnam the previous June.[123]

A month after Schechter's protest, a delegation of 50 American Rhodes Scholars in Oxford came to the U.S. Embassy in London and delivered a letter outlining their opposition to the Vietnam War. The letter, transmitted to the U.S. State Department, explained they "found it increasingly difficult to justify our government's policy in Vietnam both to ourselves and to foreign students."[124] In presenting their case against the war, they applied a cost-benefit analysis to it, expressing a belief the war would drain more in terms of money, life, and creative spirit than it would reap. The students also called into the question the claims of stopping communist aggression, and the so-called Munich Lesson, "we cannot equate Hanoi's power and aims with those of Hitler and Stalin. To us the historical analogy makes sense only if North Vietnamese activities are a manifestation of Red Chinese aggression. It is China's role that is crucial. We find the administration's discussion of that role, however, sketchy at best."[125] Unlike the college students at LSE, the Oxford group seemed to engage in less radical justification for

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[122] Press Release, "Americans in London to Picket Embassy in Vietnam War Protest," December 1966, folder 9, "Vietnam Peace Efforts in London and Paris, Box 7, Marshall Bloom Papers, Amherst.

[123] Flyer, "Tell Me Lies About Vietnam," December 10, 1966, folder 9, "Vietnam Peace Efforts in London and Paris, Box 7, Marshall Bloom Papers, Amherst.

[124] Cable, American Embassy London to Secretary of State, January 27, 1967, folder, "United Kingdom, Cables 1/67—4/67," Box 210, National Security Files—Country Files, NLLBJ.

[125] Ibid.

opposing the war, but rather framed opposition in more realist critiques that circulated at the time.

The Human Rights Day Protest, the Oxford protest letter, and the expulsion of Bloom generated a new consciousness among the American student population in Great Britain. A new coordinated effort emerged there as it had in Paris the previous year. Heading into spring 1967, Pincus and Schechter organized the disparate American voices in London and established Americans in Britain for U.S. Withdrawal from Vietnam, which became known as the *Stop It Committee*. The new committee transplanted many of the stateside SDS's language and style to its organization and operation.

If prewar progressives believed that the game of American democracy required better and engaged players, and possibly a few tweaks to the rules to ensure fairness and parity for all comers, then postwar new left activists believed the game needed new referees who did not work for the other side. The new left emerged in the wake of the Second World War and used the language of "structures," as opposed to interests, to frame and understand society and democracy. While new left intellectuals agreed with the earlier assessments offered by progressive activists that a more engaged citizenry was needed to confront the complexities of modern life, the more fundamental problem for them was the system of American democracy and capitalism, especially those who made and oversaw the rules that organized the system. Young Americans of the early 1960s, like many of the world's youth, read and debated philosophers like Herbert Marcuse, Theodore Adorno, and C. Wright Mills, who critiqued the idea that structures like bureaucracy, technology, capitalism, militarism, and consumption, which defined modern life, represented progress for humanity. Far from improving the human condition, these social theorists contended, reliance upon and belief in progress compromised an individual's authenticity and the ability to participate in civic life. For scholars like Marcuse, little difference existed between Western liberal democratic societies and Eastern Communist ones. Both systems used similar structures and planning that

alienated the public by aligning their interests with the state and erasing any meaningful opposition. As a remedy to this technocracy, activists in the 1960s promoted "participatory democracy" that emphasized grassroots organizing and activism as the best way to change and transform American political, cultural, and social life and structures.[126]

Pincus, the chief organizer of the group, envisioned *Stop It* as a place that would bring together all Americans from different philosophies to register opposition to the Vietnam War, and foster "participatory democracy," the hallmark of stateside SDS chapters.[127] The tactic utilized grassroots activism and consensus building, and eschewed formal structure. As such, the group remained decentralized and left its members to work through consensus. *Stop It* was organized around several committees engaged in different projects and protests to accommodate diverse interests and harness individual strengths to the collective goal of ending the war. At *Stop It* meetings, referred to as "idea socials," discussions ensued over the best method to proclaim opposition to the war as Americans abroad.[128] The American student population at the London School of Economics (LSE) became the primary constituency for members of *Stop It*. U.S. officials who kept tabs on the organization reported *Stop It* included, "the presence of 200 American students at

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[126] Jeremi Suri, *Power and Protest: Global Revolution in the Age of Détente* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003), 88-130, states that Marcuse was influential in creating a international language of dissent; See also, "Marcuse's Mentors: The American Counterculture and the Guru of the New Left," in Thomas Wheatland, *The Frankfurt School in Exile* (Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 2009), 296-334, which takes a contrary view of the Frankfurt School's influence on the American antiwar movement, indicating that it has been over stated.

[127] Pincus described his vision for *Stop It* as a space "where people can come who are opposed to the war for whatever reason and just do their thing." Robert Hurwitt, "Stop It Gets Started," *Peace News*, December 29, 1967, Folder, " 202—activities of American Vietnam Deserters," Box 202, Archief Ton Regtien, IISH.

[128] Stop It Committee, "Meeting Announcement for 25 June 1967," folder, "Americans in Britain for US Withdrawal from Vietnam [Stop It], 1967-1968" (XIV), Box 303, War Resisters' International (WRI) Archives, IISH; Stop It Committee, "Fellow Americans in Britain," folder, "Americans in Britain for US Withdrawal from Vietnam [Stop It], 1967-1968" (XIV), Box 303, War Resisters' International (WRI) Archives, IISH.

LSE, among them a self-appointed representative of the Students for a Democratic Society and a Yale Law School graduate who acted as legal advisor to the accused student, also helped to promote the conscious imitation of the American student left."[129]

To build their constituency, *Stop It* members appealed to other Americans in London, and throughout Great Britain, in newspapers and the distribution of handbills.[130] Like PACS, *Stop It* composed and distributed leaflets to engage American tourists in London. Members handed out the leaflet "Welcome Americans," which warned tourists of possibly receiving a poor reception in destinations due to U.S. policy in Vietnam.[131] In addition they published, "London: A Guide for Americans in 1967," and sold it on the streets for two shillings (30 cents). The twenty-page booklet contained a single page on tourist information for "Swinging London," including dining, shopping, and transport. The remaining pages were filled with graphic images of the destruction inflicted on the Vietnamese people, quotes by U.S. officials and peace activists about the war, and statistics culled from newspapers. It urged Americans who bought and read the booklet "to help to bring this war to an immediate end, to return American men to civilian life, and to reshape American policies so we may return, with respect, to the international community."[132]

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[129] Briefing Book, European Youth and Young Leaders Conference at Airlie House, May 14-15, 1967," folder, "European Youth and Young Leaders," Box 23, Harry McPherson Files, NLLBJ.

[130] Stop It Committee, "Americans!," folder 3, "Stop It Committee," Box 7, Marshall Bloom Papers, Amherst; Stop It Committee, "Fellow Americans, Help Stop It!," [n.d.], folder, "Americans in Britain for US Withdrawal from Vietnam [Stop It], 1967-1968" (XIV), Box 303, WRI Archives, IISH; Letter, "Fellow Americans in Britain [n.d.], folder, "Americans in Britain for US Withdrawal from Vietnam [Stop It], 1967-1968" (XIV), Box 303, War Resisters' International (WRI) Archives, IISH.

[131] Flyer, "Welcome Americans," folder, "Americans in Britain for US Withdrawal from Vietnam [Stop It], 1967-1968" (XIV), Box 303, WRI Archives, IISH.

[132] Stop It Committee, "London: A Guide for Americans in 1967," folder, Americans in Britain for U.S. Withdrawal in Vietnam [Stop IT], box 303, WRI Archives, IISH.

However, this approach did not always transpire smoothly, and encountered setbacks due to individuals' sense of superiority, arrogance, and an adherence to an exceptional view of the United States that extended to how peace demonstrations were organized. In interviews, several *Stop It* members expressed dismay at the complicity of the British in the U.S. war in Vietnam. They chastised the state of the British peace movement, commenting that they had become too institutionalized and lacked commitment to fundamental social change.[133] Some *Stop It* organizers contended the American war required a distinctly American-led peace movement to mobilize the world.[134] Activists in Britain viewed these attitudes as arrogant and elitist, given the well-established antiwar and anti-nuclear network and traditions that had operated for two decades in Britain by the late 1960s.

U.S. Campaign (West Berlin)

At the same time events moved in the direction of organizing in London, Americans in West Berlin, too, registered their dissent as U.S. citizens. In late November 1966, Peter Standish and Francis Fuller, two American students, formed the U.S. Campaign in West Berlin. Operating out a one-room office near the Kurfurstendamm, the U.S. Campaign advertised itself as a gathering place for Americans or anyone wanting to learn more about the war, in the hopes it would spur growing opposition.[135] Like other antiwar American groups, the U.S. Campaign circulated flyers, brochures, posters, and buttons to other Americans. They wrote letters to antiwar organizers in the United States and gave interviews to both the American and German media.

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[133] Robert Hurwitt, "Stop It Gets Started," *Peace News*, December 29, 1967, Folder, " 202—activities of American Vietnam Deserters," Box 202, Archief Ton Regtien, IISH.

[134] Ibid.

[135] David Saltman, "Expatriates Help in Protest," 21 November 1967 *The Daily Kent Stater* (Kent State University student newspaper), 4.

The Campaign's literature and correspondence indicated political realism, too, framed their opposition to the war. At the center of the Campaign's objection was the claim the war did not represent the U.S.'s national security interest. In letters they specifically referenced Walter Lippmann, George Kennan, Hans Morgenthau, as well as policymakers like Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield.[136] In marches and interviews, the Campaign stressed the need for a political settlement in Vietnam, and believed such a settlement was best achieved through a neutralized solution that included all parties, including the NLF. To accomplish this, the U.S. Campaign promoted their beliefs that 1) the U.S. should institute an immediate, permanent, and unconditional halt of bombing North Vietnam and 2) U.S. recognition of the NLF.[137] In addition, literature proclaimed that the United Nations' proposal offered the best roadmap for peace in Vietnam, given the global community's desire to settle the situation.

U.S. government was particularly sensitive to the emergence of opposition to the Vietnam War among expats in West Germany. West Berlin had both strategic and symbolic value for U.S. foreign policy during the Cold War. A city surrounded by an unfriendly Soviet satellite, divided by a wall, and heavily fortified with American garrisons throughout, President Johnson often invoked West Berlin as rationale for the U.S. military intervention in Vietnam. This fact did not escape Standish who commented in an interview on the U.S. Campaign's objectives, that it "can make good use of the

[136] Letter, Peter Standish to National Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam, January 25, 1967 [and response 2/11/67], folder, "General Correspondence, January-February 1967," Box 2, Records of National Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam, Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Philadelphia, PA; Klimke, *The Other Alliance*, 81-83.

[137] Clippings, "Vietnam Protest Reaches Americans Abroad," [n.d.—ca. June 23, 1967] and Press Release, U.S. Campaign, "Stop the Draft Week," October 14, 1967, folder, "Germany, 1967-1970" Box 4, Student Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam Records, WHS.

unique Cold War ideological significance of West Berlin and its role in American foreign policy."[138]

The activities of the U.S. Campaign quickly came to the attention of the U.S. Consulate in West Berlin. Surveillance reports of the U.S. expatriate community compiled by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) noted a growing interaction between U.S. expatriates and leftist student groups in the city, especially students belonging to the German Socialist Federation (SDS) at West Berlin's Free University. The reports also noted that most of the student activists in Germany were motivated by "long overdue reform of the German university system," and were "sons and daughters of well to do West German professional and businessmen."[139] The CIA's emphasis on the university system, however, neglected other criticisms many West German youth voiced over their perceptions of shortcomings of civil society in the Federal Republic, and its seemingly blind commitment to the Cold War foreign policies of the United States.

This discontentment among West German youth offered American students venturing overseas the opportunity to create niches in which to discuss and protest the war. To reach highbrow audiences, the U.S. Campaign established a reading room with literature on the war, and invited Americans and Berliners to visit and read up on the war.[140] In creating a library, the Campaign provided an alternative space to the popular "Amerika Haus" established by the United States Information Agency (USIA) after the

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[138] "Vietnam Protest Reaches Americans Abroad, Vietnam Summer News (Cambridge, MA), June 23, 1967; Clippings, "Vietnam Protest Reaches Americans Abroad," [n.d.—ca. June 23, 1967], folder, "Germany, 1967-1970" Box 4, Student Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam Records, WHS.

[139] Report, Richard Helms to President Johnson, "Student Dissent and its Techniques in the US," January 5, 1968, folder, "CIA, Volume 3, [2 of 3], Box 9, National Security File, Agency File, NLLBJ.

[140] "Vietnam Protest Reaches Americans Abroad, Vietnam Summer News (Cambridge, MA), June 23, 1967; Clippings, "Vietnam Protest Reaches Americans Abroad," [n.d.—ca. June 23, 1967], folder, "Germany, 1967-1970" Box 4, Student Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam Records, WHS.

Second World War to promote cultural exchanges. The Amerika Haus was familiar to both German and American intellectuals who often relied on the assistance of the State Department for information about travel and exchange opportunities.[141] In contrast to the space where the U.S. government disseminated official publications, knowledge, and viewpoints, Peter Standish and Francis Fuller's library of English language books placed a clear marker within the politicized city that the U.S. government did not possess a monopoly on information pertaining to the war.

Despite the efforts to reach to intellectual audiences, the U.S. Campaign emphasized in its press releases and the press interviews their organization included church workers, teachers, musicians, clergy, and other Americans living in West Berlin. In essence, they wanted to ensure that they were not simply portrayed as students, but rather, as regular citizens who opposed the war.[142] However, the appeal to erudite citizens is unmistakable. In April 1967, Standish sent a letter to the *New York Review of Books,* informing its readership of the organization, and inviting Berlin-bound readers to join the protest, declaring, "It need hardly be said that the views of Americans abroad on the war in Vietnam have been badly neglected. We therefore request their support."[143]

Conclusion

A week after President Johnson's July 1965 announcement of increasing U.S. troop levels in South Vietnam, several members of the U.S. foreign policy establishment

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[141] Klimke, *The Other Alliance*, 187-193; Maria Hoehn, *GIs and Frèauleins: The German-American Encounter in 1950s West Germany* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002), 61-62.

[142] Clippings, "Vietnam Protest Reaches Americans Abroad," [n.d.—ca. June 23, 1967], and Press Release, U.S. Campaign, "Stop the Draft Week," October 14, 1967, folder, "Germany, 1967-1970" Box 4, Student Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam Records, WHS.

[143] Peter Standish Letter to the Editor, *New York Review of Books*, 4 May 1967, Online at: http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/1967/may/04/lobby/?pagination=false [accessed on September 5, 2013].

met for dinner to discuss the "information problem." They were concerned why the administration continued to encounter difficulty in selling the war. At the gathering, Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs James Greenfield was especially critical of the administration's sales pitch, believing it was too ridden with clichés. He cited the claim "our country's honor is at stake," and "Our friends won't trust us if we desert the Vietnamese," as especially problematic. Greenfield believed statements to this effect gave the administration trouble when foreigners said publically that they want us out of Vietnam, "in effect pulling the rug out from under us." National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy contested Greenfield's assessment, but did concede the group should make more of foreign statements, like Willy Brandt's reference to the conflict as "our war."[144] Getting to the heart of the problem, Greenfield, bluntly asked his colleagues later in the meeting, "What reaction would we like to get from the American people and from foreigners?" and "Why do people seem to understand that it is necessary to fight over in Berlin but not over in Vietnam?"[145]

By spring 1967, the expatriate antiwar movement understood the distinction transatlantic allies were willing to make between the justifications for war in Vietnam and the continued defense of Western Europe, and used it to build their ranks. *Stop It* claimed 150 members in the summer and 400 members by the end of the year.[146] It is

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[144] Public Affairs Policy Committee, "Memo for the Record," 3 August 1965 and "Dinner Meeting on the Information Problem" 4 August 1965, folder, "Vietnam Public Affairs Policy committee," Box 197, National Security File, Country File—Vietnam, NLLBJ.

[145] Ibid.

[146] Membership lists have yet to be located for the organization and may not exist. The one 150 number is given in a June meeting announcement of Stop It. See, Stop It Committee, "Meeting Announcement for 25 June 1967," folder, "Americans in Britain for US Withdrawal from Vietnam [Stop It], 1967-1968" (XIV), Box 303, War Resisters' International (WRI) Archives, International Institute of Social History, Amsterdam, Netherlands. The figure of 400 members is taken from a letter sent out by Stop It's International Affairs Secretary in early 1968. See, Daniel Schechter to SDS and other antiwar organizations, 17 January 1968, folder, "United Kingdom, 1967-1969; undated" box 55, Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) Records, WHS.

uncertain how many of these members were active and engaged members, and how many had simply signed a form or a petition signaling solidarity with the organization and its antiwar goals. Nonetheless, it appears that *Stop It* had about thirty active and engaged members by spring 1967. Similarly, by late 1966 PACS had approximately 50 active expatriates within their ranks.[147] The U.S. Campaign, verified by the reports the U.S. Mission in Berlin sent to State Department in Washington, often attracted between 55 and 80 individuals at weekly marches in West Berlin.[148]

Although relatively small in number, their intellectual opposition to the war reflected the spectrum of dissenting traditions in American history. Progressive activists, realists, and student leftists blended to offer different transatlantic audiences—people in their host countries, other expatriates, tourists, visiting intellectuals—an outlet to oppose the war while abroad. While this diversity of dissent provided a degree of versatility in attracting members, it also sowed generational and ideological disagreements, minimizing effectiveness. Expatriate opposition gradually moved toward framing their opposition as something distinctly American, as a basis for both unity and legitimacy.

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[147] PACS, "Membership Rosters," Box 7, Series M88-202, PACS Records, WHS.; Bethany Keenan, "'At the crossroads of world attitudes,'" 64-65.

[148] "70 Americans in Berlin Protest Policy on Vietnam," *New York Times*, 30 April 1967, p. 5; Telegram, AMConsul Berlin to Secretary of State, "US Campaign Demonstration," April 29, 1967, and "Vietnam Protest By American Citizens in Berlin (U.S. Campaign)," June 22, 1967, folder, "POL 23-8/Ger W/ 6/1/67," Box 2133, RG 59: General Records of the Department of State—Central Foreign Policy Files, NARA II.

CHAPTER THREE
OUTSIDE AGITATORS: AMERICAN PATRIOTISM AND THE FRAMING OF U.S. EXPATRIATE DISSENT, 1966-1968

In early July 1966, two major newspapers covered how Americans abroad "celebrated" the Fourth of July. At U.S. embassies throughout Europe, protesters used the holiday to voice dissent over President Johnson's decision to escalate the war in Vietnam. A short piece in the *New York Herald Tribune*, the paper of record for the expatriate community, noted demonstrations in Paris included a small contingent of Americans, known as the Paris American Committee to Stop War (PACS), who marched in silence to the U.S. embassy.[1] The article ended with a mention that "one of the Americans present burned an American flag."[2] The *New York Times* included a large picture of the American flag set ablaze. In their coverage, entitled "Paris Protest Gets Out of Hand," they captioned the photo "Demonstrators applaud as American flag, held up by a woman who said she was from New York, is burned at the *Place de la Concorde* in Paris in protest against the Vietnam War."[3]

The news stories prompted letters to the newspaper that denounced the July 4 events and called into question the patriotism of the organizers. The *Herald Tribune* published a letter under the heading "Bad Taste?" from M. Widmayer who claimed such demonstrations by Americans abroad eroded U.S. prestige and fueled anti-American sentiment by bringing disturbances to "another man's country."[4] Responding to the

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[1] Plans for the July 4 demonstration had in been in the works for over a month, a letter announcing PACS's plans and trying to enlist support of other Americans declared, "public demonstrations against the United States have become worldwide and, to our mind, increasingly necessary." Letter, Sandra Adickes and Lawrence M. Bensky to James and Gloria Jones, June 2, 1966, folder 12, box 80 (80.12), James Jones Papers, Harry Ransom Center, University of Texas, Austin (hereafter, HRC).

[2] "Anti-Vietnam Protests Mark 4th of July in Europe," *New York Herald Tribune* (European Edition), July 5, 1966.

[3] "Paris Protest Gets Out of Hand," *New York Times*, July 5, 1966; "July 4th in Paris," *PACS News*, Summer 1966, Box 1, M88-202, Paris American Committee to Stop (PACS) War Records, Wisconsin Historical Society, Madison, Wisconsin (hereafter, WHS).

[4] "Bad Taste?" *New York Herald Tribune* (European Edition), July 8, 1966.

criticism, PACS organizers attributed the "few regrettable incidents" to sympathetic Frenchmen and local troublemakers and claimed the acts were not the responsibility of the organizers. PACS President, journalist Schofield Coryell, wrote a response to the paper claiming the participants were "patriots" and asserted, "I would venture to suggest that, rather, our country's reputation is being disgraced today only by those in high places who are responsible for our government's policy of cruel and unjustified military intervention against the people of Vietnam, bringing widespread death and destruction to that unfortunate but indomitable nation."[5]

PACS's response to the July 4 protest exhibited a growing realization that the social contract governing the relationship between the state and its citizens during the Cold War was untenable. The foundation of the liberal state held that citizens would provide unconditional support to the government, and in exchange, it would provide for citizens basic economic security, guarantee full participation in civic life, and ensure the public's physical safety from internal and external enemies. Yet, the underpinning principal of this agreement is that that state must be both powerful to protect its citizens and assure its citizens the rights of civic participation. However, during wartime when the state obligates mobilization for war, it becomes evident that the state cannot ensure its citizen's protection without requiring their sacrifice and placing restriction on rights, even while claiming to fight "for democracy."[6]

For U.S. citizens abroad, lived experienced highlighted this disconnect.[7] As the U.S.'s international credibility eroded in the wake of the war, it made economic, social,

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[5] Schofield Coryell to *International Herald Tribune*, July 8, 1966, Box 7, M88-202, Paris American Committee to Stop War (PACS) Records, WHS.

[6] Robert Westbrook notes this often places liberal democracies at a disadvantage in mobilizing its citizenry for war. Robert Westbrook, *Why We Fought: Forging American Obligations in World War II* (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Books, 2004), 8-11 and 16-17.

[7] Joan W. Scott, "The Evidence of Experience," *Critical Inquiry* 17:4 (Summer 1991), 780-795.

and cultural exchanges for overseas Americans more difficult, making the U.S. government unable to fulfill its assurances under the social contract. Furthermore, expats lived in a curious citizenship limbo. Citizens and the government, as Widmayer's letter attests, expected expats to unquestioningly defend the state's positions and actions, even as expats remained suspect and the defining characteristic of citizenship, voting in national elections, was not universally guaranteed until 1976.[8] In addition, the U.S. government marshaled its vast transatlantic resources to spy upon, discredit, and halt the expression of alternative expressions of U.S. patriotism abroad. Aiding the U.S. government in their efforts were well-worn assumptions of overseas Americans and their susceptibility to foreign influences, believing they might be seduced by the false promise of communism.

To understand this relationship between the antiwar dissent, expatriates, and contested Cold War views of citizenship, I examined several prominent antiwar demonstrations organized by expats between 1966 and early 1968. Most events transpired in conjunction with large stateside protests like 1967's Spring Mobilization, Vietnam Summer, and the global demonstrations throughout 1968. Coordinating with the stateside antiwar movement helped to reaffirm national connections and ideas that, despite being overseas, antiwar expats shared a common association with those in the homeland.[9] Other times, demonstrations and activities were the function of opportunity and location, like when Vice President Hubert Humphrey traveled to Western Europe in service of the administration's continuing efforts to build transatlantic support for the war.

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[8] Not until passage of the Overseas Voting Rights Act of 1975, would all expatriates be assured of being allowed to participate in U.S. elections.

[9] The idea that the organizations wanted to maintain a distinctly American identity and member is something U.S. Campaign member Juan Flores discussed with Martin Klimke, *The Other Alliance: Student Protest in West Germany and the United States in the Global 1960s* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), 82.

Nonetheless, the desire to emphasize connections to the U.S. and the stateside antiwar movement became an important frame for expatriate dissent. With a core group of activists by early 1967, expatriates sought productive ways in which they might contribute to the burgeoning stateside activism, especially as its tactics shifted. Summer 1967 became known as "Vietnam Summer" among the U.S. antiwar movement. It signaled a period of extensive and sustained pressure on lawmakers to settle for peace in Vietnam. Borrowing the title from the 1964 "Freedom Summer" which called on students and young people to travel south and assist with the civil rights struggle, student leaders believed the same principles of collective action could be applied locally to help bring the Vietnam War to an end.

PACS, *Stop It*, and the U.S. Campaign used "Vietnam Summer" to register their dissent as U.S. citizens, position their dissent as an alternative form of patriotism, and make connections to their homeland in light of the psychological and political isolation dissidents experienced by not being able to actively participate in the stateside movement. As this dissent within the expatriate community took shape, it increasingly framed objections to the war in patriotic terms as an embodiment of the United States' own history, values, and traditions, and linked the contemporary struggle for Vietnamese Independence with the U.S. Revolutionary War two centuries prior.

By connecting to the U.S.'s revolutionary past, PACS's rhetoric tried to legitimize its dissent and status as citizens by asserting a common political and intellectual lineage that could be placed at the country's origin. By using rhetoric, symbols, and icons of the U.S.'s revolutionary heritage, expats reminded their audiences, primarily others in the transatlantic public sphere that alternative ideas of the United States still existed, even if marginalized. In essence, the message was that dissent did not mean disloyalty, even if the criticism emerged from outside the geographic borders of the United States, and that common heritage provided them the right to vocalize their opposition, just as the U.S. undertook efforts to mobilize global opinion. Holding events on the Fourth of July and at

sites commemorating transatlantic friendship, expatriates conveyed they took their civic obligation to engage in politics seriously, even when separated from the United States, and staked claims that distance was not a drawback, but rather it enhanced the ability to understand global opinions of the United States.

However, traditional and official conceptions of citizenship, loyalty, and patriotism retained a powerful pull, even among those skeptical of U.S. policy in Vietnam. As such, tensions proliferated within the rank and file of expat organizations as the competing formulations had their adherents. Throughout spring and summer 1967, disagreements became more pronounced as some students pushed for radical alternatives to disrupt the U.S.'s ability to wage and conduct the war. Sit-ins at draft boards and blockades at local military depots were debated and considered. Draft resistance and military desertion networks proliferated as well.[10] The fear of course, as new left expats brought their committed antiwar stances, was that it risked alienating more moderate supporters who had doubts about the war, but refused to participate in illegal activities. The participation of people with different political leanings and agendas in overseas antiwar politics proved unwieldy and undisciplined. Some saw the limits of their opposition as speaking solely as Americans and within accepted parameters of dissent. Others believed the expats' location and organization offered opportunities to build transnational alliances and address a host of social and political issues beyond the limited frame of the war.

[10] On Vietnam Summer, 1967 see: Penny W. Lewis, *Hardhats, Hippies, and Hawks: The Vietnam Movement as Myth and Memory* (Ithaca: Cornell University Pres, 2013), 84-90; Tom Wells, *The War Within: America's Battle Over Vietnam* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), 168-170; Nancy Zaroulis and Gerald Sullivan, *Who Spoke Up?: American Protests Against the War in Vietnam* (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Wilson, 1984), 110-121; Melvin Small, *Johnson, Nixon, and the Doves* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1988), 100; Michael S. Foley, *Confronting the War Machine: Draft Resistance During the Vietnam War* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003), 63-64.

Vice President Humphrey Comes to Europe

The visit of Vice President Hubert Humphrey to Western Europe in April 1967 offered expatriates an opportunity to present their patriotic dissent. Humphrey's visit aimed at smoothing over tensions within the transatlantic alliance in the wake of the Vietnam War, and it followed other efforts of the administration to press for international support for the war.[11] However, given the unpopularity of the war in the U.S. and overseas, and the reception of other U.S. representatives in Europe, security details implemented advanced precautions. The extra vigilance appeared to pay off the night before the Vice President appeared in West Berlin and police foiled a supposed assassination plot by arresting eleven members of the radical Kommune I, only to discover the bomb making equipment included yogurt and pudding intended to splatter on and embarrass Humphrey.[12]

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[11] Politicians in Western Europe continued to officially and publically support the war; yet growing discontentment within their own borders made that support increasingly tenuous in early 1967. A State Department cable from March 1967 noted the British government was having increased difficulty over the Vietnam problem, "and hoped some prominent American of significant political standing might visit UK for a few days to make authoritative presentation of US case before relatively small groups of highly influential individuals in political, press, and academic circles to provide renewed support and arguments for those seeking support US-Vietnam policy." Believing the U.S. official "could probably come under cover of the other business," the State Department proposed William Bundy, or the Under Secretary of State as likely candidates, and indicated that Secretary Rusk could stop over later in March and April to meet with British authorities. Telegram, Dean Rusk to American Embassy in London, March 13, 1967, folder, "United Kingdom, Cables 1/67—4/67," Box 210, National Security Files—Country Files, Johnson Library, Austin, TX (hereafter NLLBJ). See also, Fredrik Logevall, "America Isolated: The Western Powers and the Escalation of the War," in Andreas W. Daum, Lloyd C. Gardner, and Wilfried Mausbach, *America, the Vietnam War and the World: Comparative and International Perspectives* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 183-192; Fredrik Logevall, *Choosing War: The Lost Chance for Peace and the Escalation of War in Vietnam* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1999), 180-182; Thomas Alan Schwartz, *Lyndon Johnson and Europe: In the Shadow of Vietnam* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003), passim. John W. Finney, "Humphrey Chides Critics of the U.S.," *New York Times*, April 4, 1967.

[12] A full discussion of the "pudding plot" can be found in Klimke, *The Other Alliance*, 155-157; Mausbach, "Auschwitz and Vietnam," in Daum, et. al., *America, the Vietnam War and the World,* 286-290.

In advance of Humphrey's arrival in West Berlin, the U.S. Campaign sent a letter urging him to support a neutralized solution to the conflict.[13] Three of the demonstrations in West Berlin during Humphrey's visit were organized by the U.S. Campaign,[14] marching under their own banners "Americans Opposed to U.S. Policy in Vietnam" and "Peace in Vietnam" to showcase Americans who opposed the war. In subsequent letters publicizing their efforts, the U.S. Campaign made a point to note that its demonstrations during the visit and in the aftermath were the only ones in the city that were exclusively planned by and conducted by American citizens. The implication being that this dissent offered was distinctly American in nature and not to be conflated with actions of Europeans.[15]

In contrast to the dissent in West Berlin, the combined French and American reception for the Vice President in Paris was less than hospitable. Anti-Vietnam War sentiment had gripped France from the top of the country's leadership to the person on the street.[16] Even French President De Gaulle had been vocal on his opposition and offered to negotiate a settlement among the participants.[17] French opposition to the war,

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[13] Newspaper Clippings, "Vietnam Protest Reaches Americans Abroad," [n.d.—ca. June 23, 1967], and Press Release, U.S. Campaign, "Stop the Draft Week," October 14, 1967, folder, "Germany, 1967-1970" Box 4, Student Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam Records, WHS.

[14] Press Release, U.S. Campaign, "Stop the Draft Week," October 14, 1967, folder, "Germany, 1967-1970" Box 4, Student Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam Records, Wisconsin Historical Society, Madison, Wisconsin; Airgram, AMConsul Berlin to Department of State, "Vietnam Protest By American Citizens in Berlin (U.S. Campaign)," June 22, 1967, folder, "POL 23-8/Ger W/ 6/1/67," Box 2133, RG 59: General Records of the Department of State—Central Foreign Policy Files, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD (Hereafter ,NARA II).

[15] Press Release, U.S. Campaign, "Stop the Draft Week," October 14, 1967, folder, "Germany, 1967-1970" Box 4, Student Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam Records, WHS.

[16] Bethany S. Keenan, "'Vietnam is Fighting For Us:' French Identities and the U.S. Vietnam War, 1965-1973" Ph.D. diss, University of North Carolina, 2009, passim.

[17] See, "Statement of French President Charles de Gaulle at his Tenth Press Conference in Paris, July 23, 1964 reprinted online at: http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/1964degaulle-vietnam.htm [accessed on October 8, 2010]; French attitudes toward U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War is examined in Keenan, "Vietnam is Fighting for Us," 26.

which spanned the political spectrum, derived from its collective memory of fighting colonial wars in Algeria, and of course, Indochina a decade before.[18] From the vantage point of the French public and policymakers, the United States, despite its rhetoric of fighting communism, securing democracy, and maintaining credibility, was simply engaged in another colonial war. This understanding led many French new left organizations and citizens to use the Vice President's visit to express frustration on the war. As Humphrey traveled throughout the city, his motorcade was bombarded with eggs and paint as demonstrations erupted on the streets and police sought to control the situation.[19]

For the U.S. expatriates of PACS, the Vice President's visit offered an arena both to connect with their homeland and represent the alternative strand of U.S. global mission and values in which they located their civic identity. Emphasizing a common humanity and revolutionary heritage, PACS repeatedly linked the U.S. struggle for independence with the ongoing Vietnamese struggle during the Vice President's visit. PACS extended its welcome to Humphrey with a small ad in the *International Herald Tribune*, proclaiming: "Mr. Humphrey! No rhetoric or free speech justifies the destruction of Vietnamese villages and children—you can't sell democracy with napalm!"[20]

Humphrey's time in Paris included visiting a statue of George Washington, which had been a gift from the American people to France, and laying a wreath as a way to illustrate a common revolutionary heritage the two countries shared. H. Bruce

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[18] Keenan, "U.S. is Fighting for Us," 307.

[19] John W. Finney, "Humphrey in Paris, Pleases De Gaulle, but Arouses Demonstrations," *New York Times,* April 8, 1967. John W. Finney, "In Europe, Humphrey Finds Old Friends, and Young Strangers," *New York Times*, April 9, 1967.

[20] "Advertisement," *International Herald Tribune*, April 6, 1967; PACS Records, Microfilm, Reel #2, WHS.

Franklin, a Stanford University Professor in Paris at the time, recounted in his memoirs that he brought a stack of leaflets to distribute to the crowd during the ceremony, which called attention to the statue's significance. In the flyers, PACS disputed the legitimacy of Humphrey laying the wreath, citing the inscription on the statute "Given by the women of the United States of America in memory of the Friendship and Fraternal Aid given by France to their fathers during their fight for independence." In a leaflet PACS asked, "Is napalm burning 'friendship and fraternal aid?" and declared, "Washington and Lafayette would be ashamed of us," invoking the revolutionary heroes of both countries.[21] The flyers positioned the war in Vietnam within this same revolutionary tradition, and questioned whether the use of napalm on the Vietnamese people followed in this shared heritage among people who wanted their independence. Other members of PACS assembled along the parade route to display banners and NLF flags to the passing motorcade. Franklin's attempts at distributing leaflets earned him an arrest and time in a jail that quickly filled with protesters.[22]

Following his return from the European trip, Humphrey recalled the egg throwing and disruptions were "blown out of proportion" and stated that he did not believe they were reflective of the broader sentiment of Europeans toward Americans. Instead, he attributed the "agitation" to "the work of a highly organized handful of people."[23] By using language that categorized protesters collectively, regardless of nationality, he deployed images of characteristic of communist infiltration and subversives many

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[21] PACS Flyer, "Vice President Humphrey," [n.d.], folder 7, box 84 (84.7), James Jones Papers, HRC.

[22] H. Bruce Franklin, *Back Where You Came From: A Life in the Death of the Empire* (New York: Harper's Magazine Press, 1975), 182-187.

[23] Maurice Carroll, "Humphrey Discounts Anti-U.S. Protests in Europe" *New York Times,* 13 April 1967.

Americans during the Cold War understood. Furthermore, by referring to them as a "handful," the Vice President called attention to their modest numbers and the threat a minority faction posed to subvert democratic rule.

The Vice President's dismissal of what transpired notwithstanding, the events surrounding his Western European trip had a chilling effect on the White House and the U.S. diplomatic establishment on sending high ranking officials abroad. When a request from the British government arrived at the State Department in November asking for a Vice Presidential visit to London, U.S. planners considered the recent nature of receptions. In weighing the options in terms of press and security, and recalling the events during his spring visit to the continent, the reception other American policymakers like Walt Rostow received in Great Britain, and the large demonstrations at the embassy, U.S. Ambassador David Bruce recommended against the visit.[24]

Spring Mobilization, 1967

A week after Humphrey's transatlantic sojourn, stateside activists held the largest antiwar demonstration to date that brought together students and other voices within the antiwar cause. Organized by David Dellinger's National Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam (MOBE), the event held major demonstrations in New York and elsewhere on April 15, 1967. As plans for the demonstration took shape, MOBE enlisted various student and leftist organizations papering over the ideological differences that

[24] In February 1967, National Security Advisor Walt Rostow gave a lecture a lecture at Leeds in which students carried placards, and some 50-100 of 650 students in attendance walked out as the lecture began. In addition, several vocal outbursts occurred throughout the lecture whenever Vietnam was mentioned. Despite the protest, the U.S. Embassy in London, when reporting back to the State Department, dismissed the demonstration as "the press exaggerated the reaction in their headlines," and noting that Leeds "has a reputation for attracting students who rejoice in left-wing causes." The Embassy also reported that Rostow successfully proselytized to several students and 15 professors before the lecture (with the "press successfully excluded") and that "it was here among reasonable and unemotional minds that Rostow marshaled an almost unassailable case for US position." Memo, US Embassy London to State Department, February 24, 1967, folder, "United Kingdom, Memos 1/67—4/67," Box 210, National Security Files—Country Files; and Cable, Ambassador Bruce to State Department, November 16, 1967, folder, "United Kingdom, Cables 7-12/67," Box 211, National Security Files—Country Files, NLLBJ.

wrecked earlier cooperation by focusing exclusively on mutual opposition to the war. By producing a protest showcasing thousands of dissenters across the country, MOBE hoped to convey the extent of antiwar sentiment by early 1967.

Antiwar voices within the expatriate community approached MOBE about participating and contributing their worldwide presence to the event, in order to showcase that opposition to the war spilled outside the nation's border. For expatriates, working with MOBE provided another avenue to burnish their civic credentials and frame their dissent as patriotic, despite accusations to the contrary. In January 1967, the newly formed U.S. Campaign contacted MOBE to obtain information about the upcoming protest and explore the possibility of affiliating with the group.[25] Similarly, Maria Jolas contacted David Dellinger about the possibility of having PACS host a solidarity event in Paris. Jolas proposed the event include a transatlantic phone call between those gathered in Paris and those in New York to be the event's culmination. Such a call, she argued, would demonstrate the solidarity of world opinion with the growing antiwar movement in the United States and would sustain PACS in its own efforts.

As plans on both sides of the Atlantic proceeded, however, difficulties ensued. Being away from the United States provided logistical nightmares in organizing and vocalizing this dissent. Distance made coordinating and staying current with trends and developments within the U.S. antiwar movement difficult. PACS had hoped to find a high profile international peace activist in Europe to address the crowd gathered in New York from Paris. Jean-Paul Sartre, Linus Pauling, and Reinhold Niebuhr were discussed but ruled out for various reasons.[26] Despite PACS's efforts, the phone call never

[25] Letter, Peter Standish to National Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam, January 25, 1967 [and response 2/11/67], folder, "General Correspondence, January-February 1967," Box 2, Records of National Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam, Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Philadelphia, PA (Hereafter, SCPC).

[26] Telegram, Ira Morris to David Dellinger ca. 1 April 1967, folder, "Spring Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam, 1966-1967," Box 3, PACS Records, WHS; Letter, David Dellinger

materialized due to both an inability to agree on and find a suitable speaker, as well as technical difficulties that prevented effective transatlantic communication for an outdoor rally.[27]

Given the inability of an impressive transatlantic phone call to materialize, PACS used the April 15 protest in Paris to reaffirm a specific ideal of American patriotism, once again linking the antiwar cause with the United States' revolutionary origins. For the event, PACS chose to hold it at the statue of revolutionary hero Thomas Paine in *Parc Montsouris.* Speakers, including Jolas, laid a wreath at the statue and quoted familiar passages from *The Crisis* as well as from *Rights of Man* claiming Paine as a revolutionary in the truest form, whose words "moved men to action."[28] By placing a wreath at the statue, PACS co-opted the message and significance the U.S. government used to convey its friendship with France a few weeks earlier during the Vice President's visit. Instead of Washington, PACS found its own revolutionary heroes to emphasize the solidarity between common peoples who sought to end a war in Vietnam that many viewed as another revolutionary struggle for independence.

The expatriate-led protest in London for the Spring Mobilization also featured symbols of the United States prominently for the growing "politics of the street" the *Stop It Committee* had come to favor. At noon on April 15, 1967 approximately twenty-five U.S. citizens gathered outside of the American Embassy in London to protest the Vietnam War. The demonstration featured two props—a small, empty casket and U.S. flag draped atop it. As the crowd chanted slogans and carried placards, disagreement

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to Maria Jolas, April 4. 1967, folder, "Spring Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam, 1966-1967," Box 3, PACS Records, WHS.

[27] PACS Meeting Minutes, 11 April 1967; PACS Spring Mobilization Program, 15 April 1967; and Letter, PACS to Spring Mobilization Committee, 25 March 1967, folder, "Spring Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam, 1966-1967," Box 3, PACS Records, WHS.

[28] Maria Jolas, "Remarks at 1967 Spring Mobilization Events in Paris," 15 April 1967, folder, "Spring Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam, 1966-1967," Box 3, PACS Records, WHS.

consumed their ranks when one of the protesters doused the coffin and flag with lighter fluid intending to set it ablaze, despite a warning from a London policeman that burning the flag would result in their arrest. An FBI informant among the crowd later reported that two Americans were at the center of the street debate. Harry Pincus wanted to set the flag and coffin on fire to symbolize the destruction of Vietnam and hoped to be arrested. Pincus's associate and co-organizer, David Slaney, wanted to avoid arrest. As the crowd argued over how to proceed, a London police officer grabbed the flag and put it in the boot of his car. No arrests were made.[29]

The disagreement over the flag within the ranks of *Stop It* portended many of the problems and disagreements that would define its operation over the next year. Whether Pincus's desire to burn the flag can be attributed to showmanship or to deeply held convictions on the destruction of Vietnam is unknown. Given Pincus's background, evolution, and future activism, both seem likely explanations. The division within the ranks of *Stop It*, too, suggests while opposition to the war grew, individuals remained cognizant of the dangers, problems, and stigmas protesting while overseas held, and such officially sanctions framings of patriotism and citizenship retained an important pull and power, even while overseas.

Nonetheless, as the war continued, the U.S. flag continued to be a contentious symbol utilized in expatriate protests. The flag's use by antiwar expats signaled a belief it defied ownership by a single segment of the U.S. population, but rather it belonged to everyone. Furthermore, its presence in demonstrations outside the United States asserted that despite both distance and contrarian opinions, expatriates retained membership in the

[29] Memo, Federal Bureau Of Investigation, "Spring Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam," May 26, 1967; Henry W. Kemp, U.S. Embassy London Duty Officer, "Log of Events of April 15, 1967," April 18, 1967; Memo, FBI Legal Attaché London to FBI Director, "Student Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam," May 25, 1967, Folder, "Harry G. Pincus FBI File," Box 7645, RG 65: Records of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, NARA II.

national community, and were willing to proclaim it publically to challenge the hegemony of the dominant Cold War views. Such displays by antiwar expatriates, however, hit a sensitive nerve with the U.S. government.

Marching Behind the Flag, U.S. Campaign

Two weeks after the Spring Mobilization, the U.S. Campaign in West Berlin held the first of what would become its signature protest: a weekly march down the Kurfurstendamm with the American flag prominently displayed. The plan called for Americans to walk in twenty ranks of five people across with the U.S. flag in front and a banner proclaiming their identity as Americans and the desire to "neutralize Vietnam." As antiwar and new left sentiment proliferated in the city, Standish and Fuller looked to promote solidarity with German new left groups, and showcase an alternative presence of Americans in the city to contrast with the heavily militarized aspect of American operations there.

In planning for the demonstration, Fuller and Standish met with local officials and the police, making no secret of their plans and seeking approval for the march.[30] Their plans, however, hit a nerve as West Berlin officials tipped off American officials who grew concerned about the protest, and in particular the use of the American flag. Debate ensued among U.S. officials how best to prevent the flag from being used in the demonstrations. U.S. diplomats entertained several options at preventing the demonstration from occurring. The U.S. Mission met with US Ambassador George McGhee and petitioned the German Appeals Court (Senat) asking that they approve a permit for the demonstration only if the organizers of the demonstration agreed not to display an American flag. The U.S. Campaign refused this stipulation. Furthermore, the judiciary ruled against U.S. officials stating the police could not legally refuse a permit

[30] Telegram, American Mission Berlin to Secretary of State, "Planned Vietnam Protest By Americans in Berlin," April 21, 1967, folder, "POL 23-8/Ger W/ 6/1/67," Box 2133, RG 59: General Records of the Department of State—Central Foreign Policy Files, NARA II.

unless so ordered by U.S. authorities. In stressing the point, the U.S. Mission informed the State Department that if the U.S. chose this option, the Senat would want the directive in writing, for legal purposes.[31]

Seemingly in a box, the U.S. government finally tried to persuade its allies, Britain and France, to ban the use of the flag in the sectors of the city they administered, since the proposed demonstration crossed into multiple sectors. The French readily agreed. British diplomats expressed a willingness to comply with the request, but in doing so, pointed out several problems with a possible ban, which had previously been raised and discussed among U.S. officials.[32] Primarily among these concerns was that a U.S.-imposed limitation on demonstrations might renew anti-Vietnam demonstrations by students and other young people in the city. Furthermore, it might also push other American students who sat on the fence into the antiwar camp, noting, "There is further risk that specific ban on the use of the flag will be taken by students as a challenge to their ingenuity," and "Students could, for example, individually carry small American flags such as those used in state visits. We might also have the problem of explaining why U.S. authorities in Berlin cannot permit U.S. citizens to take action."[33] At the same time, the embassy noted failing to ban the flag's use would not be in accordance with the city's special status, and many people, both Americans and Berliners, would question the permitting of the flag's use. Also, they expressed the concern that the visible presence of a flag might escalate tensions at the demonstration.[34] In other words, the U.S. government anticipated that they would receive criticism from both sides no matter their final

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[31] Ibid.

[32] Ibid.

[33] Telegram, American Mission Berlin to Secretary of State, "Planned Vietnam Protest By Americans in Berlin on April 29" April 21, 1967, folder, "POL 23-8/Ger W/ 6/1/67," Box 2133, RG 59: General Records of the Department of State—Central Foreign Policy Files, NARA II.

[34] Ibid.

decision regarding the flag. An alternative solution proposed by both the British and French governments asked whether the U.S. had considered expelling Fuller and Standish from West Berlin. U.S. responded doing so would be exceedingly difficult.[35]

In light of these concerns, on April 21, 1967, a week before the protest, the State Department advised its embassies in Bonn, London, Brussels, Moscow, and Paris that the use of the American flag in antiwar displays is "highly undesirable." However, realizing few options existed to prohibit or limit its use in the demonstration, the State Department noted,

> We are inclined to believe, however, that attempts at suppression of demonstration of denial of permission to carry flags would probably get even worse and longer-lasting publicity. Therefore, unless you perceive major security threat arising out of the demonstration, believe it wisest not to intervene. However, you may wish to alert police to possibility of flag-burning or other desecration and request them to halt such acts.[36]

An estimated 80 US citizens participated in the April 29 demonstration that included both an American flag and a sign declaring, "Neutralize Vietnam."[37] State Department reports indicated it was orderly, that all participants appeared to be American (although it is unsure as to how they would know this for certain), and it received little media attention.[38] Efforts to suppress future protests, however, did not end, as West Berlin police tried to limit the walks to once every six weeks, rather than every week. Despite

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[35] Telegram, American Mission Berlin to Secretary of State, "Planned Vietnam Protest By Americans in Berlin," April 21, 1967, folder, "POL 23-8/Ger W/ 6/1/67," Box 2133, RG 59: General Records of the Department of State—Central Foreign Policy Files, NARA II.

[36] Telegram, Secretary of State to American Mission Berlin, et. al., "Planned Protest by US Students in Berlin, April 29," April 21, 1967, folder, "POL 23-8/Ger W/ 6/1/67," Box 2133, RG 59: General Records of the Department of State—Central Foreign Policy Files, NARA II.

[37] "70 Americans in Berlin Protest Policy on Vietnam," *New York Times*, 30 April 1967, p. 5.

[38] Telegram, AMConsul Berlin to Secretary of State, "US Campaign Demonstration," April 29, 1967, folder, "POL 23-8/Ger W/ 6/1/67," Box 2133, RG 59: General Records of the Department of State—Central Foreign Policy Files, NARA II.

the efforts to limit and stop the marches, the U.S. Campaign continued the weekly protest, and encouraged other Americans to join them.

Government Monitoring of Expats

The efforts to limit the U.S. flag at protests in West Berlin represented only the leading edge of U.S. government interest in expatriate protests. In November 1967, a declassified CIA memo reported a group of Fulbright students in Munich planned to circulate a petition critical of President Johnson and the U.S. government for the Vietnam War among other Fulbright students on the continent.[39] With the highly visible protests overseas, the White House grew increasingly concerned over international public opinion on the Vietnam War, and especially the role U.S. expats had in shaping that opinion. President Johnson's Special Assistant for Domestic Affairs, E. Ernest Goldstein, met with three other presidential advisors to discuss the matter under the euphemism of "information and representation" that needed re-examination. At the meeting were Ed Fried, the president's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, and presidential staffers Fred Panzer and Robert Fleming, who both worked on press and polling issues. Of the three areas the group identified at the meeting to evaluate, the first was "the way in which we send professors and other people abroad to represent the United States." The implicit message from the meeting was the White House needed to re-evaluate how the U.S. government sanctioned and financed individuals to travel overseas through cultural exchange programs to better ensure compliance with the official messages of the United States. [40]

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[39] CIA Report, "The Peace Movement: A Review of Developments since 15 November," 21 December 1967, folder, "Miscellaneous CIA Material [3 of 3]," Box 15, National Security File/Intelligence File, NLLBJ.

[40] Ernest Goldstein, Memo to the file, November 14, 1967, folder, "Western Europe Survey," box 4, Ernest Goldstein Files, NLLBJ.

In many ways, discussions that rose to the level of the White House on the matter of how to better control the intentions and messages of travelers on the government's dime eerily recalled a less extreme version 1950s McCarthy-era tactics, when the State Department's Passport Office determined what travel was legitimate. Although 1967 was over a decade removed from the height of McCarthyite travel restrictions, that spring Secretary of State Dean Rusk sent a memo to the U.S. Embassy in Paris notifying them the passports of several Americans "have been officially revoked" in connection with the Bertrand Russell War Crimes Tribunal that convened in Stockholm to investigate whether the U.S. was guilty of war crimes in Vietnam. The memo also congratulated the Embassy on its "good work with the GOF [Government of France]" in preventing the Tribunal from meeting there, a NATO ally, and forcing it to Sweden.[41]

Either convinced the Soviet Union and international communism orchestrated the international antiwar movement or worried about the potential embarrassment overseas organizing possessed, President Johnson instructed CIA Director Richard Helms to investigate connections between the antiwar movement and communism.[42] In a series of memos, the CIA sketched out channels between the U.S. antiwar movement and international organizations that might provide conduits for communists to infiltrate.[43]

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[41] The revocations were in addition to ones previously applied to prominent activists Ralph Schoenman. Russell Dearnley Stetler, John Gerassi, David Dellinger, and Carol Brightman who participated in the conference despite the official sanction to travel. Memo, Dean Rusk to American Embassy Paris, March 24, 1967, folder, "France 1/67-7/67," Box 173, National Security Files--- Country Files, NLLBJ.

[42] Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones, *The CIA and American Democracy* (Binghamton, NY: Vail-Ballou Press, 1989), especially Chapters 8 and 9, 139-175; Klimke, *The Other Alliance*, 204-205. Charles DeBenedetti, "A CIA Analysis of the Anti-Vietnam War Movement: October 1967" *Peace & Change* 9:1 (1983), 31-41; Charles DeBenedetti, "The American Peace Movement and the National Security State, 1941-1971," *World Affairs* 141:2 (Fall 1978), 118-129.

[43] This fact did not escape many of the leaders of these organizations who rightly suspected they were under surveillance. Harry Pincus commented in an interview to the *Times* of London that he believed CIA agents attended the group's meeting. Stanford professor, H. Bruce Franklin, who headed the university's student program in France learned of CIA surveillance of PACS while in jail following protests during Vice President Humphrey's visit to the city. "The Stop It Americans," *Times* (London), 2 June 1967; Franklin, *Back Where You Came From*, 186-189; Keenan, "'Vietnam is Fighting for Us," 281.

U.S. expats appeared in the report as a possible source for this interaction and collusion. The agency noted there was a lack of evidence that expats worked with or were under the direction of communists, but warned any such support would be likely be "clandestine," and noted their "voluntary activities serve Soviet and Chinese interests about as well if they were controlled."[44] More significantly, according to the memos, was the role expats had in functioning as "colonies" of the U.S. antiwar movement. Helms noted the stateside movement "count[s] on the moral support and encouragement of expatriate Americans,"[45] and expats provided an important channel for coordinating U.S. activity with foreign activity, declaring, "[I]n some capitals, U.S. students have formed their own protest organizations, which function as subsidiaries of the NMC [National Mobilization Committee]. Examples are Stop It and Angry Arts committees in London and the Paris American Committee to Stop War."[46]

The language in the CIA's report reflects the long-standing assumption that the longer U.S. citizens remained overseas, the more susceptible the citizens were to "corrupting" influences. Fears of overseas Americans "going native" had inhabited popular culture since the early part of the twentieth century. The more time citizens spent overseas, the more likely they might subscribe to "anti-American ideals," and bring those ideas back into the United States for subversive purposes.[47] Over time, this fear

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[44] Central Intelligence Agency to President Johnson, "International Connections of U.S. Peace Groups," November 15, 1967. *CIA FOIA documents*, [http://www.foia.cia.gov/] accessed and downloaded, April 6, 2010.

[45] CIA Report, Richard Helms to President Johnson, "Student Dissent and its Techniques in the US," January 5, 1968, folder, "CIA, Volume 3, [2 of 3], Box 9, National Security File, Agency File, NLLBJ.

[46] Central Intelligence Agency to President Johnson, "International Connections of U.S. Peace Groups," November 15, 1967. *CIA FOIA documents*, [http://www.foia.cia.gov/] accessed and downloaded, April 6, 2010.

[47] My use of "anti-Americanism, and its description as a "myth" derives and is largely based upon the work of Max Friedman's Anti-Americanism, where he explore how the concept evolved over the course of U.S. history, and was applied during the Cold War. As Max Friedman has adeptly noted, however, anti-Americanism provided a useful organizing framework for policymakers and the public to

metastasized into propaganda campaigns that warned of internal subversion from external sources, by way of a "fifth column," such as Roosevelt's promotion of a "Brown Scare" in the early 1940s and Joseph McCarthy's "Red Scare" of the early 1950s.[48] For bureaucrats in an agency dedicated to national security and surveillance, and who likely lived through and had personal recollections of both scares, viewing U.S. expatriates in a similar fashion was not a stretch of the imagination.

This assumption served the interests of the national security state and justified keeping expats under surveillance. Stories of Red Squads and agent provocateurs within the ranks of stateside antiwar groups were well known by activists, although the extent to which remained opaque until the investigations and revelations of the 1970s.[49] However, when dealing with the international manifestation of antiwar dissent, the U.S. government could marshal the resources of their transatlantic allies, who shared the Cold War assumptions and desire to maintain law and order within their borders. As unrest consumed western democracies throughout 1968 for a variety of social and political reasons, U.S. expats provided a convenient excuse, allowing political leaders to apply the

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distill complex notions of how the rest of the world viewed and understood the United States. This ideology of anti-Americanism, allowed policymakers and the public to understand the world, and try to make sense of how people might resist and confront what they naturally assumed to be divinely inspired mission to lead the world. In this way, anti-Americanism functioned as a powerful, "myth." Allegations that the rest of world harbored and exhibited "anti-Americanism" during the Vietnam War as Max Friedman has explored in his own work were largely overblown. Using definitions mostly on the conservative scale that he calls anti anti Americans, If anti-Americanism was largely a "myth" how then to explain the protests of the time? For Friedman, the protests were largely directed at a specific instance— continuing U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War. As more revelations appeared about U.S. conduct in the war and on its college campuses, the more international criticism intensified. As Friedman notes international students of the New Left were often adept at separating their feelings about the United States and its involvement in the war. Max Paul Friedman, *Rethinking Anti-Americanism: The History of an Exceptional Concept in American Foreign Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 5-7; Bernd Greiner, "Saigon, Nuremberg, and the West: German Images of America in the late 1960s," Alexander Stephan, ed., *Americanizations and Anti-Americanism: The German Encounter with American Culture after 1945* (New York and Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2005), 51-66.

[48] Abbott Gleason, *Totalitarianism: The Inner History of the Cold War* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 74-75.

[49] Ivan Greenberg, *The Dangers of Dissent: The FBI and Civil Liberties Since 1965* (New York: Lexington Books, 2010), 93-97.

"outside agitator" label to activists who crossed borders and disturbed the social order, as had been the case with Marshall Bloom during the spring 1967 protests at LSE.[50]

While it is difficult to pinpoint the origins of the "outsider agitator" and concept precisely, it became a common trope in the southern U.S. during the civil rights movement, when local officials commonly applied the term to civil rights workers, from both the north and south, to demonize and discredit them and their work. The implication was that people with no vested interest in the well being of the community arrived, stirred up trouble, and disrupted a way of life that many white southerners asserted had been fine for decades. It was a way to "other" individuals and their political goals. Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., referenced the label in his 1963 "Letter from a Birmingham Jail."[51] It was also deployed by civic officials during the Vietnam War, especially in college towns, when protests turned violent, to attribute to a group of highly professional group of outside agitators that moved from town to town to cause trouble, once again deflecting local and organic origins of political demands.

The allegations, monitoring, and policies intended to curb protests in the late 1960s and early 1970s proved very effective in dividing the antiwar movement and isolating its more radical critiques within the public's consciousness. It required a growing antiwar movement that increasingly included middle class and "moderate" voices to pause and take stock of the nature and appropriate manifestation of their dissent. More moderate expats who drifted toward antiwar circles found few places to inhabit, especially as the established antiwar community overseas dissolved or was subsumed under a more nebulous international new left movement with strong anti-

[50] Flyer, "Bloom Must Go," "Free Speech," February 7, 1967, folder 11, "Correspondence London, 1966-1967," Box 6, Marshall Bloom Papers, Amherst College Archives and Special Collections, Amherst, Massachusetts.

[51] Martin Luther King, jr., "Letter from a Birmingham Jail," April 16, 1963, online at http://www.africa.upenn.edu/Articles_Gen/Letter_Birmingham.html [accessed June 20, 2014].

imperial critiques of U.S. foreign policy that did not always gibe with their own world views.

Despite allegations and beliefs by the CIA that the U.S. expatriate opposition had been infiltrated by communist sources and influences, ironically, the primary culprit responsible for infiltrating expat groups was the U.S. government, who sent undercover agents to monitor their activities. In an early press interview, Harry Pincus commented he believed some "CIA bozos" attended *Stop It* meetings.[52] Harry Pincus's FBI file contained over 170 pages documenting his activities between 1967 and 1972.[53] H. Bruce Franklin reportedly learned of infiltration as he was carted to jail during the protests over Vice President Humphrey's visit in 1967.[54] In a December 1967 CIA memo, Helms told the White House, U.S. students in West Berlin planned to form a five-man team to train other group members on how to discuss Vietnam before German audiences and that they established a reference library.[55] Interestingly, the language used by the CIA in the memo, is almost verbatim of the U.S. Campaign's November 6, 1967 meeting minutes, indicating the spy agency had agents on the inside of the group as well.[56]

Many expatriate groups suspected or learned of the infiltration. The long-standing climate of suspicion expatriates and activists operated within fostered a climate of mistrust and accusations were sometimes leveled at other members to gain political

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[52] "The Stop It Americans," *Times* (London), June 2, 1967.

[53] Folder, "Harry G. Pincus FBI File," Box 7645, RG 65: Records of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, NARA II.

[54] Franklin, *Back Where You Came From,* 182-187; Keenan, "'Vietnam is Fighting for Us," 281.

[55] CIA Report, "The Peace Movement: A Review of Developments since 15 November," 21 December 1967, folder, "Miscellaneous CIA Material [3 of 3]," Box 15, National Security File/Intelligence File, NLLBJ.

[56] Meeting Announcements, U.S. Campaign, "Meeting November 7, 1967," November 6, 1967, folder, "Germany, 1967-1970" Box 4, Student Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam Records, WHS.

leverage within the group. The historian Linda Gordon, at the time a U.S. graduate student and organizer in *Stop It*, recalled years later many within the organization suspected Pincus of being an informant.[57] Such accusations, whether true or not, dictated the nature and character of expatriate dissent by dividing their ranks and prevented a coherent message by early 1968, a critical moment when increased opportunities to work with the international antiwar movement emerged.

International Vietnam Congress and the March Project, 1968

As 1968 dawned, internationally strewn Americans had to formulate new messages and pursue new outlets to publicize their critiques of the war while abroad. The success of the Tet Offensive added a greater urgency to the antiwar movement and its messages about the war to world.[58] If the war could be brought to an end, the time was now. The emergence of a globally constituted antiwar opposition in the aftermath of the Tet Offensive, the U.S. government's crackdown on expatriate dissent by enlisting its allies in the effort, and the shift to civil disobedience as the preferred tactic of the stateside antiwar movement impeded the effectiveness to do so, but did not halt it altogether. Ironically, this occurred at a moment when pubic opinion in the U.S. decidedly turned against the war.[59] After 1968, expats placed more emphasis on U.S. imperialism to further position the Vietnamese people as the inheritors of the democratic and egalitarian principles of the U.S.'s own revolutionaries almost two centuries prior.

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[57] Oral History Interview with Linda Gordon, interview by author, MP3 digital recording, Washington, DC, January 3, 2014.

[58] John Prados, *Vietnam: The History of An Unwinnable War* (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 2009), 233-243; Marilyn Young, *The Vietnam Wars*, *1945-1990* (New York: Harper Collins, 1991), 216-226; "The End of Racial Harmony," and "In the Rear with the Gear, the Sergeant Major, and the Beer," in Ronald H. Spector, *After Tet: The Bloodiest Year in Vietnam*. (New York: Vintage Books, 1993), 242-278.

[59] On public opinion of the Vietnam War in the aftermath of the Tet Offensive see, Small, *Johnson, Nixon and the Doves*, 131; Prados, *Vietnam,* 241-243; Young, *The Vietnam Wars*, 226.

For Americans in West Berlin, the events of Vietnam Summer exposed the limits of patriotism as an organizing factor for their activities. Not only did the U.S. government contest their use of the American flag in demonstrations, the *Außerparlamentarische Opposition* (APO, extra-parliamentary opposition) in West Germany received a jolt, radicalizing it. During the Shah of Iran's visit to the city, which elicited mass protests for his gross human rights violations, a young German university student and activist, Benno Ohnesorg, was shot. The culprit was a West German police officer; however, years later released Stasi files revealed the officer had been an undercover East German agent, hoping to provoke the student left to action and revolt, to cause discord within the West German government.[60]

The changing political landscape pushed expats into working more closely with international activists focused on displaying solidarity with national liberation movements. The new fascination with national liberation in the developing world manifested in a two-day international antiwar conference held in West Berlin on February 17-18, 1968. Organized by the West German APO, the conference brought international antiwar activists together in the divided and highly politicized and militarized city. The event featured speakers such as Britain's Tariq Ali, West German activist Rudi Dutschke and was attended by several U.S. activists, including Danny Schechter and Linda Gordon of *Stop It*.[61]

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[60] For an in-depth analysis of the significance of Ohnesorg's death on the student movement in West Germany see, Nick Thomas, *Protest Movements in 1960s West Germany: A Social History of Dissent and Democracy* (Oxford and New York: Berg Publishers, 2003), 107-124; On the identity of the assassin see, "Stasi Archive Surprise: East German Spy Shot West Berlin Martyr," Spiegel Online, 22 May 2009 online at: [http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/stasi-archive-surprise-east-german-spy-shot-west-berlin-martyr-a-626275.html]

[61] Aufruf Zur International Vietnamkonferenz—West Berlin 1968 [Call for a International Vietnam Conference West Berlin, 1968]; Programm Der Internationalen Vietnamkonferenz West Berlin 1968 [Program of the International Vietnam Conference West Berlin 1968]; An die Teilnehmer der Internationalen Demonstration [To the Participants of the International Demonstration], folder, G. Fackelmann-- "Vietnam Kongress, Feb. 1968," Box Indochina-Vietnam, Collection: SBE 495/Vie/F1 [Asia], Hamburg Institute for Social History, Hamburg, Germany; Oral History Interview with Linda Gordon, interview by author, MP3 digital recording, Washington, DC, 3 January 2014.

Adhering to the new emphasis on imperialism, activists at the International Congress planned a major demonstration for the final day that took protesters through the streets of West Berlin and concluded at the American McNair Military base.[62] Activist Rudi Dutschke, de facto leader of the German APO, had heard from deserter groups that several black GIs had wanted to desert, and had envisioned the mob storming the base to help liberate these servicemen.[63] In attempts to keep protesters away from the base, and off the streets altogether, West Berlin city officials continually denied permits to march, and rumors spread that military personnel were given orders to shoot any protesters storming the base. Confronted with these possibilities, Dutschke and the other organizers changed the demonstration route, but held it nonetheless, garnering about 20,000 protesters of all nationalities marching through the streets.[64]

Even as the demonstration featured activists from multiple nations, such protests possessed different meanings for the various citizens. As U.S. activists participated in the high profile conference on the frontlines of the Cold War, they tried to use it to subvert the argument that Vietnam was in reality about protecting West Berlin, and keeping an American commitment to the divided city. For many of the German students and activists who marched and chanted "USA-SA-SS," protests offered a way to position U.S. atrocities in Vietnam alongside their own national crimes committed two decades earlier, which were attracting greater public attention and discussion throughout Germany by the

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[62] Thomas, *Protest Movements in West Germany*, 155-159; Mausbach, "Auschwitz and Vietnam," in Daum, et. al., *America, the Vietnam War and the World,* 297; "Mit Rucksack und Gepäckt zum Kongreß" [With Backpacks and Luggage, they arrive at the Congress] *Berliner Zeitung* 19 February 1968.

[63] Thomas, *Protest Movements in West Germany*, 159; Fraser, et. al., *1968: A Student Generation in Revolt*, 177-178.

[64] Thomas, *Protest Movements in West Germany*, 155-159; "Vietnam Kongreß gibt nicht auf Neuer Antrag auf Demonstration" [Vietnam Congress Denied New Application for Demonstration] *Berliner Zeitung* 16 February 1968.

mid-1960s.[65] The Americans participating in the demonstration may have also wanted to make similar connections and draw a comparison to the nature of U.S. military intervention in the 1940s versus the 1960s.

A month after the International Vietnam Congress, the Vietnam Solidarity Committee and the British Campaign for Peace in Vietnam organized the "March Project," an effort to publicize anti-imperialist arguments against the war before the British public.[66] The project involved a week of protests highlighting the reach of U.S. markets in Britain and the resulting economic dependency they claimed clouded British officials' judgments on foreign policy. U.S. students in London joined the protest, echoing some of their earlier efforts the previous year at targeting the American companies Dow Chemical, which produced Napalm, and had been a target of many high profile protests on U.S. college campuses the previous fall, and Pan-American Airlines, which had government contracts to transport U.S. soldiers into South Vietnam.[67]

In advance of the protests, the remnants of the *Stop It Committee* published a lengthy and heavily annotated booklet entitled "Vietnam, The United States, and Britain: The Facts of Entanglement." The 25-page booklet intended for the British public provided lengthy details and statistics on how U.S. corporations infiltrated Britain, and how it translated into British complicity in the war. Hoping to shame the British public, the booklet discussed how the Wilson government overtly supported the U.S. in Vietnam through assistance in training U.S. soldiers for jungle warfare, and shipping equipment

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[65] Mausbach, "Auschwitz and Vietnam," in Daum, et. al., *America, the Vietnam War and the World*290-292; Greiner, "Saigon, Nuremberg, and the West: German Images of America in the late 1960s," in Stephan, ed., *Americanizations and Anti-Americanism,* 51-66.

[66] The Stop It Committee, "Vietnam, United States, and Britain: The Facts of Entanglement (The March Project) (London: Stanhope Press, 1968); Wells, *The War Within,* 249.

[67] Flyer, "Dow Makes Napalm, " Folder, "Americans in Britain for US Withdrawal from Vietnam [Stop It], 1967-1968" (XIV), box 303, War Resisters International Archive, IISH; Appy, *Working Class War,* 121-123.

such as bulldozers and heavy machinery to build roads and infrastructure in South Vietnam.[68]

During the week of protests, *Stop It* organized demonstrations at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce in London, the offices of Pan American Airlines, and at the Dow Chemical Offices.[69] The weeklong demonstrations culminated with a march from Trafalgar Square to the U.S. Embassy organized and led mostly by British peace groups, which devolved into chaos and violence, much like the protest at the International Antiwar Conference in West Berlin a month earlier.[70] The March Project caught the attention of U.S. officials who reported back to their superiors on the nature and character of the protests. Perhaps more importantly, however, it was the last major event undertaken by *Stop It.* Having depleted their financial resources, *Stop It* now discovered they were 300 pounds in debt.[71]

Americans in May 1968 Paris

The demonstrations that consumed Paris for weeks beginning in May 1968 added to the widespread perception of international protests were a haven of anti-Americanism:

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[68] The Stop It Committee, "Vietnam, United States, and Britain: The Facts of Entanglement (The March Project) (London: Stanhope Press, 1968).

[69] Oral History Interview with Linda Gordon, interview by author, MP3 digital recording, Washington, DC, January 3, 2014; Center for Democratic Alternatives Newsletter (March 1968) Vol. 1 no. 5, folder 2, box 86 (86.2), James Jones Papers, HRC; Airgram, U.S. Embassy London to Secretary of State, "British Commercial Climate," March 22, 1968, folder, "POL 23-8/UK/ 1/1/68," Box 2569, RG 59: General Records of the Department of State—Central Foreign Policy Files, NARA II; Richard Bourne, "Firms with Vietnam Interests Face Boycott by Students," *The Guardian* (London), 12 March 1968, p. 5

[70] Telegram, U.S. Embassy London to Secretary of State, "London Anti-Vietnam Demonstration," March 19, 1968 and Telegram, U.S. Embassy London to Secretary of State, "Anti-US Demonstration," March 17, 1968, folder, "POL 23-8/UK/ 1/1/68," Box 2569, RG 59: General Records of the Department of State—Central Foreign Policy Files, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD; Gwen Morgan, "London Mob Marches on U.S. Embassy," *Chicago Tribune*, 18 March 1968, p. 1

[71] Letter, Stop It Committee to Friends, [n.d. ca. 1968], folder, "The Stop It Committee—Americans in Britain for U.S. Withdrawal from Vietnam, 1968," Box 2, Heinz Norden Papers, New York University, Tamiment Library, New York City, NY (Hereafter, TL-NYU).

conspiring anarchists and leftists appeared to U.S. leaders to be bent on subverting and assuming control of the government of a key U.S. ally, undermining its ability to exact any influence in the country and throughout the transatlantic region. French workers, students, and citizens organized in response to widespread dissatisfaction with the modern social and economic issues in the country. For students, the French university system was a specific target of the protesters, who occupied several buildings on campus. From there, protests spread to the streets, where others in solidarity erected barricades and clashed with police who tried to restore order. Factory workers joined the protests, and within a few days Paris was immobilized.[72] In campus buildings and throughout neighborhoods, activists formed collectives in which they discussed a range of issues from social policies to political and foreign policy. For some activists, the events on the streets signaled the start of Marx's international revolution, a fear reflected in telegrams U.S. officials sent to the State Department, who worried the protests might engulf other western democracies. In one dispatch to the U.S. State Department, the U.S. ambassador described the scene on the streets as an "unreal atmosphere."[73]

Despite the excitement and uncertainty in the French capital, few U.S. citizens reportedly took part in the demonstrations. Any involvement of U.S. citizens on the streets were largely informal, sporadic, and the product of spontaneity. The U.S. embassy

[72] On the uprising in Paris and elsewhere throughout 1968 see, Alain Touraine, *The May Movement: Revolt and Reform* (New York: Random House, 1971); Alain Schnapp and Pierre Vidal-Naquet (translated by Maria Jolas), *The French Student Uprising, November 1967-June 1968: An Analytical Record* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971); David Caute, *Sixty-Eight: The Year of the Barricades* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1988); Gassert, Philipp and Martin Klimke, eds. "1968: Memories and Legacies of a Global Revolt," *Bulletin of the German Historical Institute*, Supplement 6 (2009); Martin Klimke and Joachim Scharloth, eds. *1968 in Europe: A History of Protest and Activism, 1956-1977* (New York: Palgrave McMillan, 2008); Gerd-Rainer Horn, *The Spirit of 68: Rebellion in Western Europe and North America, 1956-1976* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); Ronald Fraser, et. al. *1968: A Student Generation in Revolt* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1988); "The International 1968, parts I and II," *American Historical Review* 114, no. 1 and no. 2 (February and April 2009);

[73] Airgram, U.S. Embassy Paris to Department of State, "Student Commune in Paris," June 5, 1968, folder, "POL 23-8/France/61-68," Box 2098, RG 59: General Records of the Department of State—Central Foreign Policy Files, NARA II.

reported some "New Left U.S. students," were holed up in the Cesier annex at the Sorbonne University, and had a direct line to report on events to their counterparts in the United States.[74] PACS, however, avoided entanglement, although tried to continue holding meetings during the protests.[75] Furthermore, some of the newly arrived U.S. military deserters exhibited solidarity by manning barricades and meeting with workers at some of the plants where strikes were ongoing.[76]

Despite this lack of participation by U.S. expats, as French President De Gaulle slowly regained control of the country in the ensuing weeks, he utilized a common tactic of attributing the unrest to "outside agitators," who stood to gain from the disruptions.[77] Some within the French government entertained the idea that the CIA were the mastermind of the protests, believing the U.S. government stood to benefit economically if a weakened France reversed course on the gold crisis.[78] In the aftermath, the French government blamed the unrest on radical and "Trotskyites" and banned several groups in France believed to represent those interests.[79] They expelled over 150 foreigners believed to be ringleaders of the protests, although the initial round of deportations did not include

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[74] Airgram, U.S. Embassy Paris to Department of State, "Student Commune in Paris," June 5, 1968, folder, "POL 23-8/France/61-68," Box 2098, RG 59: General Records of the Department of State—Central Foreign Policy Files, NARA II.

[75] Bethany Keenan notes a couple of PCS meetings were disrupted due to the barricades in Paris, Bethany S. Keenan, 'At the Crossroads of World Attitudes and Reaction': The Paris American Committee to Stopwar and American Anti-war Activism in France, 1966–1968, *Journal of Transatlantic Studies*, 11:1 (2013), 72-73.

[76] Ibid., 73-75.

[77] Telegram, U.S. Embassy Paris to Secretary of State, "Alleged States' Involvement in French Crisis," June 6, 1968, folder, "POL 23-8/France/61-68," Box 2098, RG 59: General Records of the Department of State—Central Foreign Policy Files, NARA II.

[78] Ibid.

[79] Telegram, U.S. Defense Attaché Office Paris to U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, June 13, 1968 and Telegram, U.S. Embassy Paris to Secretary of State, "Call on Ministry of Interior," July 30, 1968, folder, "POL 23-8/France/61-68," Box 2098, RG 59: General Records of the Department of State—Central Foreign Policy Files, NARA II.

any Americans.[80] French officials monitored and maintained strict control over protesters' activities in an effort to prevent another outbreak.

With the French government's crackdown against dissidents underway, the U.S. State Department seized the opportunity to ask French officials to restrict antiwar protests and meetings in the country as Vietnam Peace Talks began in Paris. U.S. officials argued to the French officials that the protests made the negotiations exceedingly difficult and threatened to derail the talks.[81] Heeding the U.S.'s request, French officials limited the ability of U.S. and French activists to cooperate in their opposition. PACS, the International Information Center for the Denunciation of War Crimes, and the French-Vietnamese Medical Association planned a conference in Paris to include photographs and films with graphic depictions of the U.S. war's effects on the Vietnamese people. Believing such a display and conference could provoke unrest and protests, the French Ministry of Interior banned the PACS conference, acceding to the U.S. government's demands, and the local prefecture notified PACS of the prohibition.[82]

When informed of the ban, PACS seemed to understand it arose from the U.S. government's efforts to limit dissent during the peace talks.[83] Their assessment was correct. Sergeant Shriver, the U.S. ambassador to France, personally thanked the newly appointed French Interior Minister Raymond Marcellin for the ban and "other measures

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[80] Telegram, U.S. Defense Attaché Office Paris to U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, June 13, 1968, folder, "POL 23-8/France/61-68," Box 2098, RG 59: General Records of the Department of State—Central Foreign Policy Files, NARA II. "France is Expelling U.S. Peace Activist," *New York Times*, 11 August 1968, p. 8"Expelled American Back from France," *New York Times*, 12 August 1968, p. 32; Press Clippings on Expelled Journalist, Microfilm, Reel #3, Paris American Committee to Stop War Records, WHS.

[81] Keenan, "'At the Crossroads of World Attitudes,'" 72-73.

[82] "Police Ban Protest on U.S. Vietnam War Role," Microfilm, Reel #3, Paris American Committee to Stop War Records, WHS; Keenan, "'At the Crossroads of World Attitudes,'" 72-73.

[83] Keenan, "'At the Crossroads of World Attitudes,'" 72-73.

helpful to us including providing security for the embassy."[84] Marcellin responded that he would be happy to "help in any way possible, including if we [the U.S.] wished to have petitions stopped insofar as delivers at the embassy was concerned, they would do that." Shriver told Marcellin there was no need to stop petitions from being delivered, but appreciated their help in these matters.[85] PACS appealed the decision, and looked to line up support from prominent leftist members of French Parliament. However, in the wake of the May protest and the increased surveillance, natural allies seemed reluctant to assist the group.[86]

With PACS firmly in the crosshairs, France and the U.S. government further curtailed PACS activities. In August, the French government ordered the deportation of Schofield Coryell, an American journalist and founder of PACS, for contributing to leftist publications. Claiming Coryell had disrupted the public order during the May and June protests, he was taken to Orly Airport and placed on a plane for New York. In registering their protest to the deportation, Coryell and his PACS colleagues petitioned the government, claiming Coryell only reported on the protests as a journalist, and did not participate in them. The effort proved futile.[87]

The U.S. government's attempts to curb dissent from expats in France pertaining to the Vietnam reached its apex in October, two months after the deportation of Coryell. The local prefecture office, where PACS had to register, contracted and informed the organization it had to suspend its activities. The aftermath of the May protests, the

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[84] Telegram, U.S. Embassy Paris to Secretary of State, "Call on Ministry of Interior," July 30, 1968, folder, "POL 23-8/France/61-68," Box 2098, RG 59: General Records of the Department of State—Central Foreign Policy Files, NARA II.

[85] Ibid.

[86] Letter, Ira Moris to Maria Jolas, August 10, 1968, Microfilm, Reel #3, Paris American Committee to Stop War Records, WHS; Keenan, "'At the crossroads of world attitudes,'" 73.

[87] "Expelled American Back from France," *New York Times*, 12 August 1968, p. 32; "France is Expelling U.S. Peace Activist," *New York Times*, 11 August 1968, p. 8.

continued meetings, and its work with deserters raised its profile enough that it the French government could not allow it to continue meeting and meet its obligation to the United States to mitigate protests during the ongoing peace talks.[88]

The final PACS meeting held on October 29, 1968 discussed unresolved affairs of the organization, and alternatives available to U.S. citizens who wanted to continue working toward peace. A lengthy discussion ensued over the efforts they might undertake as individuals (distributing literature; sponsoring fundraising dinners). Ira Morris and others wanted to discuss how they might continue functioning as a group, and raised the possibility that they might form a section of the French Movement Against Atomic Armament (MCAA), which might provide them enough cover to continue their activities. Some within the ranks protested given the MCAA's willingness to work with communist organizations, an ongoing sticking point with many members of PACS.[89] After voting to disburse the organization's remaining funds to an organization committed to collecting medical supplies for Vietnam, the meeting adjourned, leaving U.S. citizens in Paris to their own devices to find an outlet for their antiwar activism.[90]

Conclusion

Throughout 1967 and into 1968, expatriates confronted the fallacy of the Cold War citizenship arrangement that exchanged security for loyalty and obligation. By drawing attention to the global opposition the war, and making comparisons between a specific interpretation of the U.S.'s revolutionary heritage with the Vietnamese struggle for independence, expats openly questioned how defeating North Vietnam was central to the country's national security. Additionally, their experiences abroad confirmed the war

[88] Press Clippings on Expelled Journalist, Microfilm, Reel #3, Paris American Committee to Stop War Records, WHS.

[89] Meeting Minutes, "PACS Final Meeting," October 29, 1968, Microfilm, Reel #3, Paris American Committee to Stop War Records, WHS.

[90] Ibid.

damaged U.S. credibility in the transatlantic region, where it had enjoyed an abundance of credence only a few years prior with President Johnson's election. In this climate, unflinching loyalty seemed counterproductive to advancing economic, social, and cultural interests of U.S. citizens.

Furthermore, as citizens abroad exposed this arrangement and pushed it toward collapse, the U.S. government turned their vast transatlantic resources to compel compliance among this population. By monitoring expat activities and associations, limiting their ability to travel, and compiling dossiers on individuals, the U.S. government aimed at maintaining the old order. To an extent it worked. Mistrust and suspicion inhabited their ranks. Governments allied with the U.S. debated the extent to which it could legitimately impose limits on protest and dissent, and took measures to deport individuals and suspend activism by U.S. citizens on their soil.

By February 1969, an FBI field agent monitoring the expatriate protests declared it was as a "spent force."[91] While correct that the period between 1965 and 1968 represented the height of expatriate antiwar cohesiveness, the expatriates' message on the limits of citizenship could no longer be contained, and featured prominently in their protests and activism going forward. As desertion and draft resistance accelerated, the dialogue of citizenship and obligation forged within expatriate organizations supplied a language and frame for next stage of expatriate activism that included both advocating for U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam, and engaging in civil disobedience to assist U.S. military deserters and draft resisters.

[91] FBI Memo, "Harry George Pincus," May 9, 1969, Folder, "Harry G. Pincus FBI File," Box 7645, RG 65: Records of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, NARA II.

CHAPTER FOUR
U.S. EXPATRIATES AND THE INTERNATIONAL DESERTION AND RESISTANCE NETWORK, 1967-1968

In June 1968, the U.S. government formally requested the return of Jeremy Tupper, a 21-year old U.S. Army private, from the British Home Office. Tupper deserted from a U.S. military base in West Germany and was residing in the West Kensington borough of London when captured by British authorities. Appearing before a West London Magistrate, he admitted to being a deserter from the U.S. military.[1] Supporters picketed outside the courtroom where the hearing occurred. Tariq Ali and Daniel Cohn Bendit, who were attending an international antiwar conference at the time, threatened to "raid the court" if such actions continued.[2]

The request to return Tupper sparked outrage as sympathetic members of the British parliament (MPs) intervened on Tupper's behalf in the media and before public officials to prevent his return for court martial.[3] In the House of Lords, a contingent of liberal pacifists lead by Fenner Brockway questioned the Minister of State in the Home Office, Lord Stonham, about possible intervention by Harold Wilson's Labour government on Tupper's behalf. Brockway cited Britain's 1952 Visiting Forces Act, argued that Vietnam was not a NATO operation and therefore Tupper would not be found guilty of a crime in a British court he believed these facts might prevent Tupper's extradition.[4] Stonham countered with his own interpretation of the Act, and pointed out that since Tupper had previously served ten months in the U.S. military, he could not

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[1] "U.S. Deserter Given Moral Support," *Times* (London) 14 June 1968.

[2] "Tariq Ali Warning of Raid on Court." *Times* (London) 14 June 1968, p. 1

[3] "Plea to keep deserter in Britain." *Times* (London) 15 June 1968, p. 2.

[4] *Hansard Parliamentary Debates*, Lords, 5th ser., vol. 293 (1968) cols. 317-319. The Tupper Case is also referenced in "Desert for Peace!" *The Black Dwarf* 5 July 1968, folder, "European Students Syndicalism," box 148-149, Ton Regtien archives, IISH, Amsterdam, Netherlands (Hereafter, IISH).

claim to be a conscientious objector.[5] British authorities finally surrendered Tupper to U.S. custody on June 18, 1968.[6] Tupper's situation and the U.S. and British government responses provoked debate within sympathetic expatriate circles over the issue of assisting deserters, especially who might help who and under what circumstances, given the dangers such work posed for expats.[7]

As desertion and draft resistance proliferated on both sides of the Atlantic, overseas Americans became acquainted with diverse global attitudes that questioned and resisted the continued U.S. military presence on their soil.[8] Pacifists organizations like War Resisters' International (WRI), Fellowship of Reconciliation (FOR), and the Committee of 100 opposed all forms of militarism and possessed a long history of aiding war resisters through its national sections scattered worldwide. Many members of these organizations had spent time in jail during the First and Second World Wars for refusing induction to the service. Student radicals and anarchists, including the West German APO and the Provos in the Netherlands, applied their anti-authoritarian and anti-imperial sentiments to the presence of the U.S. military, and rejected the dominant view of Cold War national security promoted by the U.S. government.[9] At the same time, draft card

[5] *Hansard Parliamentary Debates*, Lords, 5th ser., vol. 293 (1968) cols. 317-319.

[6] "Moves to Free Deserter Fail." *Times* (London) 18 June 1968, p. 2; The U.K. Statute Database, "Visiting Forces Act 1952," [http://www.statutelaw.gov.uk/content.aspx?activeTextDocId=1137244] accessed 19 April 2009.

[7] Oral History Interview with Linda Gordon, interview by author, MP3 digital recording, Washington, DC, January 3, 2014.

[8] Throughout the United States, war opponents set up coffeehouses near military bases and leafleted bars soldiers and sailors were known to frequent in order to argue against the war. Several high profile desertions, including three soldiers at Fort Hood Texas who refused deployment to Vietnam in 1966 and four sailors abroad the aircraft carrier U.S.S. Intrepid that was stationed in Japan who made their way to Sweden via the Soviet Union generated international attention for the plight of soldiers who openly questioned the policies and morality of the U.S. war. Todd Gitlin, *The Sixties: Years of Hope, Days of Rage* (New York: Bantam Books, 1987), 249-252; Michael S. Foley, *Confronting the War Machine: Draft Resistance During the Vietnam War* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003), 14.

[9] Andrew Preston, "Monsters Everywhere: A Genealogy of National Security," *Diplomatic History* 38:3 (June 2014), 499-500.

turn-ins, burnings, exile to Canada, and other measures opposing conscription had become commonplace stateside.

As many young men in the U.S. engaged in civil disobedience tactics to disrupt the war effort, U.S. expats debated their role in this growing effort to deprive the U.S. military of the men and morale necessary to continue fighting in Vietnam.[10] The debate over draft resistance exacerbated internal tensions within overseas antiwar groups. Conscription was a foundation of Cold War male citizenship, and flouting the legal requirements posed serious consequences. Men were required to register for the draft, and, if called upon by local draft boards, required to serve in the U.S. military. Contesting this demand once again exposed a fundamental flaw of the modern liberal state, in that it required its citizens to contribute to a state that had assured them protection and benefits, but now needed their cooperation to fulfill the promise.

Complicating this demand, however, was that it did not apply to all Americans equally. At the same time upper and middle class Americans had the opportunity to learn about the war at a distance, poor and working class citizens only learned of the war and its nature after being drafted or enlisting. As Christian Appy has written, the Vietnam War was largely a working class war, fought by men who disproportionately came from poor and minority backgrounds.[11] Between incentives and bureaucratic channeling, Appy

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[10] Throughout this chapter the term "deserter" refers specifically to a person who had been in active service in the U.S. military, and left before the end of the assigned tour of duty. The term "resister" refers to an individual who was eligible for the U.S. draft, but refused induction into the U.S. military. Some scholarship uses the term "draft dodger" to refer to the same population, mostly indicating that these were individuals who took advantage of some legal loophole in Selective Service System to avoid service. I realize that my use of the term is deliberately encompassing, and is contrary to the distinction Michael Foley makes who views "resisters" more narrowly, as individuals who actively confronted the conscription system, primarily through civil disobedience and facing criminal charges. However, after conducting research and speaking with individuals who avoided the draft by going abroad, they often saw themselves in no different terms, believing that their actions, too, constituted resistance. Foley, *Confronting the War Machine,* 6-8.

[11] Christian G. Appy, *Working Class War: American Combat Soldiers in Vietnam* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1993), passim.

shows the construction of the working class military to fight in Vietnam was not accidental, and derived from many of the assumptions and programs that guided President Johnson in building his Great Society.[12]

The young men targeted by the Selective Service System undertook acts of civil disobedience to deprive the military of the manpower needed to continue fighting the war. Risking jail and estrangement from friends and family members, or an undetermined period of banishment if they were abroad, men returned draft cards, burned them, and ignored summons to appear before draft boards. Other men sought loopholes or gamed the system, feigning illnesses, mental disorders, or used connections to exploit loopholes in the system to avoid the draft.[13] They risked attacks on masculinity and their place within the nation-state in order to contest official claims of the war's centrality to national security.

Under the requirements of U.S. Selective Service law, all young men had to register for the draft at age 18, and appear before the local draft board who would review their file and classify them as either draft eligible or grant them a deferment, and issue them cards indicating their status. If their draft status changed, the board might review their case and men previously exempted might find themselves eligible for conscription. The local draft boards were typically staffed by prominent members of the community who were usually white, middle to upper class males. Boards often lacked transparency in their methods of determining draft eligibility. Given the socio-economic, racial, and generational disparities between board members and those eligible to be drafted, the entire draft system became a target for the antiwar movement by 1967.[14]

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[12] Ibid., 28-38.

[13] Ibid.

[14] Whether the United States should have a standing army, who should be required to participate in that army, and who might be exempted received fierce debate in the two decades after the Second World War. Over that time, Congress and Presidents continually redefined whose civic obligation required military service. Public opposition to extensive draft calls after the Second World War forced an

For the community of expat draft-eligible students by late 1967, the prospect of burning a draft card or publically turning it in risked undermining the claim to be patriotic Americans and required them to undertake new framings of their actions. For antiwar expats, draft resistance threatened to turn organizations into single-issue groups, far too limited for an international movement that targeted injustice and inequality. Those who fled the United States to avoid the demands of conscription faced accusations that doing so forfeited their place within the national community.

Thus, as desertion took shape as an act of civil disobedience within the transatlantic sphere,[15] it forced the predominantly white and middle to upper class antiwar movement to confront issues of racial and economic inequality within the United States and its presentation in the global public sphere. Linda Gordon, a U.S. graduate student who worked with *Stop It*, recalled a high proportion of the deserters she encountered in Britain were African-American, who although serving in a military that had been desegregated for two decades, still experienced institutional prejudice and racism.[16] Left with few choices, many working class and minority men deserted.[17]

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adjustment of the requirement. However, the emerging Cold War caused Congress and President Truman to revive the draft laws in 1948, which set draft classifications and quotas in order for the U.S. military to meet its manpower needs. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, quotas fluctuated during times of war and to meet personnel needs, as occurred in July 1965 when Johnson upped the draft calls for mobilization in Vietnam. Meeting the quotas fell to local draft boards, usually composed of prominent men within the community, often skewing white and upper middle class. George Q. Flynn, *The Draft, 1940-1973* (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1993), 106-107.

[15] Gitlin, *The Sixties,* 249-252; Foley, *Confronting the War Machine,* 14; An early, but good history of the resistance phase of the movement is in Michael Ferber and Staughton Lynd, *The Resistance*, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971), 1.

[16] Oral History Interview with Linda Gordon, interview by author, MP3 digital recording, Washington, DC, January 3, 2014; On African Americans, the Vietnam War and the persistence of discrimination, see Maria Hoehn and Martin Klimke, *A Breath of Freedom: The Civil Rights Struggle, African American GIs, and Germany* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010); Lawrence Allen Eldridge, *Chronicles of a Two-Front War: Civil Rights and Vietnam in the African American Press* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2011); James E. Westheider, *The African American Experience in Vietnam: Brothers in Arms* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2008); John Darrell Sherwood, *Black Sailor, White Navy: Racial Unrest in the Fleet During the Vietnam War Era* (New York: New York University Press, 2007).

As expats encountered this reality of racial and economic inequality in the U.S. and its international implications, they confronted a question: what place did inequality have in international conversations over national security? Opting to join the desertion and resistance network as an overseas U.S. citizen made a public declaration before the rest of the world, admitting life for some in the U.S. remained imperfect and a work in progress, rather than a beacon of inspiration onto the world, despite the Manichean Cold War dynamic (and legal prohibitions) that obliged them to do otherwise. It forced U.S. and foreign governments to engage with questions of racial and socio-economic inequality and framed the war not as a product of misguided Cold War and international assumptions, but as an outgrowth of failures in American society that needed to be addressed. Assisting deserters as U.S. citizens overseas reflected a belief that the best method for the U.S. to lead the world was through its example, to ensure justice and equality to all people within its borders, hoping such actions would inspire other governments and individuals to assume a similar commitment to the oppressed throughout the world.

Deserting the U.S. Military in Western Europe

Efforts to solicit deserters from the U.S. military originated at the 1966 WRI triennial conference in Rome. The WRI ratified resolutions encouraging its member

[17] For most men stationed overseas, whether in Vietnam or in Western Europe, their ability walk away from the U.S. military depended on a constellation of factors. Desertion for American servicemen, whether in stationed Europe or Asia, was a function of motive and opportunity. The decision to desert, and to assist deserters, was not one taken lightly. Absent without leave (AWOL) was the military designation for men who failed to report to their assigned duty or work, and carried a range of penalties depending on the severity and time away from loss of rank and pay to time in jail. After 30 days, AWOL turned into desertion, which increased the severity of penalties. Although the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that U.S. citizenship could not be revoked for desertion in the case *Trop v. Dulles* (1958), consequences for desertion included long jail sentences as well as dishonorable discharges that would haunt men throughout their post-military career, and, depending on the circumstances, execution. Estimates suggest up to a half a million men deserted or went AWOL for some period during the war. This number is given by scholars including Appy, *Working Class War,* 95; Roger Williams, *The New Exiles: American War Resisters in Canada* (New York: Liveright Publishers, 1971), 103-114; Lawrence M. Baskir and William A. Strauss, *Chance and Circumstance: The Draft, the War, and the Vietnam Generation* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978), 115.

sections to picket American Express offices, distribute leaflets to tourists expressing opposition to the war, and urge U.S. servicemen in Europe to defect from the armed services in protest against the war. The resolutions asked its member sections to provide material support for deserters to assist in transitioning from military life.[18] Throughout summer 1966 WRI sections printed 32,000 leaflets and distributed them near military bases in England, West Germany, Netherlands, and Italy, encountering difficulty and harassment from local law enforcement officers who sometimes confiscated the pamphlets.[19]

The leaflet challenged the basic assumption of U.S. collective security and justifications for the ongoing war in Vietnam by framing the war as a colonial one. The pamphlet included a brief timeline of events situating the ongoing conflict within an anti-colonial rebellion that dated to 1947. Addressed to "American Troops in Europe," it made a very personal appeal to the servicemen, asking them to carefully consider the reception they had received in Europe. The leaflet appealed to the soldiers that it was within their power to end the war and the killing of Vietnamese people and Americans, conceding they were in a difficult position, yet urging them to "consider what you can do." As an example and harkening back to the anti-colonial theme, the brochure cited how French soldiers who refused service during the Algerian War altered the course of that war. To contrast with positive example of the French offered to the U.S. soldiers, the brochure referenced the Nuremberg judgment as an example of when soldiers refused to

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[18] "WRI Resolution on the Vietnam War," Folder, "12th Triennial Conference, Rome 1966 (X)," Box 14, War Resisters International Archives, IISH.

[19] Statement of HHB to Inspector Wilson of Scotland Yard, July 6, 1967, Folder " Vietnam Leaflets 1966-1967," Box 101, War Resisters International Archives, IISH; Dudley Freeman, "British Leaflets Tell GIs: 'Desert'" *Sunday Express*, July 24, 1966; "Leaflets Urge GIs to Desert" *International Herald Tribune*, May 29, 1967.

break with prevailing militarism and imperialism, offering U.S. soldiers a choice of what their legacy might be.[20]

Following the WRI's lead, antiwar activists, radicals, and religious pacifists throughout Western Europe organized a coordinated network to entice U.S. soldiers to desert. The network originated in cities and towns hosting U.S. military garrisons or places where U.S. soldiers frequently visited while on leave. Both the Netherlands and West Germany, countries that hosted significant number of U.S. troops, functioned as the epicenter of the transatlantic desertion movement. As U.S. soldiers visited Amsterdam, enthralled by its liberal policies on sex and drugs, a Dutch anarchist collective known as "the Provos" used the Central Train Station as the network's point of origin.[21] The Provos' reputation spread among sympathetic servicemen in Europe as they clandestinely passed the code, INADAMNLUGO2PROVOS (translation: In Amsterdam, Netherlands, you go to the Provos) among each other.[22]

West Germany hosted 250,000-300,000 of the 400,000 U.S. soldiers in all of Europe, allowing the growing network to flourish within its borders. German APO activists made direct appeals to U.S. soldiers in West Berlin bars with names like "Linda's Lounge," "Club 45," and "Randy's Bar," known to cater to American clientele. The operation proved so sophisticated that the 19 bars listed on a APO contact sheet

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[20] WRI Leaflet, To American Soldiers in Europe [Final], Folder " Vietnam Leaflets 1966-1967," Box 101, War Resisters International Archives, IISH.

[21] Telegram, U.S. Embassy Hague to State Department, January 4, 1968, Folder, "DEF 9-3/US/ 1/1/68," Box 1666, RG 59: General Records of the Department of State—Central Foreign Policy Files, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD (Hereafter NARA II); Anonymous "The Dutch Connection," [unpublished manuscript on the GI underground network] in folder RUD 710,02, Rudi Dutschke Papers, Hamburg Institute for Social Research (hereafter HIS), Hamburg, Germany.

[22] Klimke, *The Other Alliance,* 85; "List of Bars Frequented by U.S. Personnel" [West Berlin], folder, "Horlemann--Vietnam," German SDS Papers, APO archives, Free University, Berlin, Germany; "They Can't Send me to Vietnam," flyer of the U.S. Campaign to End the War in Vietnam, folder, "Horlemann Vietnam," German SDS Papers, APO archives Free University, Berlin, Germany; "How Vietnam Deserters Go Underground," *Times* (London), 17 August 1967, p. 8.

noted whether the bars were primarily for draftees, enlisted men, or officers and included several with an "N" (for Negroes), allowing activists to tailor their messages to specific audiences, according to their target audience's race or socio-economic status.[23]

The emerging network in the Netherlands and West Germany provided servicemen an assortment of assistance to avoid detection by authorities. The efforts expanded under the guidance and financing of two individuals, Austrian Max Watts and West German Wolf Dieter Brünn. Both antiwar activists established information centers throughout West Germany, compiled legal information about desertion, enlisted lawyers to meet with the U.S. servicemen, and arranged to transport soldiers to safe houses throughout the continent in an effort to elude U.S. authorities and their NATO allies, who interpreted treaties and agreements as requiring them to return deserters.[24]

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[23] "List of Bars Frequented by U.S. Personnel" [West Berlin], folder, "Horlemann--Vietnam," German SDS Papers, APO archives Free University, Berlin, Germany.

[24] Watts also helped organize "Resisters in the Army," known as RITA, which encouraged some servicemen who were capable of organizing resistance from within the ranks of the military and the affiliated Friends of Resisters Inside the Army (FRITA). RITA sponsored several informational centers in towns throughout the Federal Republic that aimed at enticing soldiers. More importantly, they published underground GI-resister newspapers like *The Bond*, *Where It's At*, and *Act*, which provided detailed, if opaque instructions on how to get out of the service. In addition the newspapers included personal testimonies, advocated for a GI Union and also provided information about who to contact in respective countries for additional support. FRITA typed up letters in both English and German that identified themselves as Americans in Europe, and asked the recipient to please pass the letter and an issue of *The Bond* onto any servicemen they knew who were having doubts about the war. Dieter Brünn, *Widerstand in der US-Armee: GI Bewegung in den siebziger Jahren* [Resistance in the U.S. Army: The GI Movement in the 1970s] (Berlin: Harold Kater, 1986); see also "The Dutch Connection," unpublished manuscript on the GI underground network in folder RUD 710,02, Rudi Dutschke Papers, HIS. The personal papers of Watts and Brunn and the Center for Soldatenrecht they established have been preserved; however, after Watts' death in 2010, the papers were transferred to the IISH in Amsterdam, where they await processing and remain unavailable for researchers, thus I have not had the opportunity to consult these records yet. "How Anti-Vietnam Deserters Go Underground," *Times* (London) 17 August 1967; Resisters Inside the Army [RITA], *ACT*, vol. 1 no. 1, Folder, "Americans in Britain for US Withdrawal from Vietnam [Stop It], 1967-1968" (XIV), box 303, War Resisters International Archive, IISH; Letter, FRITA to Friends, n.d., Folder, " 202—activities of American Vietnam Deserters," Box 202, Ton Regtien archives, IISH; Watts, whose real name was Thomas Schwätzer fled Austria with his family in 1938 during the Nazi terror and moved first to Britain, and later to the United States after World War Two. Vivienne Porzsolt, "Activist Scribe Struck from the Left: Max Watts, 1928-2010," Sydney *Morning Herald*, December 29, 2010; Max Watts and David Cortright, *Left Face: Soldiers Unions and Resistance Movements in Modern Armies* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1991).

At a February 1968 press conference, five deserters reported on the logistics of getting to safety while eluding U.S. and allied authorities. They spoke of receiving copies of *Act* and *Where It's At*, newsletters directed at military personnel encouraging them to desert. In addition they noted that knowledge of antiwar organizations and their deserter networks was prevalent inside the army, though military hierarchy attempted to prevent such knowledge from circulating among the rank and file.[25] The most important piece of knowledge circulating within the GI deserter community was the information on the hazards and possibilities each country offered as sanctuary.[26] Deserters knew West Germany to be high risk, despite the presence and coordination of a large antiwar, anti-military, and anti-U.S. movement within the Federal Republic.[27] As the U.S. ally on the front lines of the communist bloc, it boasted the largest U.S. military presence in Europe, and the resources to track down deserters. The West German government, reliant on NATO agreement for security and defense, did not hesitate to assist the U.S. military in locating deserters and returning them to U.S. authorities.

The primary destination for sanctuary was Sweden, which was neither a member of NATO nor bound by its provisions or treaties requiring deserters to be returned to U.S. officials. In addition, Sweden offered American deserters an opportunity to apply for social welfare benefits. The destination gained notoriety following the arrival of four U.S. sailors who traveled overland through the Soviet Union after deserting the ship the *U.S.S. Intrepid*, deployed to the Pacific Ocean.[28] Over time, several hundred American deserters

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[25] "American Deserters Talk About Their Motives," *Times* (London) 12 February 1968.

[26] *ACT* (newsletter of Resisters Inside the Army), vol 1 (1) [n.d.], folder, "Americans in Britain for US Withdrawal from Vietnam [Stop It], 1967-1968" (XIV), box 303, WRI archives, IISH.

[27] Konrad H. Jarausch, *After Hitler: Recivilizing Germans, 1945-1995* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 164-165.

[28] Thomas Hayes, *American Deserters in Sweden: The Men and Their Challenge* (New York: Associated Press, 1971), 16-17; Radio Transcript, Clancy Sigal, "The American Deserters, Part II," BBC Radio Four, September 11, 1970, folder, "Clancy Sigal: The American Deserters, Radio Transmission 1970" (V), box 303, WRI archives, IISH.

arrived in the Scandinavian country and fashioned a support community to help new arrivals overcome culture shock.[29]

A geographically closer alternative to Sweden for GIs was France. In early 1967 Louis Armfield, an American deserter, was arrested for vagrancy while sleeping on a park bench and appealed to remain in the country. His appeal forced the French to re-evaluate its policies on returning deserters under NATO provisions.[30] To address the growing crisis, in 1967 the French government opted to allow deserters to stay in the country, but with conditions.[31] Mindful of the potential consequences of having thousands of deserters and political dissidents arrive at their doorstep, the French government prohibited participation in any political causes or organizations in France by arriving Americans. This, of course, too was subject to interpretation, as some believed it applied only to organizations centered on French domestic questions, and excluded participating in Vietnam antiwar campaigns.[32] In order to ensure deserters complied with this regulation, the French government allowed them to apply only for temporary residency and work permits, and required the men to periodically renew the permissions at the local prefecture office. As a method of social control, it ensured that if an

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[29] Hayes, *American Deserters in Sweden,* 40-42; Carl Gustof-Scott, "Swedish Sanctuary of American Deserters During the Vietnam War, *Journal of Scandinavian History* 26:2 (2001), passim.

[30] Bethany S. Keenan, 'At the Crossroads of World Attitudes and Reaction': The Paris American Committee to Stopwar and American Anti-war Activism in France, 1966–1968, *Journal of Transatlantic Studies*, 11:1 (2013), 69; Richard E. Mooney, "G.I.'s Who Desert Find France Precarious, Nonpolitical Haven," *New York Times*, 2 July 1967, p. 9.

[31] In defending the decision, the government cited past practices of not automatically returning deserters and the practice of other countries, specifically Germany and Belgium, who during the 1950s refused to return deserters when requested during the Algerian War. "French 'Haven for Deserters," Times (London), September 6, 1967, p. 4; Richard E. Mooney, "G.I.'s Who Desert Find France Precarious, Nonpolitical Haven," *New York Times*, 2 July 1967, p. 9; Telegram, U.S. State Department to U.S. Embassy Paris, March 5, 1968 Folder, "DEF 9-3/US/ 3/1/68," Box 1666, RG 59: General Records of the Department of State—Central Foreign Policy Files, NARA II; Keenan, "'At the Crossroads of World Attitudes,'" 69.

[32] Telegram, U.S. Embassy Paris to Secretary of State, May 9, 1968, Folder, "DEF 9-3/US/ 5/1/68," Box 1667, RG 59: General Records of the Department of State—Central Foreign Policy Files, NARA II.

individual wanted to remain in the country it had to comply with French law or face the consequences of extradition.[33]

Deserters perceived Britain to be moderately "risky" compared to other Western European destinations. The country posed fewer cultural and linguistic obstacles for deserters, making it a somewhat more attractive option for servicemen seeking refuge. Furthermore, the tradition and prevalence of pacifist and left-leaning voices within British Parliament prevented the government from actively pursuing deserters and resisters. Despite these benefits, the British Isles were not a haven for truant military men, as the country's Visiting Forces Act of 1952 mandated the "apprehension and disposal" of deserters from Commonwealth nations and allied countries, which British officials interpreted to be NATO allies.[34] Thus, if American servicemen, like Jeremy Tupper, were identified and arrested in Great Britain, the Home Office returned them to the custody to the United States, which occurred at least ten times between 1968 and 1970.[35]

Just as U.S. military deserters in Western Europe were assisted by favorable immigration policies in France and Sweden, many draft resisters in the United States benefitted when the Canadian government in Ottawa changed its immigration policies in 1967, and instituted a point system for entry and to obtain landed immigrant status.[36] Acquiring such a status allowed the legal entry to the country and for individuals to work

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[33] Keenan, "'At the Crossroads of World Attitudes,'" 69-70; Richard E. Mooney, "G.I.'s Who Desert Find France Precarious, Nonpolitical Haven," *New York Times*, 2 July 1967, p. 9

[34] The U.K. Statute Database, "Visiting Forces Act 1952," [http://www.statutelaw.gov.uk/content.aspx?activeTextDocId=1137244] accessed 19 April 2009.

[35] *Hansard Parliamentary Debates*, Lords, 5th ser., vol. 313 (1970) cols. 9-59.

[36] John Hagan, *Northern Passage: American Vietnam War Resisters in Canada* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001), 38-42; David S. Churchill, "An Ambiguous Welcome: Vietnam Draft Resistance, the Canadian State, and Cold War Containment," *Social History*, 37:73 (2004), 5-6.

in Canada, providing a safeguard against deportation.[37] The point system held many advantages for young, able bodied and highly educated males, who were awarded points bases on their ability to bring needed skill sets to Canada, a country that routinely experienced a "brain drain" of its citizens heading south for employment opportunities.[38]

Historians have ascribed different motivations for the Canadian government's decision to liberalize its entry requirements. David Churchill has convincingly argued the changes in immigration policy "reflected a much broader set of contradictory motivations and differences within the Canadian federal bureaucracy, and in the complicated Cold War relationship between Canada and the United States."[39] In essence, the Canadian government knew the effects of such changes, especially in bringing more young U.S. citizens north to promote economic growth, but at the same time threatened to allow thousands of subversives across the border, jeopardizing Canadian security.[40] Given that Canada also depended on the United States as a NATO ally for its Cold War defense and security, and enjoyed a close relationship with the U.S. government, its policies had to adhere to Cold War assumptions as well.[41]

Thus, the Liberal Party government under Lester Pearson arbitrarily implemented and enforced the new policies as a mechanism to control and monitor the influx of new arrivals.[42] Border agents functioned as unofficial gatekeepers who had some latitude in

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[37] Churchill, "An Ambiguous Welcome," 5.

[38] Ibid., 4.

[39] Ibid., 3.

[40] Ibid., 6.

[41] A literature review suggests the First Red Scare of the 1920s in Canada was far more pervasive in terms of hysteria and harassment, the country did experience a bout of anti-Communist hysteria after the Second World War see, Reginald Whitaker, *Cold War Canada: The Making of a National Insecurity State, 1945-1957* (Toronto and Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 1994), passim; David Mackenzie, *Canada's Red Scare* (Ottawa: Canadian Historical Association, 2001), passim; Churchill, "An Ambiguous Welcome," 4.

[42] Hagan, *Northern Passage*, 37-38.

awarding points.[43] However, as in other countries with a growing U.S. dissident population, the Canadian law enforcement agency, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, kept tabs on many of the new arrivals as well and turned over information to the U.S. FBI.[44] Part of this management of immigrants was that Canadian officials initially allowed only draft resisters, ignoring their status for immigration purposes, but forbid active U.S. military personnel suspected of deserting from entering the country, until early 1969.[45] Thus, despite widespread perception that Canada welcomed U.S. draft resisters into their country, in reality experiences and receptions varied widely.[46]

Nonetheless, Canada became the most popular destination for U.S. draft resisters and later, military deserters. While figures vary as to the precise number of U.S. citizens to go to Canada, but the most frequently accepted number places the number of Vietnam-related arrivals between 30,000-40,000 young men and the women who accompanied them.[47] By the early 1970s, an estimated 20,000 American resisters lived in Toronto alone.[48] As U.S. citizens arrived in cities throughout the commonwealth, they too found each other, often settled in the same neighborhoods, sometimes creating "American ghettos" featuring bookstores, bars, and restaurants as well as social networks to help with the resettlement and adjustment period.[49]

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[43] Toronto Anti-Draft Programme, *Manual for Draft Age Immigrants to Canada*, (Toronto, 1968), 12-14; Churchill, "An Ambiguous Welcome," 5.

[44] Churchill, "An Ambiguous Welcome," 2.

[45] Hagan, *Northern Passage*, Chapter "Opening the Gates," 36-65.

[46] Churchill, "An Ambiguous Welcome," 2.

[47] Churchill, "An Ambiguous Welcome," 4; Renee G. Kasinsky, *Refugees from Militarism: Draft Age Americans in Canada* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1976), 5.

[48] Hagan, *Northern Passage*, 66.

[49] Hagan, "Toronto's American Ghetto," in *Northern Passage*, 66- 98.

The international desertion network came to the attention of U.S. officials and the public in summer 1967. In August, the *Times* of London divulged the network's existence and work in helping U.S. servicemen stationed at bases throughout the continent desert and elude authorities. The story read like a Cold War thriller, with quotes from shadowy characters, telling of operation's logistics from approaching the men to shuttling them to safe houses.[50] It reported young European activists did most of the legwork in soliciting and hiding the servicemen; however, the newspaper gave the first indication that civilian Americans might be involved in the operation, an allegation, if true, carried severe legal penalties.[51] Two Americans interviewed for the piece, without mentioning PACS, claimed a group of middle and upper class Americans in Paris helped finance the operation, and flatly denied allegations that communist governments had any involvement in the organization, operation, or financing of the desertion campaign.[52]

The revelations of the desertion network in summer 1967 provoked a crisis within the U.S. military and diplomatic establishment. The day after the report appeared, the U.S. State Department sent guidance to its embassy in Stockholm, the primary destination for deserters, on how to respond to the story. It instructed emissaries, if asked, to tell to the media, "There is, so far as I know, no effective campaign designed to induce men to desert. It's not a problem. It has not been a problem, and it isn't a problem." The

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[50] "How Vietnam Deserters Go Underground," *Times* (London), 17 August 1967, p. 8

[51] Title 18, Section 1381, Uniform Code of Military Justice (1951) that governed desertion and solicitation stated civilians who 'entice' or 'procure' or in any substantial way assist U.S. military deserters were subject to prison terms and fines. Title 18, Chapter 67 U.S. Code, section 1381, accessed on http://uscode.house.gov 24 May 2011; Clancy Sigal, "Diary" *London Review of Books*, vol. 30, no. 19 9 October 2008, [http://www.lrb.co.uk/v30/n19/siga01_.html] (accessed 30 June 2009); "G.I. Deserters Get Britons' Support" *Times* (London) November 22, 1970.

[52] "How Vietnam Deserters Go Underground," *Times* (London), 17 August 1967, 8. Although the interviewees did not specifically mention specific antiwar expatriate groups like the Paris American Committee to Stop War (PACS), years later Max Jordan, Richard Perrin, and others involved with the desertion network told historian Bethany Keenan they "received considerable aid from Mary Jo Liebowitz," one of the organizers of PACS. Keenan, "'At the Crossroads of World Attitudes,'" 70 and cf 80.

leadership in D.C. told them to quote Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara's dismissal of the story as "sheerest nonsense."[53] A few days later, U.S. diplomats in Paris cabled their bosses at the State Department to report the article "aroused little interest in the French press." U.S. diplomats there told officials in Washington that although embassy had fielded questions from various American news outlets over the previous weeks, they dutifully informed reporters that desertion was not a problem and reports of active underground organization had been "exaggerated."[54] Despite constant denials of the network's extensiveness and significance by U.S. officials in Europe, details slowly emerged after diplomats interviewed a deserter who voluntarily turned himself into authorities in November. Reporting the conversation to their superiors in Washington, U.S. diplomats in France revealed, "the number of military deserters in France had risen above previous estimates," and "French efforts on behalf of these deserters are somewhat better organized than had been previously thought."[55]

Stop the Draft Week, 1967

Although isolated incidents of draft card burning occurred as early as 1965, the Spring Mobilization in April 1967 featured the first mass protest by burning draft cards, an act many within the antiwar movement viewed as an act of civil disobedience. Draft card burnings came to the attention of the Johnson administration, which instructed the

[53] Telegram State Department to U.S. Embassy Stockholm, August 18, 1967, Folder, "DEF 9-3/US/ 7/1/67," Box 1666, RG 59: General Records of the Department of State—Central Foreign Policy Files, NARA II.

[54] U.S. Embassy Paris to State Department. August 21, 1967, Folder, "DEF 9-3/US/ 7/1/67," Box 1666, RG 59: General Records of the Department of State—Central Foreign Policy Files, NARA II.

[55] Telegram, U.S. Embassy Paris to Department of State, "U.S. Military Deserters in France," November 30, 1967 Folder, "DEF 9-3/US/ 11/1/67," Box 1666, RG 59: General Records of the Department of State—Central Foreign Policy Files, NARA II.

Justice Department to investigate and prosecute the rash of opposition in late 1967.[56] The agencies placed resisters under surveillance, compiled reports on draft resisters, and instructed the head of the U.S. Selective Service System, Lewis Hershey, to reclassify draft opponents as draft eligible.[57]

The draft had become a new terrain upon which competing views of national security were contested. For hawks and pro-war supporters, the burning of the draft card conveyed the rejection of this community, a gesture that told the rest of the United States that protesters did not want to fulfill their civic obligations, nor participate in this national community to defend the state. For the antiwar movement, the draft card and its burning embodied the contrary message that citizenship and the ability to participate in civic life did not require a draft card that was laden with political and social constructions regarding one's status.

Like the American flag, statues of revolutionary heroes, and the Fourth of July, draft cards signified membership within the imagined community and symbolized a membership that was open for interpretation among those who tried to claim it. The U.S. government did not grant deferments for students living abroad, and required them to report to U.S. military installations abroad for their induction physicals, as Oxford Rhodes Scholar and future U.S. President Bill Clinton did in 1969.[58] For overseas American men, the draft card many carried in their pockets or kept stashed in their desk or file drawers offered a material reminder that they possessed a national identity and were connected to a distant homeland, whose policies had engendered much global opposition. They could either stand to represent those policies and the values behind

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[56] Memo, Joe Califano to President Johnson, December 7, 1967, folder, "Selective Service (5), Box 56, Joseph Califano Files, NLLBJ.

[57] Ibid.

[58] As Clinton considered his options regarding his draft status, he took his induction physical while in London in January 1969. Bill Clinton, *My Life* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2004), 147.

them, or claim alternative values and policies. However, participating in anti-draft protests while abroad risked both legal and personal consequences for the men and their futures. It forced men into a choice of either facing legal penalties that included imprisonment or banishment from the homeland, a decision forced on many young men in the United States as the war dragged on into the late 1960s. The draft card and draft resistance ultimately was an individual choice, made in a very public way.

In October 1967, antiwar groups throughout the United States planned a "Stop the Draft Week." Beginning October 16, acts of civil disobedience were encouraged to disrupt the war effort. The culmination of the Draft Week would be a "March on the Pentagon" outside of Washington, D.C. over the weekend of October 21-23, featuring an estimated 50,000 antiwar protesters. Throughout the week, war opponents across the United States blocked entry into draft induction centers and military facilities. Draft eligible men who opposed the war gathered for public draft card burnings and turn-ins to Selective Service officials.[59]

As with the Spring Mobilization earlier in the year, Americans abroad saw an opportunity with "Draft Week" to connect with the movement at home and reassert their own claims about the meaning of patriotic mobilization and resistance. Anticipating widespread participation in Stop the Draft Week activities, the U.S. State Department notified U.S. embassies throughout Europe of possible en masse draft card turn-ins or burnings by American students overseas. In consultation with the U.S. Justice Department, the State Department instructed foreign service officers and U.S. Attorneys abroad not to accept cards, and to remind draft resisters that "it is their lawful obligation

[59] On Stop the Draft Week, Tom Wells, *The War Within: America's Battle Over Vietnam* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), 214-222; Nancy Zaroulis and Gerald Sullivan, *Who Spoke Up?: American Protests Against the War in Vietnam* (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Wilson, 1984), 123-133.

to have it on their persons at all times, a responsibility that may not be evaded or avoided by attempting to turn them over to foreign service officers."[60]

To coincide with "Draft Week," the U.S. Campaign in West Berlin held a series of events to link their protests with others throughout the world. The weeklong events began with a "read-in" on Monday, October 16. Held at the Protestant Student Center, the public readings included both German and English reading material compiled by the Americans.[61] The Campaign also planned to participate in a large demonstration organized by the German SDS scheduled for October 21 as part of the global antiwar mobilization.[62]

The prospect of another disturbance and possible unrest throughout West Berlin worried both German and U.S. officials, who once again undertook measures to mitigate the protests. Tipped off by West Berlin police, U.S. officials reported their concern to the U.S. State Department that recent demonstrations in the city had turned violent, especially in the aftermath of the Ohnesorg assassination. Furthermore, U.S. diplomats believed American military and cultural institutions might be targeted and notified the State Department and the U.S. Military Commander in Europe that all U.S. military personnel in the city should be alerted to the demonstration and reminded not to become involved with the protesters.[63]

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[60] Telegram, U.S. Embassy Bonn to Secretary of State, "Anti-Vietnam Demonstration and Selective Service Cards," October 16, 1967, folder, "POL 23-8/Ger W/ 6/1/67," Box 2133, RG 59: General Records of the Department of State—Central Foreign Policy Files, NARA II.

[61] Flyer, U.S. Campaign, "Stop the Draft Week," October 16, 1967, folder, "Germany, 1967-1970" Box 4, Student Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam Records, Wisconsin Historical Society, Madison, Wisconsin (Hereafter, WHS).

[62] Flyer, U.S. Campaign, "Stop the Draft Week," October 16, 1967, folder, "Germany, 1967-1970" Box 4, Student Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam Records, WHS.

[63] Telegram, U.S. Berlin to Secretary of State, "Berlin Anti-war demonstration October 21," October 16, 1967, folder, "POL 23-8/GerB/1968," Box 2109, RG 59: General Records of the Department of State—Central Foreign Policy Files, NARA II.

The October 21 protest in West Berlin proceeded along the Kurfuerstendamm and ended with a rally at Wittenbergplatz in the U.S. sector. Despite fears of widespread unrest, the assembled 10,000 protested did little damage. In reporting to the State Department, the U.S. Mission in West Berlin reported events transpired mostly without incident. Prior to the march, RIAS, the American radio and television broadcast station in the city received an anonymous bomb threat that turned out to be a hoax. In addition, a smoke bomb exploded in the cloakroom of the *Amerika Haus*, but did not cause any injuries or property damage.[64] During the parade, U.S. officials indicated the participation of Americans who carried the American flag along the demonstration route. After the parade, there were speeches, and then the crowd broke up into small groups to leaflet people throughout the city.[65] Some protesters went to the *Amerika Haus*, but eventually disbanded when faced with a blockade.[66]

Standish, in his report to the Student Mobilization Committee, the stateside organization responsible for coordinating Stop the Draft Week, indicated that with the level of participation the march was likely a breakthrough moment for West Germany.[67] Furthermore, he reiterated that "the next action, and all future actions, should be international protests," and expresses interests in learning more about the discussion for a proposed in international student strike in early April 1968.[68]

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[64] Telegram, U.S. Berlin to Secretary of State, "Vietnam Protest March," October 21, 1967, folder, "POL 23-8/GerB/1968," Box 2109, RG 59: General Records of the Department of State—Central Foreign Policy Files, NARA II.

[65] Ibid.

[66] Telegram, U.S. Berlin to Secretary of State, "Vietnam Protest March," October 21, 1967, folder, "POL 23-8/GerB/1968," Box 2109, RG 59: General Records of the Department of State—Central Foreign Policy Files, NARA II; Kimke, *The Other Alliance,* 84.

[67] Letter, Peter Standish to Kipp Dawson (SMC), November 8, 1967 [and response 11/13/67], folder, "Germany, 1967-1970" Box 4, Student Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam Records, WHS.

[68] Ibid.

For Stop the Draft Week activities in London, *Stop It* organized a committee called "The Resistance."[69] Committee participants planned a protest at the U.S. Embassy that week. *Stop It* distributed flyers that quoted from the essays from the stateside resistance movement in advance of the event. The flyers and statements justified the act within a broader tradition of civil disobedience, invoking past American traditions of patriotism and dissent, including Henry David Thoreau's writings on civil disobedience and a popular quote attributed to the Nuremberg Tribunal that "individuals have international duties which transcend the national obligations imposed by the individual state."[70]

At the beginning of the week, eight draft-eligible members of *Stop It* handed over registration cards to foreign service officers at the embassy. Following orders the State Department issued a few days prior, officials refused to accept the cards. Throwing the display of resistance into chaos, Harry Pincus and others attached the cards to the embassy door in an act of symbolic defiance.[71] Embassy officials reported the petitions and letters would be forwarded to Washington, while the draft cards were placed in the "lost property office" at the embassy.[72] That same week, a second group of *Stop It*

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[69] Labeling their group and efforts within Stop It signaled that that aligned with a movement and committee that had been established in the United States known as "Resistance" which emerged in the fall of 1967 after several activists involved with the "We Won't Go Conference" drafted and later published the statement, "A Call to Resist Illegitimate Authority," in the *New York Review of Books* and the *New Republic* in September 1967. When first published the statement had the 158 signatures of prominent Americans and activists. A year later, over 2000 people had signed the statement. See Ferber and Lynd, *The Resistance*, 118-123.

[70] Press Clippings, *The Resistance* [double sided], [n.d.], Folder, "Americans in Britain for US Withdrawal from Vietnam [Stop It], 1967-1968" (XIV), box 303, War Resisters International Archive, IISH.

[71] "Americans Hand in Their Cards," *Times* (London), 17 October1967; "Stop It Meeting Minutes, October 10, 1967," folder, "Americans in Britain for US Withdrawal from Vietnam [Stop It], 1967-1968" (XIV), Box 303, War Resisters' International (WRI) Archives, IISH; "US Students Start Vietnam War Draft Protest in Britain," *Guardian* (London) 17 October 1967.

[72] "US Students Start Vietnam War Draft Protest in Britain," *Guardian* (London) 17 October 1967.

members arranged to meet NLF officials on their way back from Canada at the London airport, and symbolically gave them their draft cards.

As had been the case in West Berlin, Stop the Draft Week activities in London concluded with a demonstration on October 22 organized by several British student groups, with active participation by Americans. Elliot Isenberg, reporting what transpired to his friend Marshall Bloom, described the day as the most violent antiwar demonstration in London to date, and included direct clashes between protesters and police in the streets. In recounting the gossip of the demonstration, Isenberg informed Bloom that *Stop It* had fashioned a parade float to resemble a U.S. tank, invoking the U.S. war machine, a fact included on a CIA report to President Johnson which described the event as "a minicar disguised as a tank in an abortive attempt to breach police lines."[73] In a scuffle between protesters and police over the tank, a policeman's cap fell into the car. *Stop It* members later absconded with the bobby's cap and journalist Danny Schechter, the organization's international affairs secretary, wore it proudly.[74]

In response to the protests and resistance in the U.S. and overseas, the Johnson administration announced in February 1968 that the Selective Service would no longer grant draft deferments for graduate study, citing efforts to make the draft more equitable for all men.[75] Coming on the heels of the Stop the Draft Week events of late 1967, and the high profile indictment of five men in Boston, known as the "Boston Five," in January 1968, the news provoked outcry among the nation's students, who faced an uncertain future after graduation, and feared their studies might have to be interrupted for

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[73] Report, Richard Helms to President Johnson, "Student Dissent and its Techniques in the US," January 5, 1968, folder, "CIA, Volume 3, [2 of 3], Box 9, National Security File, Agency File, Lyndon Johnson Presidential Library, Austin, TX (Hereafter, NLLBJ).

[74] Letter, Elliott Isenberg to Marshall Bloom, October 23, 1967, folder 22, Box 8, Marshall Bloom Papers, Amherst College Archives and Special Collections, Amherst, Massachusetts (Hereafter, Amherst).

[75] Flynn, *The Draft,* 221-223.

a tour in Vietnam. Now having a personal stake in the war and the draft, U.S. students moved to greater action.

Facing the new sanctions, younger expats in early 1968 chose to aid resistance, rather than wade into complicated morass of soliciting deserters. PACS and *Stop It* hosted public information sessions for U.S. students abroad to inform them of their options in face of the new requirements. In early 1968, they invited noted draft lawyer Howard Sacks to speak at meetings to review student's rights and obligations under the draft system.[76] Sacks also prepared a pamphlet called "The Draft Law and Americans Residing In Europe" that pacifist organizations throughout Western Europe published and distributed to Americans abroad. The booklet offered practical advice such as making sure all correspondence with draft officials was in writing, not to accept any oral promises from draft officials, and observe all deadlines. It explained U.S. law required all draft registrants to undergo a pre-induction physical, and outlined the procedures by which this could be done while residing in Europe. The manual also provided the appeals process once the local board had made its decisions, and explained the consequences for failing to report either for the physical or for a service order. It concluded with the contact information for antiwar groups in England, Canada, and the U.S.[77]

Additionally, other U.S. students in Great Britain set up draft-counseling centers that mimicked the trend on U.S. college campuses. In Oxford, American students established a Council for Democratic Alternatives that published a newsletter and encouraged students to speak with their congressional representatives about their draft

[76] Letter, Howard D. Sacks to Maria Jolas, January 12, 1968, Microfilm, Reel #6, Paris American Committee to Stop War Records, WHS.

[77] Stop It Committee, *Residing in Europe and Its Relation to the Draft*, "Resistance/Deserters, including "Resist," Dr. Spock, Draft Resistance, French Groups, and PACS Support, 1966-1970," box 2, PACS files, WHS.

options.[78] American students and their British allies in London established SUPPORT, a center to reach students there who were uncertain how the new requirements might affect them. Like the draft counseling centers that appeared on U.S. college campuses, students in London provided personal counseling and informational literature to young men who worried about their draft status. Participants were careful to point out that like similar centers in the United States, they did not "encourage draft resistance," but rather provided those inquiring about resistance with their options.[79]

Perhaps the most significant collaboration between U.S. and international activists on the issue of resistance was the compilation and distribution of informational booklets on draft resistance to American citizens. The most famous of these books was published by the Toronto Anti-Draft Programme. Its "Manual for Draft Age Immigrants to Canada"[80] appeared at draft counseling centers and provided guidance to many U.S. students who contemplated moving north to avoid the draft.[81] The guide discussed what to say and not to say when crossing the border, how to find a place to live and a job, as well as academic options. The guide quickly went out of print, and a second run had to be ordered, as tens of thousands of American draft-eligible students voted with their feet, producing a large scale exodus and setting up communities of Americans in Toronto, Vancouver, and Montreal.

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[78] Center for Democratic Alternatives Newsletter (March 1968) Vol. 1 no. 5, folder 2, box 86 (86.2), James Jones Papers, Harry Ransom Center, University of Texas, Austin (Hereafter, HRC).

[79] "Statement made by the representative of the Stop-IT Committee at the forum on the Right to refuse military service and orders. Organized by the National Peace Council in Britain," 15 June 1968, Folder, "Americans in Britain for US Withdrawal from Vietnam [Stop It], 1967-1968" (XIV), box 303, WRI archive, IISH, Amsterdam, Netherlands.

[80] Toronto Anti-Draft Programme, *Manual for Draft Age Immigrants to Canada*, (Toronto, 1968).

[81] Hagan, *Northern Passage*, 77-78; Churchill, "An Ambiguous Welcome,"5; Donald William Maxwell, "Unguarded Border: The Movement of People and Ideas Between the United States and Canada During the Vietnam Era," Ph.D. diss, Indiana University, 2010, 60-61.

A similar booklet, "England and Draft Age Americans," provided advice on how Americans looking to avoid the draft could immigrate to England. It noted, "While English law does not encourage immigration, some Americans can come here and have little fear of being returned to the U.S."[82] It relayed information on how to navigate the British immigration system and stressed immigration officers functioned as unofficial gatekeepers to the country. It outlined the requirements for each category of eligible persons who qualified to enter Britain as immigrants, and it noted that criminals, those lacking sufficient funds as determined by the interviewing officer, or those claiming a desire to remain permanently in England would be denied entry to the country automatically. The book also warned England had been known to deny entry for political reasons, citing the experiences of Stokely Carmichael of SNCC and David McReynolds of the War Resisters League. Assuming resisters successfully navigated the entry process, the manual explained that the job prospects for Americans proved grim. In most cases, the British government did not issue work permits for visitors. Furthermore, in order to qualify for such a permit, the resister had to find a job "for which no Englishman was available."[83] The booklet concluded by spelling out the processes from which American citizens could be removed from England, the application process for British citizenship, and contact information for *Stop It* and various sympathetic legal organizations in England.

Desertion, Draft Resistance, and Transatlantic Public Opinion

U.S. citizens in West Germany and in Great Britain saw the local audiences as an important constituency that required mobilization to bring the war to a close.[84] Although

[82] Stop It Committee, "England and Draft Age Americans," folder, "Draft Counseling, 1967-1968; undated," Box 51, SDS Records, WHS.

[83] Ibid.

[84] At a press conference in Paris in early 1968, five silhouetted deserters announced their experiences with the desertion network and discussed the informal knowledge that circulated about it, included that a hierarchy among the various countries had developed. In this hierarchy, West Germany was

the student movement in West Germany had been radicalized, opinion polls as late as 1968 showed West German citizens overwhelmingly supported the U.S. war. In fact, many respondents called for an expansion of it, at the same time polls in the U.S. showed a majority of Americans first time opposing the war, in the wake of the Tet Offensive.[85] In May 1968, Francis Fuller of the U.S. Campaign helped organize an "International Desertion Day," in cities throughout the Federal Republic to coincide with the anniversary of V-E Day.[86] He and others distributed flyers that challenged soldiers' pervasive belief that deployment to West Germany might keep them safe from the horrors of Vietnam, asserting that Washington's growing concern for China and Asia meant placing U.S. soldiers in West Berlin was now "a luxury the government can't afford."[87] Despite efforts, they achieved little success in actually convincing a critical mass of soldiers to leave during the Desertion Day events.[88]

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widely known as the most dangerous country for deserters due to it being "apprehend and arrest. See, ""American Deserters Talk About Their Motives," 12 February 1968, *Times* (London), p. 4

[85] "Vietnam-Umfrage in Deutschland [Vietnam Survey in Germany]," *Berliner Zeitung* 18 February 1968, notes in a recent opinion poll, 45% of Germans wanted the U.S. to stay the course in Vietnam, while 11% wanted an increase in the level of U.S. involvement. 44% indicated the desire to see a reduction in U.S. forces.

[86] Telegram, U.S. Consulate Stuttgart to U.S. Embassy Bonn, "Desertion Campaign," May 8,1968; Telegram, U.S. Consulate Munich to American Embassy Bonn, "Desertion Campaign," May 7, 1968; Telegram, U.S. Embassy Bonn to USAREUR, "Desertion Campaign," May 7, 1968; Telegram, U.S. Consulate Dusseldorf to American Embassy Bonn, May 10, 1968; Telegram, U.S. Consulate Frankfurt, to American Embassy Bonn, "Desertion Campaign, May 9, 1968; Telegram, U.S. Mission Berlin to U.S. Embassy Bonn, "Desertion Campaign, May 9, 1968, Folder, "DEF 9-3/US/ 5/1/68," Box 1667, RG 59: General Records of the Department of State—Central Foreign Policy Files, NARA II. Klimke, *The Other Alliance*, 182-187.

[87] Leaflet, U.S. Campaign in West Berlin, [n.d., ca. 1967], "They Can't Send me to Vietnam,"Binder, Horlemann—Vietnam, APO archives, Free University Berlin, Germany.

[88] Klimke, *The Other Alliance*, 182-187; Telegram, U.S. Consulate Munich to U.S. Embassy Bonn, "Desertion Campaign," May 9, 1968; Telegram, U.S. Mission Berlin to U.S. Embassy Bonn, "Desertion Campaign, May 9, 1968, Folder, "DEF 9-3/US/ 5/1/68," Box 1667, RG 59: General Records of the Department of State—Central Foreign Policy Files, NARA II.

With public opinion in West Germany marginally in favor of the war and indicating strong support for the U.S. military presence in the country to deter Communist expansion, the anti-imperialist rhetoric advanced by expats or German APO found little traction. It did, however, invite increased measures to combat the solicitation of deserters. West German authorities actively sought, arrested, and returned U.S. military deserters, lest the collective security arrangement of the Cold War be undermined. In March 1968, the Commander in Chief of U.S. Armed Forces in Europe made his displeasure known about the continued solicitation efforts. He urged the U.S. Embassy in Bonn to press the West German government on the issue, asking the "they take steps to acquaint the German public with the provisions of FRG criminal code relating to the solicitation of desertions."[89] The mission also reported that specific allied legislation remained vague on the point as well, and relied on the interpretation of a German court, if the U.S. government wanted to prosecute offenders. When the U.S. Diplomatic Mission in West Berlin once again feared the U.S. Campaign and members of the German SDS looked to increase solicitation efforts in the city, they pushed for action and reviewed the legal avenues available to prevent such activity.[90]

Draft resistance efforts in Britain, as in West Germany, largely tried to mobilize the public in that country on the war. In December 1967, *Stop It* made the issue the focus of its street politics, issuing British Prime Minister Harold Wilson an oversized U.S. draft card to symbolize British complicity in the war. Publically, *Stop It* spokesman Frank Brodhead defended the street protests and circulating petitions as a critical part of building an international movement, by demonstrating the commitment of American

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[89] Sections 109 (B) and (C) of the Federal Republic's Criminal Code outlawed the solicitation of soldiers to desert from the *Bunderswehr*, and it was later expanded to include U.S. and NATO forces. Telegram, U.S. Embassy Bonn to U.S. Mission Berlin, "Solicitation to Desert," March 29, 1968, Folder, "DEF 9-3/US/ 3/1/68," Box 1666, RG 59: General Records of the Department of State—Central Foreign Policy Files, NARA II.

[90] Ibid.

citizens in opposing the war and sending a message to British nationals inspiring Britons to "get off the fence," stating "it is an important trump card in President Johnson's hand that there has been no strong reaction [to the war] here."[91]

Brodhead and the expatriates' assessment of public attitude in Britain was largely correct. USIA polls in both December 1967 (51%) and April 1968 (52%) showed over half of British people saw the war as an effort to combat communist aggression, sharing the U.S. government's view. Only 12% of the British public viewed the war as a civil war and 13% as a U.S. effort to take over South Vietnam, with another quarter unsure. The USIA numbers from Britain exceeded even West Germany, where USIA numbers from the same period also showed a strong belief the war in Vietnam was largely an effort to halt communism (41% in December 1967 and 48% in April 1968).[92]

This attitude was echoed in a *Times* of London editorial weighing in on the Tupper case. The editorial applauded the application of the Visiting Forces Act, stating, "this agreement with the United States is of long standing. To repudiate it in these circumstances, an undoubtedly unfriendly act would be to sap the structure of NATO, which is the basis of the nation's defense policy."[93] As a compromise with the question of conscientious objectors, the *Times* proposed that the law be constructed so those who have enlisted or committed to service in the U.S. military be subject to the law, while those who have refused military induction be granted asylum.[94]

Despite public opinion favoring the U.S. explanation for the war, the debate over Britain's extradition of U.S. military deserters did not end. At testimony later that month,

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[91] "Americans Hand in Their Cards," *Times* (London), 17 October 1967.

[92] United States Information Agency, "Trends in West European Public opinion on US Policy Objectives," June 12, 1968, folder, "Trends in West European Public opinion on US Policy Objectives," Box 13, Ernest Goldstein Files, NLLBJ.

[93] "Return of Vietnam Deserters," *Times* (London), 15 June 1968.

[94] Ibid.

MP Fenner Brockway appealed to Stonham once again that the "about half dozen" American conscientious objectors in England be treated with the utmost sympathy by the British Home Office (Immigration Authority). In defense of this leniency, Brockway noted that Britain's conscientious objector laws proved far more liberal than those in the U.S. Stonham, also a member of the Labour Party, refused to concede that those from the U.S. would be given any special treatment, declaring, "while they are here we will certainly look sympathetically at anything put forward. But we cannot treat them differently from other immigrants."[95] On July 4, 1968, the House of Commons entertained a similar debate over the fate of deserters, and British independence from the United States. MP Frank Allaun of Manchester questioned Under Secretary of State Elystan Morgan on the details of Tupper's arrest. In the lower House of Parliament, Allaun pressed the undersecretary as to whether Britain ought to follow the practice of other NATO countries that had granted asylum in similar situations, or whether the more liberal British laws ought to take precedence. Offering a similar rebuttal as Stonham, Morgan contended, "there is no evidence at all of political or conscience connections in this case."[96]

Dissention Within the Expatriate Ranks

Seeking to build international connections and offering a competing conception of patriotism, U.S. expats had to contend with deeply entrenched ideas and realities of organizing overseas and sacrificing principles for accommodation and diversity of political views. As a result, some *Stop It* and PACS members began to voice objections over the new focus on desertion and resistance. In West Germany, desertion produced less dissention within the ranks, resulting in an absorption into the broader West

[95] *Hansard Parliamentary Debates*, Lords, 5th ser., vol. 288 (1968), cols. 697-699.

[96] *Hansard Parliamentary Debates*, Commons, 5th ser., Vol. 767 (1968) cols. 1684-1685.

Germany anti-imperialist movement of the early 1970s that included outreach and defense of many African-American soldiers stationed the country.[97]

Containing division within expatriate groups grew even more difficult as resistance efforts within the antiwar movements in the United States grew. As factions emerged, individuals staked out different positions they believed, as expats, they were best suited to intervene on the war, and personal agendas and grudges became leverage to advance competing viewpoints. As one member noted, "you cannot have peace without social change," signaling that within the ranks of many antiwar organizations, internal struggles often hampered messages and effectiveness.[98] Organizations often had few resources yet many colorful personalities; what constituted the best path to engender radical social change was often contested within the rank and file.[99]

Pincus's push to focus primarily on draft resistance threatened the delicate coalition of expats in London of all political persuasions: moderates, liberals, and radicals who agreed only on voicing opposition to the war and not much else. Taking a visible stand against the draft brought more attention to the organization, and members risked deportation, travel restrictions, or legal indictments, something moderates wanted to avoid.[100] Some members believed targeting British audiences, participating in the theater

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[97] Klimke, *The Other Alliance*, 108-143; Hoehn and Klimke, "A Call for Justice: The Racial Crisis in the Military and GI Movement," *A Breath of Freedom*, 143-170.

[98] Robert Hurwitt, "Stop It Gets Started," *Peace News*, December 29, 1967, Folder, " 202—activities of American Vietnam Deserters," Box 202, Archief Ton Regtien, IISH.

[99] One member described Pincus as "a nice guy, but tactless and rather arrogant at times." Peggy Duff to Maria Jolas, January 23, 1968 Microfilm, Reel #3, Paris American Committee to Stop WarRecords, WHS. This sentiment was echoed in many of the private letters and remembrances exchanged among expat activists after Pincus's suicide in May 1972. Clancy Sigal, "Harry Pincus Obituary," 1972; Heinz Norden, "Harry Pincus Obituary," June 1972, folder 5, box 1; Letter, Henry Schwarzschild to Jack Colhoun [with attached letter], May 19, 1972; Letter, Jack Colhoun to Henry Schwarzschild, June 3, 1972, folder 1, Box 4; Letter, Roger Williams to Jack Colhoun, Dee Knight, and Stan Pietlock, May 25, 1972, folder 4, Box 4, AMEX/Canada Records, WHS.

[100] Pincus was indicted 18 months later, forcing him to continue his activism in England for the foreseeable years. Edward Ranzal, "18 Indicted Here as Draft Evaders: 19th Charged With Illegally Wearing Military Uniform," *New York Times*, 30 May 1969, p. 3

of the absurd, and focusing on draft resistance to the exclusion of everything else risked making American expatriates irrelevant within a growing international social movement aimed at transforming the global community. Daniel Schechter, *Stop It*'s international secretary, was among the most vocal to this end, and sided with those in the organization who wanted to direct its energy to building a transnational coalition aimed at transforming society. In a letter to other antiwar groups in the U.S. and Europe, Schechter wrote that the "problems of organizing political activity among expatriates outside their own country has often led to fragmentation and splits…" He then elaborated, "a minority within the Stop It Committee would prefer to confine our efforts to supporting U.S. draft resistance and to aiding individual draft resisters as sort of combination liberal public relations firm and service agency," singling out Pincus and others within the organization who steered them toward the dangerous waters of aiding deserters and resisters.[101]

In the aftermath of the Tupper case, Group '68, an organization of moderate antiwar expats in London who supported the candidacy of Eugene McCarthy, entertained proposals to wholly transform into an organization supporting draft resisters and military deserters. Proponents cited recent developments in the United States where two candidates "affirmed they will continue the war," as leaving activists with no other choice to pursue civil disobedience.[102] However, the prospect rankled many of the "responsible business creative people and academics" within the group. Splitting the difference, Group '68 rejected the proposal but reaffirmed their support for the plight of the men who faced exile in a letter to the *Times*.[103] In it they lauded the efforts of the Liberal Party in Britain

[101] Letter, Daniel Schechter to SDS and other antiwar organizations, 17 January 1968, folder, "United Kingdom, 1967-1969; undated" box 55, SDS Records, WHS.

[102] Statement, "by Mark_____ prepared at the request of Group 68, but not accepted," September 23, 1968, folder, "Group 68—Americans in Britain Against the War in Vietnam; Executives Move for Peace in Vietnam," Box 2, Heinz Norden Papers, New York University, Tamiment Library, New York City, NY (Hereafter TL-NYU).

[103] Letter, Heinz Norden to *Times* (London) September 16, 1968, folder, "Group 68—Correspondence 1968," Box 2, Heinz Norden Papers,TL-NYU.

to try and move Whitehall away from supporting the U.S. in Vietnam and their willingness to assist Americans in trouble in Britain due to their draft or exile status. Group '68 admitted they were both gratified and "humiliated" since they as Americans were unable to do more to aid resisters, but justified the decision by citing sensitivities to the legal prohibitions that might spur passport difficulties or travel restrictions. As such it could only make "legal advice available to draft resisters, not to encourage, harbor, aid and abet them."[104] To this end, Norden and Group '68 also provided more financial and logistical assistance to SUPPORT. Norden, convinced SUPPORT operated within the law and declaring Group '68 stood for what it claimed, directed financial support to the draft counseling efforts.[105]

Similarly Ira Morris, PACS's president, underscored the danger of associating with deserters in a letter to PACS founder and Secretary Maria Jolas in early 1968. He feared many people in France had already surmised PACS supported and worked with the deserter community. Morris urged that if such a group operated in Paris, PACS needed to disassociate itself from them, and make it clear to French authorities they had no involvement.[106] Morris and other PACS members' concerns became more pressing a few months later when PACS member Larry Cox urged the expats to sign onto a newly created French Union for American Deserters and Resisters (FUADR), an umbrella organization announced by deserters and supporters at a press conference on April 3, 1968.[107] Expressing dismay at not being included in the press conference and adding their

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[104] Ibid.

[105] Group '68, "Appraisal and Outlook," January 1969, folder, "Group 68—Minutes, Agendas," Box 2, Heinz Norden Papers, TL-NYU.

[106] Letter, Ira Morris to Maria Jolas, February 1, 1968, Paris American Committee to Stop War Records, Microfilm Reel #2, WHS.

[107] "Statement Re: PACS' Position Towards Draft Resisters and Army Deserters," April 11, 1968, Paris American Committee to Stop War Records, Microfilm Reel #6, WHS; Bethany, S. Keenan, "'At the Crossroads of World Attitudes,'" 69-70.

name to the organization, PACS drafted a statement a week later on draft resisters and deserters explaining the decision. In it, Morris explained PACS had received a warning from the Prefecture to not participate in what was believed to be a political event. Morris further stated PACS sought legal advice on the issue and would have added its name to the organizations composing FUADR, if he and others had understood French organizations, rather than the American PACS, planned on taking the lead in the creation and operation of the organization.[108] Morris concluded the statement by inviting PACS members to discuss the issue of supporting deserters at a meeting at the end of the month.

At the subsequent executive PACS executive meeting, discussion proved heated as some members raised the possibility such an association with leftists might discredit PACS and undermine their legitimacy to be an American voice based in Europe against the war. PACS membership narrowly approved the proposal to associate with FUADR at the meeting, and refined it at the May 9, 1968 Executive Committee Meeting to give the PACS greater latitude to distance itself if FUADR partook in activities not in their best interest.[109]

Organizational problems and government reprisals were not the only barriers confronting expatriates from successfully building and participating in the desertion and resistance network. Class tensions and assumptions posed a substantial barrier in enlisting more Americans to aid and finance the network and the inability to fully empathize with the plight and circumstances of the men who arrived in foreign cities. Clancy Sigal, a blacklisted American writer who lived in London since the red scare of the 1950s, recalled his work with deserters began after visiting some friends in the U.S., whose sons

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[108] "Statement re: PACS Position toward Draft Resisters and Army Deserters," April 11, 1968, Paris American Committee to Stop War Records, Microfilm Reel #6, Wisconsin Historical Society, Madison, Wisconsin; Keenan, "'At the Crossroads of World Attitudes,'" 71.

[109] "PACS Executive Committee Meeting," Paris American Committee to Stop War Records, Microfilm Reel #6, Wisconsin Historical Society, Madison, Wisconsin; Keenan, "'At the Crossroads of World Attitudes,'" 71.

wrestled with the decision over accepting military induction.[110] Sigal contacted Max Watts, who urged him to create a desertion network in Great Britain, as Watts had done in West Germany. In trying to build and finance a British network, Sigal recalled that although antiwar sentiment proliferated among U.S. citizens at home and abroad by 1968, citizens with overseas financial interests and business reputations to protect shied away from aiding deserters, who were perceived as criminals, rather than fellow citizens.[111] In the beginning, Sigal admitted to having a "romantic" vision of deserters, which was quickly destroyed as the reality of the deserter's life, characterized by a lack of education or skills to obtain employment and their estrangement from their families, became readily evident to him.[112]

Linda Gordon was drawn to assist deserters due her previous work with the civil rights movement in the United States. Adhering to caution, she refrained from too closely associating with network organizers, maintaining ignorance of logistics, and limiting her involvement to shuttling deserters from one house to another.[113] Gordon recalled that many sympathetic expats tried to offer advice and protect the men based on their perceived notions of danger and morality. However, she realized over time that the men were not simpletons and, having served in the military, they had experience subverting authority. She recalled deserters could manipulate the situation to get whatever result they hoped to achieve, despite warnings they needed to be careful while in towns and

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[110] Oral History Interview with Clancy Sigal, interview by author, MP3 digital recording, Los Angles, CA, March 8, 2013; Radio Transcript, Clancy Sigal, "The American Deserters, Part I," BBC Radio Four, September 10, 1970, folder, "Clancy Sigal: The American Deserters, Radio Transmission 1970" (V), box 303, WRI archives, IISH.

[111] Oral History Interview with Clancy Sigal, interview by author, MP3 digital recording, Los Angles, CA, March 8, 2013.

[112] Clancy Sigal, "The American Deserters, Part I," BBC Radio Four, September 10, 1970, folder, "Clancy Sigal: The American Deserters, Radio Transmission 1970" (V), box 303, WRI archives, IISH.

[113] Oral History Interview with Linda Gordon, interview by author, MP3 digital recording, Washington, DC, January 3, 2014.

bars as they sought social interaction to break up their isolated and clandestine existence.[114]

With few job prospects, limited personal contacts, and a significant language barrier, personal isolation and estrangement from family members in the U.S. some deserters turned to crime, leading to a self-fulfilling prophecy that many of the men were part of a criminal element.[115] Deserters relied on assistance from groups like Resisters Inside the Army (RITA), FUADR, religious organizations like the Quaker Centre, sympathetic antiwar and leftist groups tied to antinuclear movement, and the French Communist Party.[116] PACS members Maria Jolas, Mary Jo Liebwitz, and Larry Cox personally helped the cause as well. Tony Clay, head of the Quaker Centre, served as a conduit for many deserters and the emerging desertion movement in Paris.

Clay recalled many American deserters who arrived in Paris showed up at the Centre, where he introduced them to other deserters. He remembered that over time, many of the former servicemen found an apartment together that quickly evolved into a crash pad with rampant drug use and other illegal activities, bringing it to the attention of the Paris police. It often fell to other deserters to monitor and intervene with one another when behaviors threatened the collective. Clay notes that some American deserters like Larry Cox, a deserter who resisted within the army and hoped to study in Paris before moving on to mission work in Africa, had a knack for ministering to fellow deserters. Clay believed Cox and others like him fulfilled a critical role as a social worker to the group, where other middle class, college educated expats failed.[117]

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[114] Ibid.

[115] Even the French Communist Party was less than enthusiastic to aid deserters seeing them as "illegal immigrants" who had no papers. Anonymous "The Dutch Connection," [unpublished manuscript on the GI underground network] in folder RUD 710,02, Rudi Dutschke Papers, HIS.

[116] Keenan, "'At the Crossroads of World Attitudes,'" 71and cf 81.

[117] Tony Clay, "Internationally Yours," [unpublished manuscript], pages 66-67, folder 10, Box 1, Michele Gibault Papers, WHS.

Conclusion

Despite the legal penalties for deserters and their advocates, as the Vietnam War continued, soldiers grew frustrated by the war and feared being deployed to Vietnam. Desertion rates accelerated after 1968 as the Vietnam War began to wind down with President Lyndon Johnson's decision to negotiate and withdraw troops and the implementation of President Richard Nixon's Vietnamization policy a year later. While many desertions occurred among troops stationed in Vietnam and Southeast Asia, rumors abounded that due to the war and the draft's unpopularity in the U.S., the dwindling number of U.S. troops needed for the war would be supplied from men already on active duty in places like Western Europe. Not wanting to be the "last man to die in Vietnam" many soldiers stationed in West Germany, Great Britain, Italy, and elsewhere sought an escape from the genuine possibility that their next duty station might be Saigon, a belief many who solicited deserters used to great effect.[118]

Confronting the U.S. military allowed members of the established antiwar U.S. community overseas who chose to participate in the ascending network to critique the dynamics of power and obligation in their home society. It also allowed many of the citizens and public officials in their host countries to challenge U.S. moral hegemony as well. In the campaign to assist and solicit deserters, their host countries sometimes worked as silent partners for the desertion and antiwar networks. Although maintaining an official commitment to NATO arrangements, the immigration and extradition allowances many countries, except West Germany, enacted during the late 1960s suggested stalwart allies agreed with the alternative vision circulated by other Americans,

[118] This quote is from John Kerry's Testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1971, see "Complete Testimony of Lt. John Kerry to Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Congressional Record (92nd Congress, 1st Session) April 22, 1971, pages, 179-210, online at http://www.lib.berkeley.edu/videodir/pacificaviet/kerry.pdf [accessed July 23, 2013]; Appy, *Working Class War*, 245-249. Spector, *After Tet: The Bloodiest Year in Vietnam*, 270-271. Flyer, "They Can't Send Me to Vietnam," Binder, Horlemann Vietnam, APO Archives, Free University, Berlin, Germany.

that the U.S. was an exemplar nation for the rest of the world, often on the side of good and justice in the Cold War, and it needed to begin acting accordingly with regard to its most vulnerable population.

With the arrival of deserters and draft resisters into foreign cities, the expatriate neighborhood was changing. The working class deserters quickly supplanted the older expatriate networks and became the new face of the American abroad. News outlets reported on the rise of deserters and gravitated to the human-interest appeal of men who stood on principle to avoid service in the military and made their way in foreign lands with little social or financial support. Antiwar politicians used the men as examples of bravery and principle, while their pro-war counterparts denounced the deserters and resisters as a new breed of coward who had made their decision to leave the country, voting with their feet to forfeit their citizenship. The pliability of expatriate image now absorbed this new sensationalized depiction of deserter and resister who left the country, conflating the two. Just as expats of the 1950s and early 1960s were disparaged as tax cheats, ugly Americans, or fellow travelers, overseas Americans by the early 1970s were now assumed to be there because they were a coward who refused to serve in Vietnam, and had the money and resources to escape to Canada or Western Europe and wait out the war.

CHAPTER FIVE
FROM THE POLITICS OF THE STREET TO THE POLITICS OF THE COCKTAIL PARTY: U.S. EXPATRIATE PROTESTS AFTER 1968

As the world learned of the atrocities committed by U.S. soldiers in a South Vietnamese village called My Lai, the North Vietnamese government sent two of the survivors, Pham Thi Lien and Vo Thi Lien, on a global tour to personalize the war and shape global opinion of the DRV and NLF.[1] As they toured cities throughout Western Europe, antiwar organizations, religious groups, and local leftist parties hosted events and receptions for the women. In February 1970, the British Communist Party hosted an event at London's Conway Hall featuring speeches by several antiwar activists, and brought the Vietnamese women into contact with several American expatriates opposed to the war.

Among the Americans present was Heinz Norden, a U.S. citizen with a history of social justice activism extending to the 1930s, who now headed an American antiwar group called "Group '68." In prepared remarks at the gathering, Norden told the audience of his conflicted feelings of even attending the event, and explicitly stated he did not share the views of, nor wish to be identified with, the organizers of the meeting. To justify his presence that evening, Norden spoke on the cause of peace, and wanted to join others committed to that vision. As the speech proceeded, he contended the war in Vietnam was not the true embodiment of the United States and, "despite the blood on its hands, America is still a great country."[2] On the tragedy of My Lai, Norden declared he abhorred the idea of finding fault with his government's actions, as right and wrong were

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[1] Kendrick Oliver, *The My Lai Massacre in American History and Memory* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2006), 213-214; Bernd Greiner, *War Without Fronts: The USA in Vietnam* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2009), passim; Marilyn Young, *The Vietnam Wars, 1945-1990* (New York: Harper Collins, 1991), 243-244; John Prados, *Vietnam: The History of An Unwinnable War* (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 2009), 351.

[2] Speech, Heinz Norden, "To Victims of My Lai Massacre," February 20, 1970, folder, "Group 68—Bulletins/Public Statements/Press Releases/petitions 1968-1973," Box 2, Heinz Norden Papers, New York University, Tamiment Library, New York City, NY (Hereafter, TL-NYU).

not on separate sides in the conflict, and his heart went out to all victims of the cruel and unjust war, including U.S. soldiers. He noted that he was ashamed of his country, and hoped once the war has ended future atrocities could be avoided.

The FBI's assessment that expatriate protests were a "spent force" by early 1969, was only partially accurate.[3] While *Stop It* was reeling from financial distress, PACS disbanded with the commencement of peace talks, and many U.S. activists in West Germany integrated into the broader desertion movement and network, expatriate opposition at the war's conclusion proved more difficult to locate. Apart from the high profile events of the Moratorium Demonstrations, the aftermath of the Cambodia Invasion, and the Vietnam Vigil, much of expatriate activism retreated to small scale gatherings and interactions among a well-educated, highly mobile elite. The close associations fostered intimate discussions among cosmopolitans as to the direction and course of U.S. foreign policy. However, at times, such venues also gave way to pettiness and personal agendas that clouded and prevented meaningful actions. It allowed a select few to maintain power and the opportunity to continue shaping the message, often crowding out other expatriate voices such as the growing deserter and resister community.

In these social circles, expats crafted and debated visions of U.S. foreign policy, often aided by influential transnational thinkers who inhabited the social circles at the frontier of the U.S.'s empire.[4] Here, antiwar expats offered a counterpoint to the administration's claims that U.S. credibility was at stake if they abandoned an ally, by continuing to show how the war damaged U.S. prestige and goodwill the country enjoyed

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[3] FBI Memo, "Harry George Pincus," May 9, 1969, Folder, "Harry G. Pincus FBI File," Box 7645, RG 65: Records of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD (Hereafter, NARAII).

[4] Charles S. Maier, *Among Empires: American Ascendancy and Its Predecessors* (Cambridge, MA; Harvard University Press, 2006), 20-21, 36.

since the Second World War. At events like the gathering in London where Norden spoke, many expats took pains to try and remind the public the U.S. still possessed admirable qualities, despite the war's destruction. In protests, meetings, cocktail parties, and publications after 1968, expats encountered the prevalent view the world no longer looked at the U.S. as the defender of the oppressed and marginalized. Focusing attention on the U.S.'s human rights record in the war, people like Norden, Maria Jolas, and others believed their greatest contribution to the antiwar effort was to speak on behalf of the war's victims: American deserters and draft resisters and the Vietnamese people.[5] In fulfilling this niche, expats continue to maximize their position on the frontier of empire to advance an alternative vision of the appropriate role of the U.S. in global affairs.

Americans Organized Abroad

With *Stop It* on the verge of collapse due to internal strife over the issue of resistance and financial difficulties in early 1968, Maria Jolas and Harry Pincus entertained the possibility of combining efforts and resources to create an umbrella organization for expatriates throughout the continent.[6] In December 1967, PACS placed an ad in the *International Herald Tribune* summoning Americans interested in serious antiwar coordination to gather in Paris the weekend of January 5-7, 1968 under the banner, "U.S. Out of Vietnam."[7] Expats from Switzerland, Italy, Denmark, as well as

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[5] Barbara J. Keys, *Reclaiming American Virtue: The Human Rights Revolution of the 1970s* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2014), 182-183.

[6] The papers of Marshall Bloom, an American student at the London School of Economics and friend of Harry Pincus contained several pieces of PACS ephemera including newsletters and handbills. See folder 9, "Vietnam Peace Efforts in London and Paris," box 7, Marshall Bloom Papers, Amherst College Archives and Special Collections, Amherst, MA (hereafter, Amherst). *Stop It* had come to PACS's attention immediately in Spring 1967, when a PACS member noticed their formation announcement in the paper, and forwarded it to Jolas with a note attached asking, "Do you know this group in England? Should we contact them?" Note with Stop It formation announcement attached, Terri Raymond to Maria Jolas, 24 June 1967, folder, "Great Britain," Box 3, PACS Records, Wisconsin Historical Society, Madison, WI (Hereafter, WHS).

[7] American Opposition Abroad, "Meeting Minutes," 6-7 January 1968, Microfilm, Reel #3, Paris American Committee to Stop War Records, WHS.

cities and towns throughout England and France inquired about the meeting and made arrangements to attend. Notably absent were members of the U.S. Campaign, although an American student from Tübingen attended.[8]

On the appointed weekend, approximately fifty Americans converged on Paris for a meeting purportedly sponsored by both *Stop It* and PACS. The conference opened with a roundtable led by Marshall Sahlins, the University of Michigan anthropology professor instrumental in organizing the first campus teach-in in March 1965. Opening the conference, he expressed a clear understanding of where the antiwar movement now stood at the dawn of 1968. Stressing action, rather than dialogue, Sahlins contended resistance and direct action defined and embodied the future of the movement at home and abroad.[9]

After the opening forum, members of PACS and *Stop It* and representatives from other groups reviewed their actions and memberships over the previous year, discussing what had proven effective and what had been less so, and entertained ideas on how to make their "ideas resound in America." One of the stark differences to come from this discussion was the drastically different political climate expats confronted in respective countries. Whereas Americans in Paris had to register with the local prefecture under the 1901 Law of Associations that required foreign organizations to be monitored, no such requirement existed for *Stop It*. However, the discussion revealed Americans in Paris received greater sympathy from both French citizens and government, owing to the vocal opposition to the war by officials and intellectuals. In contrast, *Stop It* conveyed frustration at their ability to make only incremental progress among the British public.[10]

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[8] AOA Sign-In Sheet, January 6, 1968, Microfilm, Reel #3, Paris American Committee to Stop War Records, WHS.

[9] American Opposition Abroad, "Meeting Minutes," 6-7 January 1968, Microfilm, Reel #3, Paris American Committee to Stop War Records, WHS.

[10] Ibid.

Daniel Goodwin, a U.S. citizen in Tübingen, told of the lack of West German support for antiwar sentiment. He indicated German students and the APO offered the most visible opposition to the Vietnam War in West Germany, and places like Tübingen had no distinctly American opposition to the war. He indicated, however, some possibilities might exist for expatriate opposition in Heidelberg, which had a larger U.S. military and student presence.[11] The U.S. Campaign in West Berlin had already moved in this direction by early 1968, working with other international efforts to solicit deserters.[12]

Addressing the differences in each group's constituency, Jolas pointedly asked members of *Stop It*, "Why haven't more middle aged Americans in London joined?"[13] To which the Americans in Britain responded they did not know how to reach them and they did not "move in their circles."[14] Reciprocating, *Stop It* members inquired why PACS had not done more with draft resistance. PACS, whose membership generally consisted of Americans older than draft age, indicated they too had difficulty recruiting younger Americans into their ranks, as students typically lived in the country only for a year.[15] Furthermore, the said the issue of draft resistance had little resonance in France, since the De Gaulle government already opposed the war, and allowed deserters to enter the country. In Britain, they noted, draft resistance offered another avenue to force the British

[11] Ibid.

[12] Martin Klimke, *The Other Alliance: Student Protest in West Germany and the United States in the Global 1960s* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), 83-86.

[13] American Opposition Abroad, "Meeting Minutes," 6-7 January 1968, Microfilm, Reel #3, Paris American Committee to Stop War Records, WHS.

[14] Ibid.

[15] Memo, Maria Jolas to Members of the PACS Steering Committee, n.d., Microfilm, Reel #3, Paris American Committee to Stop War Records, WHS.

government to distance itself from the United States, by allowing resisters to stay in the country or emigrate into it.[16]

In enumerating these differences and obstacles, overseas Americans arrived at areas of agreement on how best to proceed. The attendees adopted the name "American Opposition Abroad" (AOA) and discussed the nature of its mission and extent of possible collaboration across countries. They agreed to endorse the Stockholm Peace Appeal ratified in 1967, which called for an unequivocal withdrawal of U.S. forces from Vietnam and the right of self-determination for the Vietnamese people. In addition, they adopted several resolutions, including: asking members to establish draft counseling centers in their host countries, which would include a committee to study the issue of getting Americans to turn in their draft cards; investigating the issue of giving financial support to the National Liberation Front and North Vietnam for medical supplies; and a resolution supporting the creation of a pamphlet urging Americans not to commit atrocities in Vietnam.[17] For their first major coordinated action, AOA adopted a resolution to sponsor a continental protest in February to coincide with George Washington's Birthday to once again link the American revolutionary struggle for independence with Vietnam's struggle for liberation.[18]

Following the conference, however, the general membership of *Stop It* was caught off guard by the proceedings. After receiving a copy of the AOA meeting notes, *Stop It* International Secretary Daniel Schechter wrote Maria Jolas, and informed her Pincus's

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[16] American Opposition Abroad, "Meeting Minutes," 6-7 January 1968, Microfilm, Reel #3, Paris American Committee to Stop War Records, WHS.

[17] American Opposition Abroad, "Meeting Minutes," 6-7 January 1968, Microfilm, Reel #3, Paris American Committee to Stop War Records, WHS; AOA, "Press Release," January 7, 1968, Microfilm, Reel #3, Paris American Committee to Stop War Records, WHS

[18] Meeting Minutes, Americans Organized Abroad, 7 January 1968, Microfilm Reel #3, Paris American Committee to Stop War Records, WHS.

claims of representing *Stop It* at the meeting and taking an active part were well beyond the scope of what had been approved by the group at the December meeting. According to Schechter, *Stop It* had only authorized two observers to attend the meeting in Paris, take notes, and report back to the group.[19] This view was confirmed by another *Stop It* member, Henry Wortis, who told Peggy Duff of the ICDP that Pincus "apparently just took a group of his people to Paris."[20] Schechter indicated support might exist within *Stop It* to pursue such an arrangement due to interest in building connections with other Americans abroad. However, he concluded the letter by stressing a desire to continue a dialogue with PACS, but reiterating that *Stop It* had made no formal decision with regard to AOA.[21]

Schechter's terse response to AOA thwarted the attempt to form a powerful expatriate antiwar collective and harness the member groups' resources. AOA's first meeting would also be its last. This first opportunity for the U.S. expatriate community to coordinate an antiwar campaign among the younger, more radical and class-conscience antiwar activists, and their more middle class, liberally oriented counterparts failed. Over the coming weeks and months, as antiwar activists unleashed the rebellions and demonstrations that characterized the "global 1968," expatriates participated in the uprisings within their localities rather than coordinating a continental-wide effort where U.S. citizens might be front and center, marching under their own banner.

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[19] Letter, Daniel Schechter to Maria Jolas, January 17, 1968, Microfilm, Reel #3, Paris American Committee to Stop War Records, WHS.

[20] Letter, Peggy Duff to Maria Jolas January 23, 1968, Microfilm, Reel #3, Paris American Committee to Stop War Records, WHS.

[21] Daniel Schechter to Maria Jolas, January 17, 1968, Microfilm, Reel #3, Paris American Committee to Stop War Records, WHS.

Group '68

In December 1967, Senator Eugene McCarthy (D-MN) declared his candidacy for President of the United States, offering himself as a peace alternative to President Johnson. The antiwar movement, and those dissatisfied with the president's handling of the war, made McCarthy's candidacy viable at a time incumbent presidents were rarely challenged in their party's primary.[22] Nearly winning the New Hampshire primary in March, McCarthy exposed Johnson's vulnerability on the issue of the war, and not long after, Senator Robert Kennedy (D-NY) entered the race, adding another antiwar voice to party's contest.[23]

The spilt in the Democratic Party over the war reverberated overseas and starkly contrasted with the enthusiasm and idealism of overseas U.S. citizens during 1964 election. In Paris, Democrats Abroad under the continued guidance of Al Davidson channeled its efforts into maintaining party unity and discipline, despite the spilt on the war. A meeting in early March revealed the extent of tensions among party elites who were divided among the three candidates: Johnson, McCarthy, and Kennedy, and were unsure how to proceed and maximize its efforts to excite expats about the upcoming campaign.[24] A few weeks after his close call in the New Hampshire Primary, and sensing the party was divided on the war, President Johnson addressed the nation on policy changes in Vietnam. He outlined a modest increase of U.S. troops to Vietnam, the suspension of bombing, and offered to start peace negotiations. At the end of the speech,

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[22] On Eugene McCarthy's presidential campaign, Theodore H. White, *The Making of the President, 1968* (New York: Harper Perennial, 1969, reprint 2004),92-101, 311-315; Tom Wells, *The War Within: America's Battle Over Vietnam* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), 223-227.

[23] On Robert Kennedy's decision to enter the 1968 race, Wells, *The War Within*, 250; White, *The Making of the President, 1968,* 183-194.

[24] Letter, Alfred E. Davidson to Executive Committee of Democratic Party in France, March 26, 1968, folder 1, Box 88 (88.1), James Jones Papers, Harry Ransom Center, University of Texas, Austin (Hereafter, HRC).

he stunned the nation by withdrawing his candidacy. The goodwill Johnson enjoyed four years earlier among the diverse constituencies within the Democratic Party now spilled into a raucous fight for the nomination between the Party establishment and its antiwar faction that continued to the national convention in Chicago in August.[25]

McCarthy supporters in London worked exhaustively promoting his candidacy. In leaflets and flyers, McCarthy partisans recalled the disappointment they felt having worked for Johnson's election in 1964 after which he continued to pursue the war in Vietnam. Not wanting to get caught in "this kind of trap again," supporters argued McCarthy was an alternative to the "establishment stooges"—Democrat Hubert Humphrey and Republican Nelson Rockefeller—who remained committed to the stale issue of anti-Communism. At the same time, McCarthy's supporters in London decried antiwar activists who claimed no difference existed among the candidates and professed a willingness to sit the election out, as a product of "infantile leftism."[26]

McCarthy's overseas supporters invoked his statements and positions as a way to restore U.S.'s image abroad.[27] An open letter published in U.S. newspapers in mid-August, supporters appealed to the delegates gathered at the party's convention in Chicago by citing Europeans' admiration for the Minnesota Senator. Offering an international perspective, Americans Abroad for McCarthy reported "with each of his

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[25] Following Robert Kennedy's assassination in early June 1968, McCarthy became the favorite among Democratic Party members who wanted to challenge the candidacy of Vice President Hubert Humphrey, who had the support of the Democratic Party establishment, following Johnson's withdrawal. However, party rules at the time gave more weight to various political machines and interest groups, than the outcome of primaries. This would change after 1968. Walter LaFeber, *The Deadly Bet: LBJ, Vietnam, and the 1968 Election* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005), passim; Prados, *Vietnam,* 256-260; White, *The Making of the President, 1968,* passim.

[26] Group '68, "Some Plain Speaking about McCarthy," July 10, 1968, folder, "Group 68—Americans Abroad for McCarthy—1968," Box 2, Heinz Norden Papers, TL-NYU.

[27] Letter, Heinz Norden to Ella Winter, June 26, 1968, folder, "Group 68—Correspondence 1968," Box 2, Heinz Norden Papers, TL-NYU.

victories the belief grows that the world may once again have confidence in America,"[28] and declared the senator's positions as in line with their ideal vision of the United States to which they hoped to return someday.

Not satisfied to work only through political channels to end the war, Ruth Lassoff, the secretary for Americans Abroad for McCarthy, hosted a dinner for around 20 Americans in London. All present agreed the current situation in Vietnam required more than simply supporting the McCarthy campaign. However, no consensus about future action was reached beyond that.[29] The group reconvened a week later at Lassoff's flat to revisit and discuss more ideas. The meeting unfortunately devolved into chaos, bickering, and infighting due to different political and doctrinal stances, and disagreements over what actions might prove most effective. The scene, according to Lassoff, became another "Stop It situation with grown ups."[30]

Realizing the organization might falter before it had begun, a third meeting was arranged in late June. At this meeting, Ira Morris, then PACS president, attended to give the organization support and guidance. Telling the assembled activists of the growing pains PACS experienced in bringing together diverse constituencies on the issue of the war, Morris said advertising allowed expats in Paris to broaden their appeal beyond the "left wing." Morris also cautioned that whatever side projects PACS had pursued they

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[28] Group '68, "Open Letter to the Democratic National Convention," July 19, 1968, folder, "Group 68—Americans Abroad for McCarthy—1968," Box 2, Heinz Norden Papers, TL-NYU.

[29] Letter, Ruth Lassoff to Heinz Norden, June 12, 1968 folder, "Group 68—Correspondence—1968," Box 2, Heinz Norden Papers, TL-NYU; Memo, Ruth Lassoff to Group '68 Steering Committee, July 22, 1968, folder, "Group 68—Americans in Britain Against the War in Vietnam; Executives Move for Peace in Vietnam," Box 2, Heinz Norden Papers, TL-NYU; Letter, Ruth Lassoff to Friends, August 7, 1968, folder, "Group 68—Americans Abroad for McCarthy—1968," Box 2, Heinz Norden Papers, New York University, TL-NYU.

[30] Memo, Ruth Lassoff to Group '68 Steering Committee, July 22, 1968, folder, "Group 68—Americans in Britain Against the War in Vietnam; Executives Move for Peace in Vietnam," Box 2, Heinz Norden Papers, TL-NYU.

never lost sight of its central purpose: to bring the Vietnam War to an end.[31] With Morris's encouragement, the London expats proposed several projects. Some, like holding street performances "with actors dressed as Vietnamese," were rejected. Others like a symbolic washing of the American flag, and Pincus's new project of creating an "American Centre" in London were tabled and referred for future study.[32] Attendees did agree to write and submit a newspaper advertisement supporting Dr. Benjamin Spock, one of the Boston Five, and to distribute leaflets at an upcoming Fourth of July celebration for Americans in London. Most significantly, attendees agreed to give the organization structure by establishing a steering committee that included both Clancy Sigal and Pincus to guide its development and channel the ideas into action.[33] Undecided on a name for the collective, the group chose the tongue-in-cheek moniker, "Committee for Independent Americans."[34]

Throughout summer and fall, Group '68, as the organization became known, encountered a familiar problem: uniting diverse constituencies under the antiwar umbrella. Heinz Norden, then a well-respected German-American businessman who ran a medical antique business in London, served as the organization's de facto chairman. Norden maintained the respect of the core people involved with Group '68. He displayed sympathy for the young insurgent radicals who wanted to pursue direct action and revolutionary paths to ending the war. At the same time, Norden's connection to the old left, as a tenement organizer in New York City during the 1930s and 1940s, gave him

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[31] Ibid.

[32] Memo, "Towards an Independent American Centre in London," June 30, 1968, folder, "Group 68—Americans in Britain Against the War in Vietnam; Executives Move for Peace in Vietnam," Box 2, Heinz Norden Papers, TL-NYU.

[33] Meeting Minutes, Group '68, June 23, 1968, folder, "Group 68—Americans in Britain Against the War in Vietnam; Executives Move for Peace in Vietnam," Box 2, Heinz Norden Papers, New York University, TL-NYU.

[34] Ibid.

credibility with the Red Scare refugees who moved within the organization.[35] In describing Group '68 to a friend, Norden said the 40-strong group were "a mildly radicalized middle class"[36] who "still think of themselves as 'liberals,' but realize that this term has little meaning today and seems prepared to move much farther to the left, though without yet involving themselves in the 'new revolution,' which on the other hand they certainly do not reject." What unified the group, according to Norden, was its frustration with "establishment American groups" in London.[37] Despite this self-reflection, an American draft resister described Group '68 members as "the people at cocktail parties with Paul Newman and Gore Vidal,"[38] suggesting they believed members wanted to end the war but did not want to dirty their hands with the work street activism.

Just as Group '68 organized, the Soviet Union invaded Czechoslovakia and the violence flared in the streets of Chicago at the Democratic National Convention, threatening to un-spool the Group '68 coalition. Calling three emergency meetings to formulate a response to the unfolding international events, Norden argued in favor of issuing a strong statement denouncing the Soviet invasion. Norden feared the rank and file of Group '68 might resist a strong statement as distracting from the group's core mission to focus on the Vietnam War. He also worried that the possibility some members

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[35] Heinz Norden, "Housing for Defense or Defense for Housing," December 26, 1940; Heinz Norden, "Housing on the Skids," [n.d.]; "City Wide Tenants Council Resolution on Housing and Peace, June 20, 1940; and City Wide Tenants Council Housing, "Statement on Defense Housing and Conscription" October 19, 1940, folder, "City wide Tenants Council Housing and World War II 1940," Box 1, Heinz Norden Papers, TL-NYU.

[36] Group 68, "Appraisal and Outlook," January 1969, folder, "Group 68—Minutes, Agendas," Box 2, Heinz Norden Papers, TL-NYU.

[37] Letter, Heinz Norden to Ella Winter, June 26, 1968, folder, "Group 68—Correspondence 1968," Box 2, Heinz Norden Papers, TL-NYU.

[38] Letter, Marvin Bernstein to Jack Colhoun, Dee Knight, and Tony Wagner, December 10, 1972, folder 4, Box 4, AMEX/Canada Records, WHS.

might be reluctant to take a position where the organization vocally opposed Soviet aggression in Central Europe while opposing the U.S. war in Vietnam, since it might have opened them to allegations of naiveté on the question of Soviet interference in Vietnam. However, Norden and others believed a statement might position Group '68 as honest brokers on issues of U.S. foreign policy would grant some legitimacy in the antiwar scene, and blunt accusations of being communist sympathizers.[39] Resolving the impasse, Group '68 sent a telegram to the Soviet ambassador in London registering opposition to invasion and picketed a British Labour Party rally with shouts of "Russians out of Czechoslovakia! Americans out of Vietnam! Why two Labour policies on aggression?," accusing British officials of being hypocrites on matters of policy against aggression.[40]

In the aftermath of the Democratic Convention, Group '68 directed its sharpest criticism at the U.S. Democratic Party. More than disappointed in the nomination of Hubert Humphrey, Johnson's Vice President, over Eugene McCarthy, the organization saw little hope for a change in policies on the war. In a press release titled "Saigon-Prague-Chicago," Group '68 announced, "liberal Americans no longer have a presidential candidate." Expressing concern over the violence and the lost hope of the last liberal candidate, Group '68 implored the reader that the "madness must stop."[41] From the vantage point of overseas, self-professed moderate liberals, the situation appeared anarchic in all reaches of the world, with no ability of U.S., or any world power, to restore order.

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[39] Letter, Heinz Norden to Friends of Group 68, "USSR Invasion of Czechoslovakia, August 21, 1968, folder, "Group 68—Correspondence 1968," Box 2, Heinz Norden Papers, TL-NYU; Group '68, Meeting Minutes, August 25, 1968, folder, "Group 68—Minutes, Agendas," Box 2, Heinz Norden Papers, TL-NYU.

[40] Group '68, Meeting Minutes, August 25, 1968, folder, "Group 68—Minutes, Agendas," Box 2, Heinz Norden Papers, TL-NYU.

[41] Letter, Heinz Norden to Friends of Group 68, "USSR Invasion of Czechoslovakia, August 21, 1968, folder, "Group 68—Correspondence 1968," Box 2, Heinz Norden Papers, TL-NYU.

Moratorium Demonstrations, 1969

The failure of the AOA to materialize and the seeming inability to change the trajectory of the war through political channels left expatriates dispirited by 1969, ironically, as public opinion in the U.S. and abroad turned against the war. With the outpouring of international and domestic opposition, expatriates who had positioned themselves as possessing a specific expertise due to their experience and encounters abroad were now squeezed by the rising tide of international opposition to the war and the U.S. government who kept their activities under surveillance. This made their contributions less distinguishable from other critics of the war, and this inability to intervene in meaningful ways was fully on display in large-scale demonstrations after 1968.

Continuing the tradition begun five years earlier with the Vietnam Day Committee's "International Days of Protest", the Vietnam Moratorium Committee (VMC) planned major demonstrations for October 15 and November 15, 1969. The plan called for simultaneous demonstrations to take place throughout the country to contrast with the clashes between protesters and police at the Democratic National Convention in Chicago the year before, and the "Days of Rage," a violent protest intended to "bring the war home" also slated for October 1969.[42] Planners conceived the Moratorium Demonstrations as a moment during the month for U.S. citizens from all parts of the country to pause and "halt business for a day," in order to reflect on the ongoing war. They specifically hoped to entice "ordinary Americans": housewives, business owners, teachers, clergy, and others from diverse socio-economic classes and throughout the country to participate to show the breadth of opposition.[43]

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[42] Wells contrasts the violence of Chicago with the more peaceful and mainstream of the Moratorium Demonstrations that occurred in October and November 1969. Wells, *The War Within,* 370.

[43] Wells, *The War Within*, 370-375; Doug Rossinow, *The Politics of Authenticity: Liberalism, Christianity, and the New Left in America* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 234-239; Melvin Small, *Johnson, Nixon, and the Doves* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1988), 182-187.

In anticipation of the event, overseas Americans inquired about staging solidarity protests. The Vietnam Moratorium Committee received letters from expats in London, Heidelberg, Geneva, and even Franco's Spain, seeking input on how they might best support the demonstrations in the United States.[44] Most letters came from high school and college students. The students provided an assessment of antiwar efforts in their particular country, including the extent to which they knew of or worked with other antiwar groups. Most indicated they planned to circulate a letter and send it to the U.S. embassy, or wear black armbands as a symbol of protest on October 15 rather than gathering for a full-scale protest.

The letters reveal many students, perhaps owing to their transient presence overseas and the collapse of organized expat dissent the previous year, had very little memory or insight as to what transpired over the previous five years among expatriates opposed to the war. Students in Switzerland asked the VMC for information on similar groups in Europe.[45] Students in Heidelberg told the VMC there is "great potential here, but we are starting from scratch."[46] Even students at LSE, once the epicenter of expat opposition in London, reported, "We feel a large number of American students in Britain could be mobilized into a cohesive force opposing the war."[47]

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[44] Letter, Dale Lasden to Vietnam Moratorium Day Committee, October 14, 1969; Letter, G. Zanier Pitcher to Vietnam Moratorium Day Committee, October 16, 1969; Letter, Paul Reinhart to Vietnam Moratorium Day Committee, October 20, 1969; Letter, Linda Picone to Vietnam Moratorium Day Committee, October 27, 1969; Letter, Elizabeth Gala and Nancy Harmon to Vietnam Moratorium Day Committee, October 28, 1969; Pamphlet, Valerie King, "Madrid Americans for Peace," [n.d.—November 1969?], folder, "Foreign Correspondence, 1969-1970" Box 3, Vietnam Moratorium Committee Records, WHS.

[45] Letter, Linda Picone to Vietnam Moratorium Day Committee, October 27, 1969, folder, "Foreign Correspondence, 1969-1970" Box 3, Vietnam Moratorium Committee Record, WHS.

[46] Letter, Dale Lasden to Vietnam Moratorium Day Committee, October 14, 1969, folder, "Foreign Correspondence, 1969-1970" Box 3, Vietnam Moratorium Committee Records, WHS.

[47] Letter, Paul Reinhart to Vietnam Moratorium Day Committee, October 20, 1969, folder, "Foreign Correspondence, 1969-1970" Box 3, Vietnam Moratorium Committee Records, WHS.

On the appointed days, U.S. embassies again became the focus of moratorium demonstrations, and reports received by the U.S. State Department indicate widespread gatherings and peaceful protests that extended well beyond the usual locations that commonly saw actions in recent years. Reports arrived from embassies and consulates in Africa, Latin America, as well as Europe. In Luxembourg, students from Miami University of Ohio participated in protests and submitted a petition to the U.S. ambassador.[48] Six U.S. students participated in demonstration in Dublin, Ireland.[49] In Greece, 15 U.S. citizens gathered outside the U.S. embassy with placards, despite Greek martial law prohibiting political demonstrations at the time. Greek police detained three of the American protesters, who ultimately required embassy officials to bail them out.[50] The most concerning development for U.S. government officials the participation in protests by U.S. Peace Corps volunteers.[51] Volunteers in both Kenya and Bolivia staged protests, the nature of which garnered interest from White House, as Nixon approved a meeting with Peace Corp Director in Bolivia in order to obtain a full report on the activities of the young people in that country.[52]

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[48] Cable, U.S. Embassy in Luxembourg to Secretary of State, "Vietnam Moratorium—Possible Demonstration at Embassy," October 13, 1969, folder, "Moratorium October 15 1969," Box 357, National Security Council Files—Subject Files, Richard Nixon Presidential Library, Yorba Linda, CA (Hereafter, NLRMN).

[49] Cable, U.S. Embassy in Dublin, Ireland to Secretary of State, "October 15 Moratorium Demonstration," October 13, 1969, folder, "Moratorium October 15 1969" Box 357, National Security Council Files—Subject Files, NLRMN.

[50] Cable, U.S. Embassy in Athens, Greece to Secretary of State, "October 15 Moratorium Demonstration," October 13, 1969, folder, "Moratorium October 15 1969" Box 357, National Security Council Files—Subject Files, NLRMN.

[51] Memo, Henry Kissinger to President Nixon "Peace Corp Demonstration," and Cable, U.S. Consulate in Nairobi, Kenya to Secretary of State, "October 15 Moratorium," October 15, 1969, folder, "Moratorium October 15 1969" Box 357, National Security Council Files—Subject Files, NLRMN.

[52] Ibid.

Unsurprisingly, the largest Moratorium Demonstrations overseas occurred in London, Paris, and Toronto. An estimated 200 people turned out in Toronto, and consulate officials reported the protest received widespread coverage in the Canadian media. Officials also noted considerable participation in other cities throughout the country. Reporting on events in Toronto, bureaucrats indicated the usual attendees were present, but so too were people who appeared "unconnected with any group or organization," but nonetheless attributed the protest to "communist and student groups."[53]

In Paris, an estimated 700-800 people turned out for a "mostly orderly" demonstration at the U.S. Embassy.[54] Officials noted the presence of U.S. students at the protest, singling out students from Rutgers, Columbia, Stanford, SUNY, and the University of Connecticut. In addition, the embassy received 366 petitions with 810 names that day, most from various ad hoc peace groups throughout the city. The assembled crowd sang songs including "God Bless America" and held posters with names of the American war dead.[55] Despite the largely peaceful protests, rumors abounded that access to the embassy and its grounds would be blocked and cleared by French policemen; a threat many believed to be valid, given the events of the previous year. Protesters trying to deposit petitions reported encountering token resistance by French police before being permitted to proceed. Similarly, a group of U.S. citizens

[53] Embassy officials reported to the State Department Montreal had 100 people turn out, 90 people in Ottawa, but no word yet from Vancouver. Cable, U.S. Embassy in Ottawa, Canada to Secretary of State, "Moratorium Report," October 15, 1969, folder, "Moratorium October 15 1969" Box 357, National Security Council Files—Subject Files, NLRMN; Airgram, AmConsul Toronto to Department of State, "Demonstrations at Consulate General," October 16, 1969, folder, "POL 23-8: CAN 1/1/67" Box 1947, RG 59: General Records of the Department of State—Central Foreign Policy Files, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD (Hereafter, NARA II).

[54] Cable, U.S. Embassy in Paris, France to Secretary of State, "October 15 Moratorium," October 15, 1969, folder, "Moratorium October 15 1969" Box 357, National Security Council Files—Subject Files, NLRMN.

[55] Ibid.

reported they were denied entrance to the embassy the following day.[56] Denying responsibility, U.S. Ambassador Sergeant Shriver attributed the actions to an "overzealous act on behalf of French police to block the embassy."[57]

In London, Group '68 served as the primary organizer of events on October 15 and November 15. Adhering to the overall theme of the demonstration, Group '68 worked with the British Council of Peace and the Vietnam Solidarity Committee to organize a "serious and solemn" protest against the war they titled "March Against Death."[58] Expats joined with other British organizations at the U.S. Embassy in Grosvenor Square. Later in the afternoon, both Heinz Norden and Harry Pincus led a procession to the Swedish Embassy and presented its staff with a bouquet of flowers in appreciation for the country's support of U.S. military deserters, once again utilizing political theater to present their message.[59]

Many historians of the antiwar movement have described the Moratorium Demonstrations' as a success due to turnout, harnessing dissent into a collective force after the events of 1968, and prompting a response by the Nixon administration in the form of his "Silent Majority Speech" that appealed to the U.S. public to continue

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[56] Letter, Maria Jolas, et. al. to Mr. Weiss, December 6, 1969, folder, "untitled folder," Box 13, series M88-202, Paris American Committee to Stop War Records, WHS.

[57] At the November 15 protest activists reported French police working with embassy officials refused entry to any "suspicious looking people," and told the assembled crowd only ten people at a time would be allowed to entered, and only after they left, would the next ten be permitted inside. In addition, French police arrested some outside. Cable, U.S. Embassy in Paris, France to Secretary of State, "October 15 Moratorium," October 15, 1969, folder, "Moratorium October 15 1969" Box 357, National Security Council Files—Subject Files, NLRMN.

[58] Press Release, Group '68, "Second Moratorium," folder, "Group 68—Bulletins/Public Statements/Press Releases/petitions 1968-1973," Box 2, Heinz Norden Papers, Tamiment Library, New York University; Group '68, "British Campaign Appeal for Moratorium Day Nov 1969," folder, "Other Organizations—The British-Vietnam Association (formerly British Campaign for Peace in Vietnam)," Box 4**,** Heinz Norden Papers, TL-NYU; and Group '68 Meeting Minutes, October 19, 1969, folder, "Group 68—Minutes, Agendas," Box 2, Heinz Norden Papers, TL-NYU.

[59] FBI Memo, "Harry George Pincus," November 20, 1969, Folder, "Harry G. Pincus FBI File," Box 7645, RG 65: Records of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, NARA II.

supporting the war.[60] Little violence was reported in most locations, marking a significant contrast with the trends of the previous year. Americans from various backgrounds participated; demonstrations occurred not only on the east and west coasts or on college campuses, but in "middle America," attesting to the widespread and growing opposition to the war.[61]

However, overseas participation in the demonstrations had mixed results. The demonstrations showcased wider participation, especially in foreign countries that had never experienced significant expatriate participation in demonstrations to that point in the war. Yet, with the new and inexperienced participants, many of the protests lacked unifying and organizing themes. Protests failed to elicit much public interest, especially in the media, a fact many embassies reported to DC. Both Maria Jolas and members of Group '68 also tried, with little success, to use the moment to revive and reinvigorate the antiwar presence of expats overseas, confirming that while public opinion turned against the war, interest in movement waned among expats.[62]

Invasion of Cambodia, May 1970

This lack of direction and increasing frustration was evident at protests the following spring when President Nixon announced the U.S. invasion of neutral Cambodia, a country North Vietnamese soldiers used to transit south. Nixon officials also believed the government of North Vietnam had set up a major operations center in the

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[60] Nixon's delivered the "silent majority" speech on November 3, 1969, approximately halfway between the two planned moratorium demonstrations. Richard Nixon: "Address to the Nation on the War in Vietnam," November 3, 1969. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=2303 [accessed 4 May 2014]

[61] Wells, *The War Within*, 370-375; Rossinow, *The Politics of Authenticity,* 234-239; Small, *Johnson, Nixon, and the Doves,* 182-187.

[62] Letter, Maria Jolas and Susan George to Fellow Americans, October 15, 1969, folder, "untitled folder," Box 13, series M88-202, Paris American Committee to Stop War Records, WHS.

country known to as a COSVN, to coordinate their military activity in the South.[63] Nixon's announcement rattled the U.S. public. Contradicting the president's recent assurances of bringing the war to a conclusion, it now appeared the administration intended to expand the war with no end in sight. The announcement once again spurred the antiwar movement, especially on college campuses, where protests erupted and turned violent. At Kent State University in Ohio four students were shot and killed by the Ohio National Guard. Similarly, two students at Jackson State in Mississippi were killed. The war had come home.

The image of young men and women being fired upon in the name of "law and order" brought international opposition to the war to a boil, and cemented global perceptions that the U.S. proved incapable of defending or justifying the war further.[64] Canadian activists in Vancouver, British Columbia staged a "mock invasion" of the United States. Overtaking border guards, war opponents "invaded" Blaine, Washington to symbolize the U.S. invasion of Cambodia.[65] Local police reported widespread destruction in the city as windows in local businesses were smashed and U.S. flags removed, provoking an international incident. Civic associations in Canada, embarrassed by the outbursts sent replacement flags, and the Canadian Parliament in Ottawa issued several formal apologies.[66]

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[63] This was often referred to as sending U.S. soldiers to find the "bamboo Pentagon" for North Vietnam, which never materialized or was substantiated. Prados, *Vietnam,* 363-367; Young, *The Vietnam Wars*, 245-253.

[64] Wells, *The War Within*, 424-427; James Miller, *Democracy is in the Streets: From Port Huron to the Siege of Chicago* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994), 310-311; Prados, *Vietnam,* 368; Young, *The Vietnam Wars*, 250-252; Kenneth Heineman, *Campus Wars: The Peace Movement at American State Universities* (New York: New York University Press, 1993), 237-256.

[65] Airgram, AmConsul Toronto to Department of State, "Demonstrations Week of May 5-9, 1970," May 13, 1970, folder, "POL 23-8/CAN/ 3/1/70," Box 2162, RG 59: General Records of the Department of State—Central Foreign Policy Files, NARA II.

[66] Telegram, U.S. Embassy Ottawa to Secretary of State, "Mock Invasion of US By Protesters in British Columbia Due Saturday May 9," May 8, 1970 and Telegram, U.S. Embassy Ottawa to Secretary of

Two days after the Cambodia announcement, the West Berlin May Day demonstration organized by APO activists amassed over 7,000 participants, marking the largest demonstration in the city in almost two years. On May 8 and 9, after the tragedies at Kent State, students at Free University in West Berlin organized a protest at U.S. Military Headquarters over the lunch hour.[67] That night, a group of 25 U.S. students held an all-night vigil in front of the Headquarters and presented the duty officer with a petition to end the war. U.S. officials reporting to the State Department stated the students "could not be in classified in any way as hippies", and, "the students made their point in a quiet and dignified manner."[68] The following day, another demonstration with an estimated 7,000 people marched through the worker district in the city's American sector to the *Amerika Haus* where a confrontation with police took place. A final demonstration in West Berlin took place on May 23, Armed Forces Day. The commemoration featured a parade by the U.S. military in the city. Both U.S. and German activists deployed along the parade route near Technical University (TU). In response, police closed TU buildings with barbed wire and controlled entry and exits. Students harassed the parade with loudspeakers blasting "The Internationale" and displayed a large picture of Mao Zedong as background for parade photos. Reports surfaced of a small number of students hurling bottles and rocks at the parade and one U.S. soldier reported injuries.[69]

State, May 8, 1970, folder, "POL 23-8/CAN/ 3/1/70," Box 2162, RG 59: General Records of the Department of State—Central Foreign Policy Files, NARA II.

[67] Telegram, U.S. Mission Berlin to Secretary of State, "Anti-US Demonstration May 8," May 8, 1970, "POL 23-8/Ger-B/3/19/70" Box 2284, RG 59: General Records of the Department of State—Central Foreign Policy Files, NARA II.

[68] Telegram, U.S. Mission Berlin to Secretary of State, "Anti-US Demonstration May 8," May 8, 1970, "POL 23-8/Ger-B/3/19/70" Box 2284, RG 59: General Records of the Department of State—Central Foreign Policy Files, NARA II.

[69] Airgram, U.S. Mission Berlin to Department of State, "May 23 Allied Forces Day Parade," May 28, 1970, "POL 23-8/Ger-B/3/19/70" Box 2284, RG 59: General Records of the Department of State—Central Foreign Policy Files, NARA II.

In Bonn, U.S. Embassy officials took several meetings with U.S. students in the month following the Cambodian Invasion and violence on U.S. college campuses. On May 6, approximately 25 U.S. students, primarily from Wesleyan College, protested at the U.S. Embassy, holding signs opposed to the war and highlighting the recent tragedy at Kent State. Hoping to speak with an embassy official on the war, they were initially informed it would be impossible. However, embassy officials relented two days later on May 8, when twelve students returned to discuss the war. A few days later, diplomats permitted students from Lehigh University in Pennsylvania to meet with the officials as well.

From both meetings, U.S. diplomatic officials reported the students were "puzzled and confused" on the war and violence, and possessed conflicting views on the nature of the war, violence, and the invasion. The officials seemed perplexed that students' concern for the loss of life among indigenous populations in Cambodia and Vietnam contrasted sharply with their defense of new left violence in the United States "to destroy social injustice in American life," causing officials to seemingly dismiss the concerns of the students as invalid.[70] However, in their final comment to the diplomatic establishment in Washington, officials in Bonn reported that while U.S. students were "confused" and "angry" over Kent State and "the further loss of human life" many displayed "maturity" and a continuing belief in the values of the U.S. Officials noted in their report the students agreed "to not involve themselves in situations while abroad which undermine the image of the U.S.," suggesting as late as 1970 the U.S. government maintained adherence to the belief all U.S. citizens abroad should abide by strict codes of behavior that minimized dissenting views in favor of official ones.[71]

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[70] Airgram, U.S. Embassy Bonn to Department of State, "American Students at Bonn Worry About Cambodia," May 15, 1970, folder, "POL 23-8/Ger-W/" Box 2314, RG 59: General Records of the Department of State—Central Foreign Policy Files, NARA II.

[71] Ibid.

In June 1970, a month after the Kent State and Jackson State tragedies, IBM Chairman Thomas Watson, Jr. testified before the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the issue of the Vietnam War. In his testimony, he summed up the prevalent feeling that now existed throughout the world on the United States and the war. Representing a U.S. business with a sizable international presence, Watson relayed the effects the continuing Vietnam War had on the company's ability to do business overseas. Watson told the committee, "our actions are losing us valuable and traditional friends in the West. We present a picture of a terribly powerful, awe-inspiring nation, unable to manage itself in a disciplined fashion." Watson recounted examples of damage done to IBM property throughout Western Europe, including having the West Berlin IBM office set on fire, windows smashed in Cologne and at a Dutch office, and receiving bomb threats at both the Paris and Amsterdam branches.[72] Overall, the overseas demonstrations following Kent State and Jackson State were far angrier and reflected a frustration at the war's continuation. Students were confused, angry, and unsure how long the war might endure, and what the lasting effects of this turn of events might have on long-term U.S. credibility among the global public.

Vietnam, Love It or Leave It: Overseas Americans and the NLF

In late 1969, Nixon administration and military strategists implemented "Vietnamization." The plan called for reducing the number of U.S. soldiers on the ground in Vietnam, and gradually allowing the South Vietnamese Army to assume responsibility for the war. It also included a saturation bombing campaign to provide cover for South Vietnamese ground fighters, cripple the North Vietnamese infrastructure, and raise questions among DRV officials as to the extent Nixon and the U.S. military

[72] Statement, IBM Chairman Thomas Watson before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, June 2, 1970, Box 2, Series MSS M88-202 (Unprocessed Accretion, Paris American Committee to Stop War (PACS) Records, WHS.

establishment might go to win the war or force a favorable peace treaty. It was also hoped this course might minimize U.S. causalities of the war, neuter the antiwar movement, and prolong support for the war in some quarters of U.S. public opinion.[73]

This phase of saturation and indiscriminate bombing of North Vietnam brought many U.S. citizen-peace activists into the political orbit of the National Liberation Front and representatives of the North Vietnam government. U.S. citizens had traveled to North Vietnam throughout the course of the war to express solidarity, challenge the U.S. government's assumptions of the war and the Vietnamese people, and flout taboos opposing interaction with the enemy.[74] Since Western European governments and people were not involved in the war, and in many cases opposed it, the presence of Vietnamese nationals within their borders was not unusual. For Americans in Europe, the "enemy's" presence on street corners, in auditoriums, or in coffee shops offered ample opportunities to meet with and discuss the war with Vietnamese people and their representatives.

When the expatriate community first mobilized against the war, rank and file members approached NLF representatives with caution. When the U.S. expatriate community in West Berlin held an art auction and donated the proceeds to a NLF front group without any restrictions like directing the funds to be used only for medical supplies, many Americans in the organization were angered.[75] *Stop It* members in London worried association constituted treason given the legal codes and social stigma.

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[73] On President Nixon's approach to the Vietnam War: Kimball, *Nixon's Vietnam War*, passim; Lawrence, *The Vietnam War,* 145-147; Wells, *The War Within*, 417-420; Small, *Johnson, Nixon, and the Doves*, 162-192; Young, *The Vietnam Wars*, 240; Prados, *Vietnam,* 537-538; Small, *The Presidency of Richard Nixon*, passim.

[74] On Americans who traveled to Vietnam during the War see, Judy Tzu-Chun Wu, *Radicals on the Road: Internationalism, Orientalism, and Feminism During the Vietnam Era* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2013); Mary Hershberger, *Traveling to Vietnam: American Peace Activists and the War* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1998); James W. Clinton, *The Loyal Opposition: Americans in North Vietnam, 1965-1972* (Boulder: University of Colorado Press, 1995).

[75] Klimke, *The Other Alliance,* 83.

At *Stop It's* Angry Arts Week in June 1967, the British Vietnam Solidarity Committee (VSC), an organization with direct ties to the NLF and outspoken support for their politics, wanted to sell NLF propaganda as well as leaflets on the recent war crimes tribunal in Stockholm. *Stop It* refused, believing association might discredit their efforts and invite allegations of treason.[76] Within months, especially in the aftermath of the Tet Offensive, such associations receded as *Stop It* sent a telegram to the NLF expressing sympathy "in their struggle against our government's imperialist policies."[77] Such a shift likely derived from the new interests among antiwar activists throughout the world in national liberation movements, and the belief the Tet Offensive changed the context of the war and legitimated the NLF as a political and military force that the U.S. government should engage in negotiations.

France's large population of U.S. expatriates, along with its past colonial relationship with Vietnam, allowed sympathetic political agendas to come into frequent contact. PACS meetings and events featured close collaboration with Vietnamese people as historian Bethany Kennan has noted, for both solidarity and educational purposes.[78] PACS invited Vietnamese speakers and students to events like their Fourth of July gatherings where they paired the celebration of the American Revolution with the aspirations of the Vietnamese people for independence.[79] NLF officials in France

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[76] Robert Hurwitt, "Stop It Gets Started," *Peace News*, December 29, 1967, Folder, " 202—activities of American Vietnam Deserters," Box 202, Archief Ton Regtien, International Institute of Social History, Amsterdam, Netherlands (hereafter, IISH).

[77] Press Release, "Stop It Supports NLF," February 1968, Microfilm, Reel #3, Paris American Committee to Stop War Records, WHS.

[78] Bethany S. Keenan, 'At the Crossroads of World Attitudes and Reaction': The Paris American Committee to Stopwar and American Anti-war Activism in France, 1966–1968, *Journal of Transatlantic Studies*, 11:1 (2013), 65.

[79] Letter, Maria Jolas to Gloria Jones, July 1, 1968, folder 5, box 87 (87.5), James Jones Papers, HRC.

reciprocated, inviting PACS members to participate in Vietnamese cultural events, parades, and sponsored meetings.[80]

Additionally, many Americans overseas expressed solidarity by unfurling NLF flags at demonstrations in Paris and West Berlin. One demonstration in late June 1967, organized by German leftist groups against U.S. policy in Vietnam, had between 2,500 and 4,000 participants. The crowd included American students who advertised their presence with banners and signs. The U.S. Mission reported to its superiors in Washington the press covering the event made unconfirmed reports that some of the Americans carried NLF flags.[81] For the U.S. government, and citizens who regarded the expatriate community as suspect, the appearance of the enemy's banner reaffirmed what they already believed—that the expats had probably been duped and worked closely with communists to ferment discord within the U.S. Emphasizing the flags and attributing them to the American presence at the demonstration offered a way for government officials to try and build a case that further discredited antiwar dissent, especially opposition from expatriate Americans.

Yet within the context of the stateside, overseas, and international radicalization of antiwar criticism and tactics, the significance of expats carrying NLF flags might have multiple interpretations given its value as a prop within a performance of street politics. Since the U.S. Campaign, the most widely identified antiwar expat group in West Berlin, had been associated with an American flag and generated controversy with its use, it is possible the leadership also understood the publicity an NLF flag might attract. The NLF flag had made sporadic appearances at demonstrations in the United States by 1967, and often garnered mention in the press coverage of antiwar demonstrations. Thus, the flag

[80] Keenan, "'At the Crossroads of World Attitudes," 65.

[81] Telegram, American Mission Berlin to Secretary of State, "Demonstration Against US Policy in Vietnam," June 24, 1967, folder, "POL 23-8/Ger W/ 6/1/67," Box 2133, RG 59: General Records of the Department of State—Central Foreign Policy Files, NARA II.

might have provided expats a way to remain within the public's view. In addition, the NLF flag, like the U.S. flag, conveyed messages to multiple audiences. To the rapidly radicalizing left in West Germany and throughout Western Europe, the flag might have been an attempt to communicate sympathies and solidarity with them and the Vietcong. Finally, as historian Jeremy Varon has noted with regard to the appearance of the flag at stateside demonstrations, some antiwar activists believed it conveyed a revolutionary solidarity with the NLF, and tried to locate the revolutionary efforts of the NLF within the same traditions of the United States.[82]

With growing displays of solidarity, exchanges with the NLF offered a way for expats to remain relevant in the antiwar movement's culture and fulfill a purpose as a conduit to transmit information to stateside activists. U.S. expatriates provided the NLF an opportunity to communicate their messages and propaganda to the U.S. without the interference of the U.S. government and media. During the 1967 Stop the Draft Week Protests, a Vietnamese delegation passed PACS a ten page communiqué announcing the formation of the South Vietnam People's Committee for Solidarity with the American People, and asked the expats to type and forward it to U.S. activists.[83] The communiqué denounced the war and its effects on the Vietnamese people as an act of imperialist aggression, and placed the U.S. antiwar movement alongside the Vietnamese efforts to combat this imperialism as a single front dedicated to the same purpose. The manifesto continued heaping praise on the U.S. antiwar activists and constantly appealed to their

[82] Jeremy Varon, "Crazy for the Red, White, and Blue, and Yellow The Use of the NLF Flag in the American Movement Against the Vietnam War," in Benjamin Ziemann, ed., *Peace Movements in Western Europe, Japan and the U.S. During the Cold War* (Essen: Klartext, 2008), 235-250.

[83] Appeal, South Vietnam People's Committee for Solidarity with American People, October 20, 1967, folder, "Special Correspondence re October 21, 1967 Demonstrations," Box 3, Records of National Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam, Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Philadelphia, PA (Hereafter, SCPC).

"traditional love for genuine freedom and democracy." PACS dutifully typed the memo and sent it to contacts in the United States.[84]

In early 1969, Harry Pincus christened a new organization, the "Union of American Exiles in Britain," (UAEB) with men who found themselves on the wrong side of draft and desertion laws.[85] Pincus's charm and contacts proved useful in arranging meetings with other world leaders that helped elevate the reputation of the "wee group," as Pincus referred to them as in correspondence, in the eyes of stateside activists. Shortly after UAEB's formation, Pincus worked with Hetty Vorhaus, the British Communist and wife of filmmaker Bernard Vorhaus, to arrange a meeting between UAEB exiles and Nguyen Thi Binh.

Madam Binh, a NLF diplomat, was in London to meet with members of the British Parliament.[86] Binh represented the National Liberation Front's interests at peace negotiations in Paris, despite the U.S.'s unwillingness to allow them to participate formally.[87] With the onset of the peace negotiations, Binh undertook a campaign to convert global public opinion to the NLF's cause, what historian Robert Brigham has termed, "fighting while negotiating."[88] While the NLF continued to fight, NLF diplomats showcased the organization as a "pragmatic" and "less revolutionary" to present a "human face to the sufferings of the Vietnamese people." [89] Delegitimized in the west,

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[84] Ibid.

[85] Newsletter, *The American Exile in Britain*, volume 1, 5 March 1969, folder, "Correspondence, 1970, n.d. (ca. 1960s-1972)" Box 6, Alice and Staughton Lynd Papers, SCPC; Letter, Harry Pincus, et. al. to Devi Prasad, March 2, 1969, folder, "Union of American Exiles in Britain, 1969-1973" (XV), box 303, WRI archives, IISH.

[86] George Clark. "MPs hear Mrs. Binh." *Times* (London) 6 Mar. 1969, p. 6; Vorhaus, *Saved from Oblivion,* 137.

[87] Robert Brigham, *Guerilla Diplomacy: The NLF's Foreign Relations and the Vietnam War* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999), 90-91.

[88] Ibid., 94-112.

[89] Ibid., 90-91.

and portrayed as ruthless and revolutionary by western leaders and media over the past decade, the NLF wanted to circumvent normal channels to ensure their message about fighting for independence and the impact of the U.S.'s military campaign reached and possibly shaped global public opinion about the war.

Through translators, Binh and the Americans exchanged assessments of the war and ways they might mutually support their common agenda of ending it. Madam Binh reported progress at the peace negotiations remained slow. She expressed solidarity with the group, noted that as Americans they understood the position of the NLF very well, and relayed that the South Vietnamese people harbored no ill will against the American people. She used the meeting to defend the continued shooting down of American pilots and holding them as POWs, conveying to the sympathetic Americans assembled that the Vietnamese people would continue to defend their country and fight until they achieved independence. UAEB members asked what actions might help the Vietnamese people's cause; Binh expressed support for draft resistance and urged them to take her message to the American people.[90]

Cooperation with the NLF burnished expatriates' bona fide credentials as revolutionaries and activists within the broader U.S. peace movement, despite decidedly middle and upper class affiliations. Associating with NLF officials allowed them to claim the mantle of "revolutionary," not unlike past generations of Americans who fought in the Abraham Lincoln Brigade in the 1930s, or went to Cuba in the late 1950s to fight in Castro's units, or any of the other global revolutionaries who combated U.S. imperialism. The meeting with Madam Binh fit with Pincus's modus operandi that he often exhibited at the helm of the *Stop It Committee,* specifically his use of theatrics to maximize public exposure. Upon learning that Michael Ferber, one of the Boston Five indicted for aiding

[90] "Draft Resisters Meet with Madam Binh," *The American Exile in Britain*, no. 2, 16 April 1969, folder, "Correspondence, 1970, n.d. (ca. 1960s-1972)" Box 6, Alice and Staughton Lynd Papers, SCPC.

draft resisters, and Staughton Lynd were working on a book on the resistance movement (later published as *The Resistance*), Pincus sent them a dossier that included copies of the UAEB's newsletter with detailed accounts of the British group's recent activities including a reprint of the interview with Madam Binh.[91]

Similarly, after the French government ordered PACS disbanded, Maria Jolas channeled her antiwar activism into working directly with the National Liberation Front.[92] With connections to NLF members, Jolas became known within the antiwar movement as the American in Paris whom the NLF trusted.[93] She personally served as a conduit between U.S. activists and Vietnamese people in France. As U.S. citizens passed through Paris, they contacted Jolas with requests for assistance on a variety of independent projects such as documentaries, feature articles, and book manuscripts that wanted to include perspectives of Vietnamese officials.[94] Jolas wrote extensively to U.S. activists and intellectuals against the war, informing them of the feelings and ideas of the NLF in France, and passed along clippings from U.S. newspapers she translated into

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[91] Letter, Harry Pincus to Michael Ferber, November 13, 1969, folder, "Correspondence, 1970, n.d. (ca. 1960s-1972)" Box 6, Alice and Staughton Lynd Papers, SCPC.

[92] Letter, Delegation du Front National de Liberation du Sud Vietnam (NLF delegation to the Paris Peace Conference) to Maria Jolas, March 6, 1969, folder, "untitled folder," Box 13, series M88-202, Paris American Committee to Stop War Records, WHS; Letter, Maria Jolas to Nick Biel, May 1972, folder, "'B' General Correspondence, 1939-1980," Box 28, Eugene and Maria Jolas Papers. General Collection, Beinecke Rare Book and Manuscript Library (Hereafter, Beinecke).

[93] Chips Sowerwine to Cora Weiss, April 24, 1972, folder, "1972, January-June," Box 6, series M88-202, Paris American Committee to Stop War Records, WHS; Tom Hayes to Maria Jolas, August 26, 1969, folder, "envelope--politics," Box 13, series M88-202, Paris American Committee to Stop War Records, WHS.

[94] Corliss Lamont to Maria Jolas, August 5, 1969, folder, "envelope--politics," Box 13, series M88-202, Paris American Committee to Stop War Records, WHS; Chips Sowerwine to Cora Weiss, April 24, 1972, folder, "1972, January-June," Box 6, series M88-202, Paris American Committee to Stop War Records, WHS; Maria Jolas to Cyrus Eaton, March 20, 1972, folder, "1972, January-June," Box 6, series M88-202, Paris American Committee to Stop War Records, WHS; Letter, Delegation du Front National de Liberation du Sud Vietnam (NLF delegation to the Paris Peace Conference) to Maria Jolas, March 6, 1969, folder, "untitled folder," Box 13, series M88-202, Paris American Committee to Stop War Records, WHS.

French for the NLF.[95] In letters to antiwar colleagues, Jolas defended her motivation to work closely with the National Liberation Front was borne out of a deep respect for their desire for national independence, a desire she claimed to understand as an American.[96]

On May 8, 1972, President Nixon delivered a national address on the subject of Vietnam where he once again justified continuing and expanding the war. In his speech, Nixon referenced the recent offensive undertaken by the North Vietnamese Army, and declared the "international outlaws" in North Vietnam must be denied access to weapons. He announced the U.S. would mine Haiphong Harbor to deprive North Vietnamese people of essential supplies and undertake an intense bombing campaign of targets, which many war critics believed had questionable military value.[97] Known as "Operation Linebacker" the actions shocked many critics of the war, who hoped the upcoming presidential election might generate a willingness of the administration to settle the war once and for all and uphold promises made four years earlier. However, like Nixon's speech two years earlier when announcing the U.S. invasion of Cambodia, it appeared the president chose to expand the war rather than bring it to an end.

After the bombing commenced, a DRV delegation gave Maria Jolas several photographs of the bombing damage around Haiphong. The photographs showed wounded women and children as well as widespread damage to schools, a fishing cannery, and a housing project.[98] In a letter to friend, playwright, and former PACS

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[95] Letter, Noam Chomsky to Maria Jolas, November 19, 1972, folder, "Chomsky, Noam 1970-1979, "Box 29, Eugene and Maria Jolas Papers. General Collection, Beinecke. Letter, Maria Jolas to Nick Biel, May 1972, folder, "'B' General Correspondence, 1939-1980," Box 28, Eugene and Maria Jolas Papers. General Collection, Beinecke.

[96] Maria Jolas to Cyrus Eaton, March 20, 1972, folder, "1972, January-June," Box 6, series M88-202, Paris American Committee to Stop War Records, WHS.

[97] Richard Nixon: "Address to the Nation on the Situation in Southeast Asia.," May 8, 1972. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=3404.

[98] Letter, Maria Jolas to Nick Biel, May 1972, folder, "'B' General Correspondence, 1939-1980," Box 28, Eugene and Maria Jolas Papers. General Collection, Beinecke.

associate Nicholas Biel, Jolas expressed exasperation that such photos were rarely shown in the United States, and asked rhetorically what might be done "to crack the hard shell of American ethnocentrism," and end the "criminal war." In her letter, she reports that she passed the photographs onto Max Palevesky, an American entrepreneur and supporter of Senator George McGovern, that year's Democratic Party standard-bearer, and asked that he show the photos to the presidential candidate.

In addition to the damage wrought by the U.S. bombing, many expats used their position and contacts to raise awareness of the excessive human rights violations in South Vietnam by the U.S.-backed Nguyen Van Thieu regime. Thieu's tactics of torture were well publicized among the antiwar public, including how the regime imprisoned political opponents in "tiger cages" in an old colonial prison. As such, replica cages were incorporated into many antiwar protests in U.S. during the early 1970s.[99] Working with Amnesty International, passionate expats, like their stateside colleagues, used the tiger cages as a symbol to expose the U.S. government's claims of defending democracy in South Vietnam as patently false. Maria Jolas, in trying to raise money for the cause, informed author James Jones that "the entire effective opposition [in South Vietnam] is in prison—over 200,000 (according to Amnesty international) estimate."[100] For Jolas, speaking out on the war and working with the NLF offered a way to give voice to Vietnamese people silenced during the war.

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[99] Wells, *The War Within*, 456-457, 574-575; Nancy Zaroulis and Gerald Sullivan, *Who Spoke Up?: American Protests Against the War in Vietnam* (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Wilson, 1984), 404-405; Charles DeBenedetti, *An American Ordeal: the Anti-War Movement of the Vietnam Era* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1990), 313-314. On a personal experience of surviving the Tiger Cage and torture under the Thieu regime see, Christian G. Appy, *Patriots: The Vietnam War Remembered From All Sides* (New York: Viking Press, 2003), 228-231; Keys, *Reclaiming American Virtue*, 135-140.

[100] Note, Maria Jolas to James Jones, 1972, folder 5 box 22 (22.5), James Jones Papers, HRC; Letter, Maria Jolas to Gloria and James Jones, December 1, 1971, folder 20, box 95 (95.20), James Jones Papers, HRC.

Yet, doing so exacerbated tensions within the U.S. expatriate community as the war ended. In early 1973, a few months after the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam, Jolas hosted Ly Van Sau, a Vietnamese poet and spokesperson for the NLF. In addition, she invited several prominent U.S. expats in Paris to her house to meet the guest, including Gloria Jones, wife of author James. She, however, deliberately omitted him. Jolas later claimed Ly had asked her to not invite anyone from the "writing fraternity" he did not know to assure the meeting would remain off the record.[101] Additionally, she perceived James to be less interested in antiwar causes than his wife.[102] Nonetheless, both Gloria and James attended the party.

The breach of etiquette infuriated Jolas. After learning Jones had just toured South Vietnam for a planned *New York Times* piece, she became incensed.[103] Confronting Jones in a letter, she claimed her NLF sources informed her only pro-Thieu journalists were given visas to enter South Vietnam. Accusing him of being an apologist for Thieu, she believed Jones planned to whitewash the regime in the forthcoming article, and only attended the party to surreptitiously obtain quotes from Ly to use in the story. Amid her anger, she asked him not to use any information obtained at the party in his story.[104] Responding to her accusations, Jones angrily described Jolas as "self-righteous" and possessing an attitude of "moral superiority." He wrote, "I am not pro-Thieu, not pro-war, not pro-political prisoners, not pro-political oppression, not pro-torture. And I am not any of these last four whether they are done by North Vietnam, South Vietnam, the

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[101] Letters exchanged between Maria Jolas and James Jones, May 14, 1973 and Jones Response May 17, 1973, Unprocessed accretion, M88-202, Box 8, Paris American Committee to Stop War Files, WHS. Copies are also found in folder 8, box 99 (99.8), James Jones Papers, HRC.

[102] Ibid.

[103] For the piece Jones wrote about his travels to Vietnam see, James Jones, "In the Shadow of Peace: A Novelist's First Journey to Vietnam," June 10, 1973, *New York Times,* p. 273.

[104] Letters exchanged between Maria Jolas and James Jones, May 14, 1973 and Jones Response May 17, 1973, Unprocessed accretion, M88-202, Box 8, Paris American Committee to Stop War Files, WHS. Copies are also found in folder 8, box 99 (99.8), James Jones Papers, HRC.

US, China, or Russia." In closing, he noted the meeting yielded nothing of interest, but refused to promise not to print anything.[105]

While the exchange reflected a longstanding personal hostility between two expatriates who moved in the U.S. antiwar circles in Paris, Jones' comments underscores a popular criticism of the antiwar left that their human rights concerns lacked consistency and authenticity. Jones's criticism of Jolas and others who closely worked with the NLF was not borne out of a belief she was disloyal or treasonous, but rather a broader interpretation of human rights advocacy that opposed torture no matter which state, regime, or organization was a fault. It echoed the comments Heinz Norden made at the My Lai event in 1970. Inconsistency across the political spectrum opened antiwar activists to allegations of being naïve or dupes, a criticism that deflected public attention away from the message.

For Jolas, Pincus, and others who worked closely with the NLF to highlight the human rights violations of the Thieu regime, the distinction was clear: not all violations of basic human rights were equal. Highlighting the egregious conduct of the Thieu regime, the U.S.'s ally in South Vietnam, exposed the fundamental contradiction between the U.S. government's claim to be fighting for democracy and credibility in South Vietnam while a borderline totalitarian regime terrorized its own people. In essence, the human rights violations of Thieu were more substantial in their mind, as it threatened the U.S.'s international reputation as the defender of basic human rights outlined thirty years earlier in the "Four Freedoms." For them, the U.S.'s exceptional status made the difference.

[105] Ibid.

Conclusion

In October 1972, just weeks before the U.S. presidential election, U.S. National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger, who had been secretly negotiating with his North Vietnamese counterpart Le Duc Tho, declared "peace is at hand." His declaration was premature. Peace would not arrive for another 12 weeks. In the interim, some of the most intense bombing of the war occurred over the Christmas holiday, a time usually reserved for a bombing suspension. The declaration of Dr. Kissinger with the ramped up bombing produced a cognitive disconnect that proved difficult for many in the general public to understand and provided the final mobilization against the war.[106] The intensity of the bombing, and its timing, provoked an intense global backlash toward the Nixon administration.[107]

In meeting and working with the DRV government, the actions of Pincus, Norden, Jolas, and others overseas activists seemingly confirms a particular post-Vietnam War fantasy found in many revisionist histories. The common image is a wine-swilling liberal American citizens cavorting with the country's enemy at cocktail parties, while the sons of America's working class fought in the jungles of Vietnam. Such encounters between U.S. and Vietnamese people, whether on the streets of London, apartments in Paris, or in offices in Hanoi, unsettled Americans who supported the war, and people after the war who tried to understand how the U.S. lost the war.

However, such an interpretation derives from a cursory interpretation as to the significance of such meetings. Believing such encounters doomed the war effort ignores the statements and intentions of the participants, the determination of the Vietnamese people, as well as the state of U.S. and international public opinion on the war after 1968.

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[106] Prados, *Vietnam,* 503-509; Young, *The Vietnam Wars*, 272-280

[107] Robert J. McMahon, "The Politics and Geopolitics of American Troop Withdrawals from Vietnam," *Diplomatic History*, 34:3 (June 2010), 471-483; Prados, *Vietnam,* 513-514; Young, *The Vietnam Wars*, 279-280; Wells, *The War Within*, 563-569.

Rather than summarily dismissing encounters like Norden's and others with international activists, including representatives of the NLF and the DRV, such meetings advanced the antiwar agendas of both participants, and shaped expatriates' attitudes of their homeland and its commitment to postwar ideals of human rights.[108]

As the war ended, the debate over human rights after the war turned to the U.S.'s own citizens who often used the same rhetoric to justify repatriation. Tens of thousands draft resisters and military lived in a citizenship limbo at the war's end, wondering if they might be able to return to the U.S., and actively debating within their circles whether they wanted to do so.[109] Nixon's re-election and his administration's hardline stance on the issue did not seem to bode well for the exiles, who launched a campaign for universal, unconditional amnesty that finally succeeded in early 1977.[110]

[108] Keys, *Reclaiming American Virtue*, 127-152.

[109] Letter, Roger Williams to Jack Colhoun, December 30, 1971, folder 1, Box 4, AMEX/Canada Records, Wisconsin Historical Society, Madison, Wisconsin.

[110] Memo, "February 22, 1973 9:00 meeting," folder, "9 am meetings—Issues (3)," Box A128, Melvin Laird Papers, Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library, Ann Arbor, MI.

CONCLUSION
DISSENT, NATIONAL SECURITY, AND THE U.S. CITZEN ABROAD

In the final days of the 1992 Presidential campaign, President George H.W. Bush revived the echoes of the Vietnam War as a way to challenge Governor Bill Clinton's worthiness to lead the nation as commander-in-chief. In a speech delivered in Auburn Hills, Michigan, President Bush stated:

> You know my differences with him on organizing demonstrations. Look, people objected to the war. But I make a distinction: When your brothers or your peers are in a jail in Hanoi, or kids are being drafted out of the ghetto to go into that war that was not a popular war, I simply think it is wrong to go to a foreign country and organize demonstrations against the United States of America. And that's what he did.[1]

Bush's comment demonstrated the resonance of the "antiwar expatriate" in U.S. political culture. The President's remark reflected the revisionist narrative of the Vietnam War, a narrative that blamed the antiwar movement, liberals, the media, and others who failed to support the U.S. military mission in Vietnam for the U.S. defeat. It is a narrative that has often been deployed for political gain.[2] Long-ingrained notions about Americans who spent time abroad further aided Bush's characterization of Clinton. These beliefs and images of the suspicious American abroad were already familiar and readily accepted within Bush's generation, and those individuals slightly younger, who experienced the early years of the Cold War.

Not since Henry James's criticism of U.S. imperialism during the Spanish American War and his renouncing of U.S. citizenship with the onset of the First World War had U.S. citizens overseas received as much attention and publicity for commenting on U.S. foreign policy as they did during the Vietnam War. The vast unpopularity of the

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[1] *Public Papers of the Presidents: George H.W. Bush, 1992-1993,* vol. 2 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1993), 2127.

[2] On the antiwar demonstration in popular postwar memory, see H. Bruce Franklin, *Vietnam and Other American Fantasies* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2000), 47-50; Gerald Lembcke, *The Spitting Image: Myth, Memory, and the Legacy of the Vietnam War* (New York and London: New York University Press, 1998), passim; Christian G. Appy, *Working Class War: American Combat Soldiers in Vietnam* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1993), 298-308.

war and the fact that the U.S. possessed a highly mobile and dispersed population after 1945 enabled many overseas citizens would gravitate to the antiwar camp. Expatriates found ways to contribute to the growing protests and discontentment over the war, despite distance, internal discord, and efforts by the U.S. government and its allies to curtail expressions of dissent.

The concerns of the U.S. government over expatriate protests, and the efforts they deployed to restrain them, suggests this manifestation of antiwar dissent particularly challenged policymakers. For them, it subverted official justifications for the war, especially its claims that U.S. national security was at stake in Vietnam. As it had been during the period of McCarthyism, the constant mobilization for war unleashed the Johnson and Nixon administrations' potential for harassment and stirred discord among dissenters. Their ability to direct this operation toward the protests of overseas Americans reveals few boundaries to the national security state by the 1960s, as it stretched across the U.S.'s transatlantic empire.

Despite the U.S. government's efforts to stifle the dissent of citizens abroad, expats who registered opposition to the Vietnam War contributed to the broader antiwar movement and the nature of foreign policy dissent in several ways. Expatriates, through their daily lived experiences and personal encounters, understood the fallacy of claims U.S. national security, and that of the free world, was at stake in Vietnam. This rhetoric pushed the U.S. government and its citizens to think critically about the meaning and implication of "national security," apart from the associations U.S. policymakers conferred onto it. At the same time, the activism of this group composed of progressive castoffs and cosmopolitan adventurers, who adhered to an older vision of internationalism ascendant during the Second World War, reminded Americans of the necessity of remaining involved in world affairs and of the dangers posed by wholesale retreat.

After the war, concern for setting an example was channeled into issues expats believed might rehabilitate the U.S.'s reputation, specifically support for global human rights. Group '68 refashioned itself after the war into "Concerned Americans Abroad" (CAA) and continued to host events, gatherings, and roundtables on a variety of foreign affairs topics for the expatriate community. The call for protecting and extending human rights was also used by the tens of thousands of U.S. military deserters and draft resisters in their campaign for amnesty and repatriation.[3] Coordinators of the campaign, including Jack Colhoun, Dee Knight, and Joseph Jones with AMEX/Canada, and Fritz Efaw, who headed the Union of American Exiles in Britain after Harry Pincus's return to the U.S. in 1971, blended a vision of national greatness and belonging with human rights rhetoric to advocate for "universal, unconditional amnesty." They argued their dissent was patriotic and they were vindicated by the war's inhumanity, which was not in the national character. The amnesty campaign aimed at inclusiveness. Exiles wanted amnesty extended not only to the middle-class draft resister, but also to the working and lower class military deserter, as well as the Vietnam-era servicemen who had received other than honorable discharges. The amnesty fight, while ultimately successful, was among one of the first sites where the memory of the war was contested, and may have further compounded the image of the "American abroad" as an unsavory and dubious character in the aftermath of the war.

The struggle over the political and cultural narrative in the United States regarding the Vietnam War led some to conflate recollections of overseas displays of dissent with ideas of "treason," and such characterizations were used in subsequent debates over U.S. foreign policy and national security. The appropriateness of Tommy Smith and John Carlos's black-gloved, raised fist salute on the medal podium at the 1968

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[3] John Hagan, *Northern Passage: American Vietnam War Resisters in Canada* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001), 99-137.

Olympic Games in Mexico City is still debated, given the context and the fact they were "representing the U.S." at an international venue. Many have assumed Carlos and Smith were displaying a "black power salute," when in fact they were demonstrating support for the Olympic Project for Human Rights.[4] Jane Fonda remains detested in many veterans' circles for her July 1972 visit to Hanoi.[5] However, historian Mary Hershberger notes veterans' groups helped manufacture this outrage in the aftermath of her visit. In fact, National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger invited Fonda to the White House following her return to debrief the administration on her travels. Such characterizations of these, and similar events, as treason or "un-American" are stripped of their complexities and distilled into a usable package without nuance for public consumption and political gratification.

Future scholars will have to examine how this image of the disloyal expat was further refined, transformed, and deployed in post-Vietnam War foreign policy debates. It seemed to still possess some currency among the American population, as late as 1992 as President George H.W. Bush's comment on the campaign trail suggests. In that instance, while it revived some of the older debates over the Vietnam War, the allegations seemed to have little steam, and Clinton won the election. Dissent, both domestically and internationally, was muted during the Persian Gulf War (1991), and a cursory investigation of newspaper records of the time suggests no coordinated expatriate dissent

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[4] Barbara J. Keys, *Reclaiming American Virtue: The Human Rights Revolution of the 1970s* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2014), 37; Douglas Hartmann, *Race, Culture, and the Revolt of the Black Athlete: The 1968 Olympic Protests and Their Aftermath* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), 159-162.

[5] Mary Hershberger, *Traveling to Vietnam: American Peace Activists and the War* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1998), xx; Mary Hershberger, "Peace Work, War Myths: Jane Fonda and the Antiwar Movement." *Peace & Change* 29:3‐4 (2004): 549-579; Gerald Lembcke, *Hanoi Jane: War, Sex, and Fantasies of Betrayal* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2010).

campaigns. As more records and information become available, and study of post-Vietnam War conflicts come into focus, it may be interesting to examine the continuity or absence of expatriate protests after the Vietnam War, and what, if any, claims they made about the nature of U.S. national security.

With more U.S. citizens spending time overseas at the dawn of the twenty-first century, historians can consider how this population encountered, contested, and accepted official definitions of national security in the aftermath of September 11, 2001 as well as before and during the Iraq War. It is possible that the rapid rise of technology over the past two decades allows dissenters a much larger, even global audience, and makes the location where a person expresses opposition or comments on foreign and domestic policies matter less than in past eras. However, anecdotal evidence from the run-up to the Iraq War suggests location and audience may still be a factor in shaping the public's understanding and characterization of dissent. In February 2003, Olympic skier Bode Miller voiced concerns over the coming Iraq War while at the World Alpine Skiing Championship in Switzerland. There he claimed, "I do a much better job representing the U.S. than they do of me," and he noted the distinctions many Germans and Austrians made in supporting him, but also by voicing opposition to the U.S. government for the impending Iraq War.[6] Natalie Maines, the lead singer of the female country group The Dixie Chicks, encountered similar criticism. In March 2003, she announced during a London concert, "Just so you know, we're ashamed the president of the United States is from Texas."[7] As the Bush administration tried to mobilize the public for a war based on dubious intelligence and accusations they deemed to be a threat to national security,

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[6] Christopher Clarey, "U.S. Foreign View Doesn't Sit Well with U.S. Star," *New York Times*, February 14, 2003, D4.

[7] Kyle Munson, "Saddam's Angles or Proud Americans," Des Moines Register, May 8, 2003; Paul Krugman, "Channels of Influence," *New York Times*, March 25, 2003, A17.

Americans overseas once again became a topic of discussion and focal point for pro-war factions, who viewed their expressions of overseas dissent as out of bounds and detrimental to war mobilization and national security. Over the ensuing weeks both Miller and The Dixie Chicks endured public outcry and accusations of being a traitor.

Additionally, as more government documents and Justice Department memos become declassified, future historians will be better able to ascertain how the events of September 11, 2001 altered or reinforced popular and official conceptions of "national security" as both a justification for war and a reason to curtail dissent. Current political debates and world events suggest such changes reverberated into the relationship between the U.S. government, its overseas citizens, and meanings for due process.[8] Dissent, national security, and the ability of citizens to move overseas all seem to retain much of the tension that has defined it for half a century.

[8] Department of Justice White Paper, "Lawfulness of a Lethal Operation Directed Against A U.S. Citizen Who is a Senior Operational Leader of Al-Qa'ida or an Associated Force," online at: [http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/msnbc/sections/news/020413_DOJ_White_Paper.pdf] accessed February 5, 2013; Charlie Savage and Peter Baker, "Obama, in a Shift, to Limit Targets of Drone Strikes," *New York Times*, 22 May 2013.

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